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Abstract

This work seeks to understand the conditions leading the degradation of Earth in order to
discover pedagogy for restoration. The degradation of natural environments and of social
conditions is identified as a significantly anthropogenic process. This suggests that degradation
of Earth is a moral issue and thus human morality and its development are explored in depth.
Individual moral development is found to be deeply related to socialization and provides insight
into how and why we fail to live to our potential as a naturally moral species. However, through
education we can achieve a greater potential. This process cannot be scripted, but certain
elements of such pedagogy are explored as both educational processes and precursors to
education. We must help students meet their basic needs, center their own identities and
experience while simultaneously emphasizing community and relationships, and help them to
find a sense of purpose. These efforts facilitate restoration by helping students reach a physical
and emotional place that is conducive to learning and self-efficacy so that they may engage in
the project of restoration in their own way.
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Not a reading of the word alone, nor a reading only of the world, but both
together, in dialectical solidarity (Freire & Freire, 1992/1994, p.105).

Preface

The United States is a nation defined by its original sin: the genocide of
American Indians. Everything afterward is just another chapter in the fall from
grace. ... No reparation, no penance, no atonement can ever erase the eternity
of genocide. Life ever after will be forever stained by the attainment of this
“carnal knowledge.” Such an inauspicious beginning raises significant questions
about the viability of this so-called democratic experiment: Is it possible for
democracy to grow from the seeds of tyranny? Can the “good life” be built upon
the death of thousands? (Grande, 2004, p.31)

Western Washington University is built on occupied territory of the Lummi Nation. As a
student within this institution, I find myself to be complicit in the continuing process of
colonization of America. But I refuse to silently collude by ignoring inconvenient and
uncomfortable truths. Colonization is not an historic event and the oppressive, violent, tragic
and painful results of the ongoing invasion of America are plain to see for anyone who dares
look with a critical eye. They are also easily ignored. Many of us have the luxury to overlook or
even deny that people are suffering and dying at the expense of our own privilege and
ignorance. To begin a project of restoration in any other way than to acknowledge colonization
would not only be fraudulent, but demeaning of those who suffer this injustice, to those who
are targeted by oppression, and to all of those already working for restoration.
I have constantly wondered if any vision for a better world is inevitably short sighted
when imagined within the academy. As one of the great thinkers of our time, Albert Einstein
was not only concerned with theoretical physics, but was a German Jewish refugee deeply
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concerned with civil rights. Einstein suggested that we cannot solve today’s problems with the
same kind of thinking that led to these problems in the first place. Einstein explicitly suggested
that the kind of thinking in question led to use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and worried
that it would be used again.
Today we must abandon competition and secure cooperation. This must be the
central fact in all our considerations of international affairs; otherwise we face
certain disaster. Past thinking and methods did not prevent world wars. Future
thinking must prevent wars. (Einstein, 1946)
Warfare was/is much less common in hunter-gatherer societies and warfare of the scale and
magnitude that Western society has experienced likely arose with agriculture and
industrialization (Abrams, Coast Community College District, & KOCE-TV, 2002). The “past
thinking” that Einstein denounced was the dominant Western way of thinking often referred to
as Western Modern Science1 (WMS) (Ogawa, 1995).
My own work is conducted in a manner that is congruent WMS and many consider
these notions of science to be one of the many tools of domination within a system structured
to produce and communicate knowledge in ways that maintain the status quo (Horkheimer &
Adorno, 1944/2002). With this in mind, it has been said that “the master’s tools will never

1

The use of this term is intended to contextualize the notions of science within the academy and the
dominant American culture and makes implicit the fact that there are alternate systems of knowledge. To
further contextualize WMS, Pomeroy (1994) suggested a different interpretation of the acronym: White
Male Science. This term is used to emphasize the role of patriarchy and white supremacy within the
institution of Western Modern Science.
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dismantle the master’s house” (Lorde, 1984, p.110). As a Black2 lesbian feminist, Lorde (1984)
was writing about the hierarchy, oppression and relations of power within (and beyond)
feminism. Lorde suggested that the presence of such “tools of a racist patriarchy” would
undermine feminist efforts ensuring “that only the most narrow parameters of change are
possible and allowable” (Lorde, 1984).
Many interpret Lorde’s (1984) essay more generally and suggest that academia itself is
one of the master’s tools. I recognize the presence of hierarchy, power, and oppression in
academia, but that doesn’t condemn the entire institution. I think Lorde (1984) was referring to
the social relations associated with institutions such as academia rather than those institutions
in their entirety. We must be vigilant and critical of the structures we operate within and careful
that we don’t use the master’s tools in ways that support the master’s cause (oppression). If we
challenge the master’s rule and refuse to conduct ourselves according to the master’s rules, I
see no reason to suggest that we can’t fight oppression within the academy. In fact academia is
one of many fronts where we must work to bring about structural change.
However, it is problematic to presume that one could envision any utopian future from
a space in which these problems exist and deeply shape our minds. Even if this could be done
sufficiently to imagine an incremental improvement, the “timeless nature of the gap between

2

I don’t assume any Black person to be, or to identify as, African American (cf. Dead Prez I’m A African on
Let’s Get Free, Dead Prez, 2000). There may be an implication of citizenship and nationalism. The term
People of Color seems much less assuming, but I will always defer to the terms of identity, status, and
experience expressed by the authors that I cite.
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the world of our aspirations, hopes, and dreams and the world we create with our policies
practices, and every day actions” (Loeber, van Mierlo, Grin, & Leeuwis, 2007) must be
addressed and somehow bridged. Glasser (2007) offered a poem written in Egypt 4000 years
ago by a man contemplating suicide:
To whom can I speak today?
The gentle man3 [sic] has perished
The violent man [sic] has access to everybody.
To whom can I speak today?
The iniquity that smites the land
It has no end.
To whom can I speak today?
There are no righteous men [sic]
The earth is surrendered to criminals. (p.40)
The tragedy is not in the identification of iniquity, but in the loss of hope. The quote clearly
identifies the crisis as a moral one with physical manifestations realized when humans
collectively fail to live to their potential. It also illustrates that much of our modern concerns
over the future have plagued generations of humans and are not contemporary issues. Multiple
religions and world views hold that there was a time in history where our potential was more

3

I have made a deliberate attempt to use inclusive language in this work. I have quoted several historical
texts that use archaic language where the terms “man” or “mankind” are used in a plural sense which is
not gender inclusive. In each case I have used the Latin adverb sic to indicate that it is archaic language
quoted exactly as it was written. Additionally, I have decided not to directly quote any text using such
language if it was written within the past approximately thirty years because I believe that the
contemporary use of such language is inexcusable beyond the second wave of feminism. Furthermore, I
believe that even when using inclusive language, when gender and other markers of identity are not
made explicit, the white male voice dominating academia may be implicit. While generally avoiding
gender specific pronouns, I have decided to directly call attention to the claimed identities of some
authors in some contexts. I do so at the risk of causing their knowledge to be interpreted or valued
differently. This is absolutely not my intention and I hope that this decision is does not result in a sense of
tokenization of those authors. I deeply apologize if I have, at any point, misidentified any of the folks
mentioned in this paper or if I have used language that is exclusive.
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fully realized. Much of the philosophy and religion of modern Western civilization is consumed
with understanding how, when, and why we went wrong (e.g., The Fall in Christianity and
critique of the Neolithic Revolution in WMS). However, as long as we are able to recognize a gap
between the world we seek and the world we create and maintain that it can be bridged, we
have a vision for change and a source of hope.
The central question of this work is whether an academic investigation into the
dominance, oppression, and exploitation by humans over ourselves and the planet could be of
any utility. The task, within a colonized institution, on occupied territory, using the master’s
tools, to envision a future that may be unimaginable from our current vantage point, with any
hope to bridge the gap between that vision and its fruition, sounds impossible. Upon much
reflection, however, I have concluded that this is no deterrent at all. There simply is no
acceptable alternative but to attempt the project of restoration from every possible angle,
including efforts within the structures and epistemologies of domination. As Einstein concluded:
Science has brought forth this danger, but the real problem is in the minds and
hearts of men [sic]. We will not change the hearts of other men [sic] by
mechanism, but by changing our hearts and speaking bravely… When we are
clear in heart and mind - only then shall we find courage to surmount the fear
which haunts the world.
Thus, my aim, through this project is not to argue specific ideology but to investigate how we
may become clear in our hearts and minds. I aim to make what is intuitive and knowable in
every human epistemology undeniable in the epistemology of WMS. This intuitive knowledge
relates to the ways we interact with one another and with the planet. It is a need for justice as a
matter of survival. We can, will, and must achieve a greater potential if we are to remain a
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viable species on planet Earth. We face crisis, but we have not yet crossed the threshold into
oblivion. We must collectively engage in a process of restoration.
The project of restoration is fundamentally one of hope. I am deeply inspired by
accounts of rescuers who subjected themselves and their families to unimaginable risk in order
to save the lives of victims of the Holocaust (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Oliner & Oliner (1988)
described the importance of hope for those rescuers:
If we persist in defining ourselves as doomed, human nature as beyond
redemption, and social institutions as beyond reform, then we shall create a
future that will inexorably proceed in confirming this view. Rescuers refused to
see Jews4 as guilty or beyond hope and themselves as helpless, despite all the
evidence that could be marshalled to the contrary. They made a choice that
affirmed the value and meaningfulness of each life in the midst of a diabolical
social order that repeatedly denied it. Can we do otherwise? (p. 260)
Although the question is rhetorical, the answer is no. As Paulo Freire (1994) wrote, “there is no
change without dream, as there is no dream without hope” (p.91). If we believe that the task of
creating a better world is insurmountable then it will be. But if we strive to be unreasonable
people who maintain love, hope, and courage despite all reason and reality, then love, hope,
and courage become reality. Such an endeavor is a source of individual fulfillment in its own
right regardless of whether our aspirations are externally realized. For example, even when

4

I believe that the language that we use is important. I prefer the term Jewish people to Jews. Jew is not
considered to be bad word (except when it is used as a negative attribute e.g., “Jew Lawyer,” or as a verb,
e.g., “Jew the price down.” However, as part of an effort to use inclusive language, I find it important to
also use life affirming language. The term Jewish people affirms life and resists dehumanization. It’s easier
to remain disconnected when discussing “destroying Jews” because nothing about the phrase affirms life.
It could just as well be replaced with “destroying furniture.” A phrase like, “murdering Jewish people,”
makes the situation much more salient because the terms are human.
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unsuccessful the Holocaust rescuers were better able to cope with reality and maintain their
humanity even when their rescue attempts were unsuccessful. However, without the hope to
try, there would be no possibility of success at all. Thus, if there is to be any hope at all for a
better future it is the hope that we create ourselves.
The struggle for a better world cannot rest on hope alone. It must be informed by
critical understanding of what it is that is happening in the world that we find problematic,
inspired by a dream for a better world, and fueled by the knowledge that it is possible. Freire
(1992/1994) wrote,
I do not mean that, because I am hopeful, I attribute to this hope of mine the
power to transform reality all by itself, so that I set out for the fray without
taking account of concrete, material data, declaring, “my hope is enough!” No,
my hope is necessary, but it is not enough. Alone, it does not win. But, without
it, my struggle will be weak and wobbly. We need critical hope the way a fish
needs unpolluted water. (p. 8)
Philosophic considerations and theoretical critique must be critically informed of dominant
notions of reality. We can and must reject reality as enforced and defended by subjective and
dominant WMS epistemology but we can only do so by knowing that reality. A creative and
radical struggle for a better world does not become reactionary by its acknowledgement of
present conditions. If in our efforts to avoid becoming reactionary, we focus entirely on the
dream of a better world we risk ignoring the immediate and unavoidable reality (e.g., food
insecurity) of those who change is intended to benefit the most. As we dream of a better world
we have to react to consequences of this reality. The goal must be idealistic large scale
structural change, but we must simultaneously be working at an individual level for and with
those most severely targeted by oppression.
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Freire (1994) found hope to be an “existential, concrete imperative” (p.8) and an
ontological need. The concept of hope as an ontological need, as something akin to faith, and as
a theoretical or even poetic concept is beautiful and inspiring. However, the concrete necessity
of hope is cemented in reality for me by knowledge that I owe my entire existence to hope
because my paternal grandparents are Holocaust survivors. In an interview conducted by the
University of Southern California Shoah Foundation, my grandmother, Rosalie Krzesni, gave her
account of life before, during and after the war. She said that my grandfather and two aunts had
been in hiding during the war and survived with the help of Dutch rescuers (Krzesni, 1997). I
don’t know who these people were or why they did it, but the Oliners’ (1988) quote applies
regardless. For all I know the rescuers who aided in my own family’s survival could be among
those interviewed by Oliner and Oliner (1988).
My grandmother was liberated from Bergen-Belsen concentration camp by the British in
1945 (Krzesni, 1997). She stated that she believed that she had survived because she was strong
and able to work. She reports the conditions there to have been far worse than those that she
had experienced in Auschwitz. She talked about seeing thousands of dead bodies and surviving
by eating leaves from the ground. Upon liberation she immediately fainted, having contracted
typhus. My grandparents met after the war having both lost their spouses. They gave birth to
my father Holland and then immigrated to United States in 1954 (Krzesni, 1997).
My grandmother said that she decided to do the interview because it was something
that my family had not talked about. She said it had been too painful but she thought that it was
important that someone would know what happened after she was gone. In the end of her
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interview, my grandmother was asked if there was anything else that she would like to share
about her life and the Holocaust. She said, “have faith, and that is all that I can tell you” (Krzesni,
1997). Although I never talked with my grandparents about the Holocaust, I was very close with
my grandmother and she was one of the most caring, strong, stubborn, independent, and
inspiring people that I have ever known. I think that the faith and strength that she speaks of is
not only religious faith, but faith in ourselves and our ability to persevere. It is my grandmother’s
hope as well as that of the rescuers that I have carried throughout this project.
I would have likely never discovered my grandmother’s interview if my research hadn’t
led me to the Oliners’ (1988) which inspired me to investigate the testimonials of Holocaust
survivors as well as rescuers. There is something profoundly significant in my mind about finding
myself in my research. I’ve always regretted that I didn’t know much about my family history
and wished that I’d taken the opportunity to talk to her about her experience while she was
alive. I think that has been the greatest success that my efforts could have and has moved me
more than any academic investigation possibly could.
My maternal grandparents were also both deeply involved in WWII. They both grew up
working on farms in the US South. Having lost their family farm during the great depression, my
grandfather found work throughout the south as a migrant farm worker before joining the
Army. At the same time my grandmother went to work in a shipyard to support US war efforts.
Both pairs of grandparents achieved middle class status in United States after the war and thus I
have lived a life of privilege. I do feel pride in my family history and in the efforts of my
grandparents and parents to give their children a better life. But, I haven’t offered this story to
suggest that people who are the targets of oppression just need to pick themselves up by their
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bootstraps. The idiom is literally and figuratively nonsense. I know that the opportunities that
my parents and grandparents found for upward mobility are not strictly a function of their
individual merit. They were upwardly mobile in a context that was conducive to that mobility
and those opportunities were not and are not equitable- they were arbitrarily defined by a racial
hierarchy.
With the knowledge that I experience such privilege despite the fact that my ethnicity
has been targeted by oppression and genocide, I feel a sense of duty to those who continue to
be more severely targeted. I am extremely angry at the existence of such injustice. This is a
natural and important response to injustice. We should all be angry. However, we must focus
that anger and avoid becoming consumed by it. It is in anger that I dive head first and head
strong into a struggle for justice and for a better world, but it is hope that keeps me from
drowning.
I believe that the best I can do is to acknowledge the problematic context of my work,
approach it with humility, and critically hope that in the cycles of contemporaneous action and
reflection to follow, I will find a way to have a positive influence on the planet and its
inhabitants. This work is nothing more than my own process of reflection and if not coupled
with action, it will be a meaningless waste of time and money that should have been directed
elsewhere. However, my hope is that I have developed an understanding that will inform and
direct me in the work that I feel that I need to do. If my knowledge is a product of the master’s
tools, then I hope that I can repurpose that knowledge for liberation rather than domination. I
want to make it absolutely clear that this thesis is not independent of my personal values. There
is no avoiding the fact that this paper is representative of my own agenda for change. This is not
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an esoteric project aimed at understanding some obscure phenomena, but an effort to
mobilize existing knowledge in a struggle for a better world. That world, as the Zapatistas say, is
a world where many worlds fit. Thus, I have tried to leave much of the definitions of change and
of progress open ended, and focus more on how and why people engage in such efforts in order
to help more people become engaged in their own way.
I have tried to share the perspectives of scholars (both academic and nonacademic) of
different disciplines and also different ethnic, cultural, and racial backgrounds, identities and
experiences. I have tried to balance my use of empirical knowledge produced by WMS and “the
master’s tools,” with knowledge of lived experience offered by nonacademic scholars who, by
choice or circumstance, have concentrated their efforts on a close reading of the world rather
than a close reading of the word. In this effort, I have tried to directly quote, rather than
paraphrase the work of others as much as possible. Although this work is a representation my
own voice and self-conception, I have conceptualized it as a conversation between the profound
thinkers that I have had the pleasure of knowing directly or through written and recorded
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words. In this conversation, I certainly comment and moderate, but my goal is to primarily be
an active listener5.
I know that I don’t have the time, skill, or capacity, to fairly represent all of the voices
who have contributed to my understanding or to hear all of the voices that should contribute to
it. It is very important to me that I get it right (empirically and morally) because this project is a
representation of myself- more precisely, it is a representation of who I hope to be. However,
this project is unfinished and will always remain unfinished. I don’t believe that we ever get to
get it right, we only get to progress. In that sense, I hope I look back on this in ten years knowing
that it was an important step, but that I overlooked and neglected more critical questions or
explicitly had parts wrong. If I am able to say that, I will know that I have made progress in my
efforts. Finally, I want to begin this work with an apology to anyone who I misrepresent,
tokenize, fail to represent or fail to give credit to. I hope that anyone who reads this will provide
me the opportunity to understand and make amends for any such mistakes.

5

This is more aspirational than practical. One shortcoming of this method is that I have primarily selected
my own sources (with tremendous help from my advisors). Every source is filtered through my own
perceptual framework and shifted to fit my own interests and I have un/intentionally omitted ideas that
have not resonated with me. My own internal conversation could never rival the diversity of thought
offered in a genuine conversation with a distinct other. Ultimately, I do not possess anywhere near the
cognitive prowess and theory of mind to truly reflect the voices of the many brilliant thinkers that I have
cited or omitted detrimentally.

13
This final draft is only the first draft.
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Introduction
It is written in rage and love, without which there is no hope. (Freire & Freire,
1992/1994, p.10)
My interest in education is founded in belief of the fundamental role of education in
shaping society. Although I am passionate about sharing and developing knowledge and
constructing meaning as an ends of its own, it is education’s potential to catalyze social change
that compels me to aspire to be an educator. The premise of this work is that social and
ecological degradation are a single anthropogenic process. As we degrade the planet we
degrade ourselves and as we degrade ourselves we degrade the planet. I argue that since the
processes are inseparable, any activism or educational effort for the benefit of the natural
environment must deeply address social justice and any activism or education towards social
justice must significantly include the natural environment.
What we know is no more significant than the way we know it and the way we know
something is inseparable from ourselves and our environment. In order to deeply know
something tacitly rather than just memorize explicit facts- to understand something and
incorporate it into ourselves- we must experience it. We must connect our cognition, affect and
the environment in which knowledge exists. This means that knowledge has place, time, social
and emotional context and that it is conditional. I seek to understand the conditions of
knowledge that may cause degradation or support restoration. By understanding the conditions
that produce ecological and social degradation I hope to design pedagogy for restoration.
This thesis is intended to bridge the wisdom of environmental education (EE) and social
justice education (SJE) and apply ecological and social justice concepts to the broader process of
education. Neither EE nor SJE can be discrete content areas. They should be themes fully
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integrated into all facets of education and justice for the natural environment and for people
must be a primary concern in all public and private life.
1.1

Positive Approach
My work is distinctly theoretical and while empirical research reinforces many of the

concepts it is apparent that theory dominates. The potential for confirmation-bias and
overgeneralization in research based in theory is high (Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, &
Baumgardner, 1986). In order to address this, I have tried to be clear about the values and
assumptions that define this work. The central assumptions of my work are that social and
environmental degradation have and are occurring and that oppression exists. I am less
interested in providing evidence to support such realities (that I have accepted as truth), than in
understanding the conditions producing degradation and designing strategies to create a
different reality (pedagogy for restoration). I am trying to understand under what conditions
degradation prevails in order to design strategies for pedagogy for restoration. Conditionseeking and design strategies are described in Under What Conditions Does Theory Obstruct
Research Progress? (Greenwald et al., 1986).
A central assumption in this work is that ecological and social degradation are affected
anthropogenically. In the search to understand how and why degradation occurs, I will make no
prefatory attempt to catalog the myriad manifestations of the human caused ecological and
social crisis, prove that we are in a period of mass extinction, or that climate change is occurring
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much more quickly than can be explained by natural processes6. “Awareness of consequences
and information related to land use and social conflict” has been shown to affect moral
reasoning about the environment (Berenguer, 2010) and
such issues require urgent attention, [but] basic knowledge about them does
not lead us to a clear path to action, nor does it motivate participation in their
solution. Rather, such all encompassing negativity often leads to feelings of
powerlessness, apathy, guilt and disillusionment, clouding the path towards real
solutions. (Tilbury, 2007, p.124)
Advocating and analyzing the specific environmental issues that we face today is not a task to be
dismissed or trivialized. However, these issues are symptoms of larger processes that I hope to
examine. I strive to embrace both/and7 rather than either/or logic and thus believe that both
the specific environmental issues and systems of production of those issues must be addressed.
The specifics have been and are continuing to be thoroughly researched so I hope to make a
contribution through a broader treatment. For the purposes of this work acceptance (or
openness to the idea) that social and ecological degradation are significantly caused (or even
affected) by humans is sufficient.
There seems to be a common structure of argumentation that begins with a shock and
awe approach to emphasize the importance of an issue and concludes with some shred of hope.

6

For an account on the human impact on nature see Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen, and McNeill‘s (2011)
paper proposing that the human impact on Earth is so great that it rivals geologic forces and represents a
new epoch in Earth history that should be formally recognized as the anthropocene.
7
“Whenever we love justice and stand on the side of justice we refuse simplistic binaries. We refuse to
allow either/or thinking to cloud our judgment. We embrace the logic of both/and. We acknowledge the
limits of what we know” (hooks, 2003, p.10).
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This is not unlike the structure of the preface to this thesis but for the remainder of this work,
I attempt a positive approach. Harré (2011) suggested that there may be an optimal ratio
between offering positive solutions and identifying the severity of environmental problems of
between 3:1 and 6:1. Obviously this is difficult to quantify and attempts to do so have been
heavily criticized (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2013), but the point is that humans are likely to be
more motivated to solve today’s problems by positive action-oriented solutions than dwelling
on the associated threats.
There may be an evolutionary basis for a positive psychology based in our fight or flight
response (Haidt, 2006). We are evolutionarily disposed to react much more instantaneously and
intensely to immediate threats than opportunities as a necessary survival strategy, because
missing a single opportunity generally would not threaten our life, but failing to respond to a
single threat, such as a predator, would likely result in death. Our fight or flight response served
us well in the past and is important in certain situations. However, in the modern world where
threats are often abstract and persistent, we are poorly adapted for coping with sustained stress
and become easily overwhelmed by negativity (Haidt, 2006).
My position, as taken by Harré (2011), is that an understanding of the severity of a
problem is important to inspire action but too much information may lead to hopelessness and
inaction. I don’t think this is something the WMS can precisely quantify, but we can take it as a
matter of folk wisdom that we need to adaptively balance positivity and negativity and that
neither extreme is healthy (e.g., denying that any problems exist, or feeling doomed). Thus, I will
not shy away from the problems or in my critique, but neither will I intentionally sink into the
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muck of hopelessness. I am striving for a balance between critique and hope that is referred
to as critical hope.
Critical consciousness … involves not only a critical social analysis of inequities
and actions taken to achieve greater social justice, but also a sense of personal
efficacy or perceived capacity to effect change. Some people, for instance, may
be aware of systemic inequalities, but may be unlikely to take action to improve
systems unless they believe that their actions will likely be effective. The
achievement of critical consciousness therefore requires people to attain an
understanding of structural and historical forces that impinge on and constrain
collective action for social justice, yet to simultaneously maintain their hope
that—despite these forces—their own participation in justice-focused action
can be effective. (Christens, Collura, & Tahir, 2013)
The challenges that humans and the rest of the planet face are undeniable but the problems
identified in society and in education present opportunities for improvement.
Finally, in this effort to maintain a positive approach it is imperative to focus on assets,
solutions, and opportunities on the path to restoration rather than on deficits, problems, and
barriers in a fight against oppression. Often the more attention an author dedicates to
identifying a problem, the weaker their proposed solution. Much of the works I’ve studied
importantly problematize or deconstruct existing social structure, knowledge or epistemology,
but provide little direction towards solutions. A great solution doesn’t always need to be
prefaced with a long problem statement, theoretical critique, or philosophical deconstruction.
This project is about onstructive and creative pursuits focused on what could be rather than
deconstructive and overly critical accounts of reality.
1.2

Structure of document
Chapter 1 defines environmental education (EE) by establishing an historic dictate through

examining its founding documents. This exploration reveals a broader interpretation of EE
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calling for greater attention to social issues and urban environments. Additionally the
exploration reveals that EE was intended to be an approach to education reform emphasizing
participatory action in solving broadly defined environmental problems such as poverty. Next
Chapter 1 investigates the current practice of EE and the context in which EE takes place with
special attention to urban environments. The chapter concludes with a suggestion for how EE
may move forward in consideration of its historic dictate and present context. Ultimately the
chapter attempts to frame EE as the foundation for pedagogy of restoration.
Chapter 2 investigates how and why oppression happens. The chapter investigates how the
ways we discuss oppression in the work of anti-oppression may undermine our efforts. Next
various theories on oppression are examined using the Marxist critique of capitalist production
and distribution of goods as a foundation. Epistemological and ecological perspectives on the
roots of oppression are also considered. I suggest that although it may be important to consider
how and why oppression happens, it may not offer significant utility towards ending oppression.
The chapter concludes with a consideration of restoration as an opposing force to oppression.
Chapter 3 attempts to deeply understand human morality as the motivator for prosocial
and pro-environmental behavior. The chapter begins by exploring how empathy and morality
may be evolved human dispositions as well as potential pitfalls of such an approach. Next
empathy and its development are explored as precursors to morality. Next, the limitations of
empathy are examined which begins to shed light on why our empathic disposition does not
result in perfect harmony among humans. With a solid foundation in empathy, the chapter
continues by exploring human morality, how it develops, and the specific principles of rights,
caring, and justice that we may consider in the process of determining right from wrong. Next
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moral limitations and conflict are examined; specifically considering how we exclude
individuals or groups from moral consideration and differing conceptions of right and wrong.
After a brief interlude into Hip Hop’s insight on moral conflict and antisocial behavior in urban
environments, outlying behavior is discussed. The discussion of outlying behavior takes a
sympathetic approach to understanding how and why some may behave in a harmful manner
and emphasizing the role of stress and trauma. The chapter concludes by exploring how people
are triggered by certain conflicts to engage in prosocial and pro-environmental behavior and
outlines a variety of ways in which individuals are motivated. Overall, chapter 3 is about
understanding the human potential for goodness and how we are motivated to do good for one
another and for the natural environment.
Chapter 4 significantly departs from the previous chapters and attempts to detail elements
of pedagogy for restoration. I propose that pedagogy must concentrate on helping students
meet their physical and emotional needs and encourage a sense of efficacy. I suggest that
learning, growth, and morality will follow if the environment is conducive to it. This approach to
education is composed of three elements of pedagogy: pedagogy of basic needs, pedagogy of
identity, and pedagogy of purpose. Pedagogy of basic needs suggests that meeting students’
basic physiological and psychological needs is prerequisite to all educational efforts. The section
proposes that meeting students’ basic needs is morally imperative but that meeting needs can
also be incorporated into a meaningful educational experience. The section takes hunger as an
example and proposes how pedagogy of basic needs could reframe the discourse of need and
transform a classroom into a community development organization whose purpose is to
eradicate hunger. Pedagogy of identity focuses on facilitating leaning relevant to students own
experience. Pedagogy of identity is equally focused on self-concept and relationships, employing

21
multicultural education intended to honor our similarities and our differences while
emphasizing that we are all connected. Hip Hop is explored as an American urban culture
relevant to many students’ experiences with examples of how Hip Hop facilitates education.
Finally pedagogy of purpose focuses on helping students develop a sense of purpose in the
world in order to engage in their own way and on their own terms. This pedagogy explores how
sense of purpose develops and how educators can support students in that pursuit. The chapter
concludes by coming full circle by illuminating that each element of pedagogy supports and
reinforces the other. Finally, I revisit the practice of environmental education and consider how
pedagogy of restoration may inform or be informed by environmental education.
The work concludes with a demand for action.
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Chapter 1:

Environmental Education

Environmental education should promote the strengthening of peace, the
further relaxation of international tensions and mutual understanding among
States and be a real instrument for international solidarity and for elimination of
all forms of racial, political and economic discrimination. (UNESCO, 1978, p.26)
1.1

Historic Dictate of Environmental Education

To establish the foundation of this work in environmental education (EE) I examine the
foundation of EE. Although education in and about the environment has almost certainly taken
place in some form for as long as humans have, the thrust of EE field was defined in the 1970s.
The first major document was the Stockholm Declaration in 1972 which resulted from the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment which aimed to address “ the need for a
common outlook and for common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the
preservation and enhancement of the human environment” (UNEP, 1972). The Stockholm
Declaration identified an educational need which the Belgrade Charter attempted to address in
1975 (UNEP, 1975). The Belgrade Charter established the framework and guiding principles for
EE which were further developed at The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) Intergovernmental Conference on Environmental Education, held in
Tbilisi, 1977.
The officers of the Tbilisi conference commission represented USSR, Belgium, Benin,
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Thailand, Canada, India, Bulgaria,
Malaysia, Sierra Leone, United States of America, Venezuela and Tunisia (UNESCO, 1978). The
Tbilisi Declaration is a condensed summary of the conference proceedings and provides the
most commonly used definition of EE. The definition is often paraphrased and a thorough
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reading of the Final Report on the conference proceedings provides much broader
conceptions of EE than such definitions usually reflect8. The Tbilisi Declaration (1978) stated:
Environmental education, properly understood, should constitute a
comprehensive, lifelong education, one responsive to changes in a rapidlychanging world. It should prepare the individual for life through an
understanding of the major problems of the contemporary world, and the
provisions of skills and attributes needed to play a productive role towards
improving life and protecting the environment, with due regard given to ethical
values. By adopting a holistic approach, rooted in a broad, inter-disciplinary
base, it recreates an overall perspective which acknowledges the fact that
natural environment and man-made [sic] environment are profoundly interdependent. It helps reveal the enduring continuity which links the acts of today
and the consequences for tomorrow. It demonstrates the inter-dependencies
among national communities and the need for solidarity among all mankind
[sic]. ("The Tbilisi Declaration," 1978)
The focus of Environmental Education was not strictly defined to be the natural environment.
The emphasis was on the sustainability and quality of life as both a socially and ecologically
focused effort. According to the Belgrade Charter and Tbilisi Declaration, EE is about the
relationship between humans and the environment and an interdisciplinary approach rather
than a narrow ecological one.

8

A commonly used definition of EE that is attributed to the Tbilisi Declaration is:
Environmental education is a learning process that increases people's knowledge and awareness
about the environment and associated challenges, develops the necessary skills and expertise to
address the challenges, and fosters attitudes, motivations, and commitments to make informed
decisions and take responsible action. ("Environmental Education Framework : Creating an
Environment to Educate about the Environment," 2003)
Although I would not suggest that this is a misrepresentation of the Tbilisi Conference proceedings, it is
not a complete representation and neither is it a direct quote as it is sometimes presented to be.

24
Economic development is a central concern in each of the three documents. The
Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme opened the conference by
calling for the “sustained improvement of the quality of life, eradication of poverty and
equitable participation of people in the benefits of development” (UNESCO, 1978, pp. 61-62).
Environmental problems are not just those of the detrimental or irrational use
of natural resources and pollution. They include problems of
underdevelopment, such as inadequate housing and shelter, bad sanitary
conditions, malnutrition, defective management and production practices and,
more generally, all problems which stem from poverty. They also include
questions of protecting cultural and historical heritages. (UNESCO, 1978, p.11)
Thus, “poverty itself is a form of environmental degradation” (UNESCO, 1978, p.11).
Although economic development was considered imperative, “unprecedented economic
and technological progress” was recognized to bring “inevitable changes, improvements, but
also environmental hazards” (UNESCO, 1978, p.40). In fact, this conflict between human
interest, economic interest, and the well-being of the planet was the central concern of the
Stockholm Declaration. The first paragraph of the declaration stated:
Our generation has witnessed unprecedented economic growth and
technological progress which, while bringing benefits to many people, have also
caused severe social and environmental consequences. Inequality between the
poor and the rich among nations and within nations is growing; and there is
evidence of increasing deterioration of the physical environment in some forms
on a world-wide scale. This condition, although primarily caused by a relatively
small number of nations, affects all of humanity. (UNEP, 1972)
The Belgrade Charter (1975) was prefaced with a statement in direct response to the Stockholm
Declaration calling for a new international economic order,
one which takes into account the satisfaction of the needs and wants of every
citizen of the earth, of the pluralism of societies and of the balance and
harmony between humanity and the environment. What is being called for is
the eradication of the basic causes of poverty, hunger, illiteracy, pollution,
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exploitation, and domination. The previous pattern of dealing with these crucial
problems on a fragmentary basis is no longer workable. (UNEP, 1975)
In each of the three documents the emphasis is on development that protects human rights and
improves human welfare in a manner that is not destructive to the natural environment. Such a
concern for detrimental influence of economic interests on both human welfare and the natural
environment and a vision for positive development was the premise of environmental
education.
The goal of EE was to “ensure the preservation and improvement of humanity’s
potentials and develop social and individual well-being in harmony with the biophysical and
man-made [sic] environment” (UNEP, 1975). This conception of EE certainly did not arbitrarily
identify ecological degradation as an environmental issue and social concerns as separate
humanitarian ones. In fact, it was meant to bridge the two areas of concern and position the
needs of humans and the needs of the planet in congruence through a new global ethic and
educational reform (UNEP, 1975). “To improve all ecological relationships, including the
relationship of humanity with nature and people with each other” (UNEP, 1975). This new ethic
was intended to be global, but not static or universal. The relationships were meant to be
interpreted on an individual basis in accordance with cultural context.
Environmental education was not about specific learning objectives and was neither
intended to be peripheral to public education or an addendum to it. Environmental education
was meant to be reform all public education. The Belgrade Charter (1975) explicitly stated the
necessity of educational reform.
The reform of educational processes and systems is central to the building of
this new development ethic and world economic order. Governments and
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policy-makers can order changes, and new development approaches can begin
to improve the world’s condition – but all of these are no more than short-term
solutions, unless the youth of the world receives a new kind of education. This
will require new and productive relationships between students and teachers,
between schools and communities, and between the education system and
society at large. (UNEP, 1975)
The Tbilisi Declaration was largely consumed with expanding on the broad and sweeping
demands of the Belgrade Charter and began to elaborate on how exactly EE might reform
education.
Environmental education must look outward to the community. It should
involve the individual in an active, problem-solving process within the context of
specific realities and it should encourage initiative, a sense of responsibility and
commitment to build a better tomorrow. By its very nature, environmental
education can make a powerful contribution to the renovation of the
educational process. ("The Tbilisi Declaration," 1978)
The Tbilisi Declaration clearly defined EE as a community project aimed at improving the lives of
human and all living beings and a critical approach to reforming the educational process.
All three documents were much more focused on the approach to EE than the specific
practices, intuitively aware that specific application could not be context independent. Although
certainly implicit, specific ecological knowledge was not emphasized in The Tbilisi Declaration
(1978) or the preceding documents. Rather, The Tbilisi Declaration (1978) emphasized general
understanding and knowledge necessary for participation in problem solving. The UNESCO
Report envisioned an inclusive environment where
Active participation would … replace intellectual conjecture. Moreover, the
varied origin of participants, which, in conventional education might be
regarded as a difficulty, would then become an advantage, since it would be
possible to achieve the spontaneous integration of different disciplines and
different ways of thinking in a joint experience directed towards the solution of
problems. (UNESCO, 1978, p.22)
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Without explicitly using such terminology Tbilisi and Belgrade screamed for popular
educational approaches demanding reform such as integrative education, participatory action
research and critical pedagogy. In summary, “environmental education must adopt a holistic
perspective which examines the ecological, social, cultural and other aspects of particular
problems” (UNESCO, 1978, p.12).
1.2

Practice of Environmental Education
The early vision for EE detailed in the UNESCO Final Report and Tbilisi Declaration is

quite radical in its relation to the practice of EE and environmentalism today. Gruenewald (2004)
calls EE “politically sanitized” and suggests that EE should “not be content with the self-inflicted
narrowness that the adjective [environmental] inevitably conveys” (p.101). The North American
Association for Environmental Education (NAAEE) “adopts language and concepts associated
with conventional standards: grade-level performance, achievement, and effectiveness”
(Gruenewald, 2004, p.80). Alignment with conventional standards may have improved the
credibility and receptivity of EE and increased its reach and presence in mainstream education.
However by such alignment, EE may have been reformed and disciplined by conventional
education rather than reforming education as it was intended to. Gruenewald (2004) suggested
that alignment with standards and institutionalization of EE “serve to legitimize, rather than
challenge, educational practices that are problematic, that in fact create the need for
environmental education” (p.76) Such alignment of “EE with the official, high-status contentarea standards of general education has become a trendy means of legitimization, one that may
work against transforming the ecologically problematic thrust of general education”
(Gruenewald, 2004, p.80). The alignment of EE with economic values of “individualistic
competition and nationalistic success in the global economy… rather than emphasizing that EE
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calls for a new (or ancient) ecological way of knowing” (Gruenewald, 2004, p.80) may, indeed,
be a problematic thrust significantly contributing to social and ecological degradation.
The narrowness and political neutrality that Gruenewald (2004) criticizes in EE (whether
or not it is accurate) is not dictated by the Belgrade Charter or Tbilisi Declaration. The UNESCO
Report calls for EE to “consider the environment in its totality - natural and built, technological
and social (economic, political, technological, cultural-historical, moral, aesthetic)” (UNESCO,
1978, p.27). I broadly conceptualize the environment as the space in which life exists. This space
is equally subject to and constructed by ecological and social forces from climate change to gun
violence. Henceforth, I intend this broad interpretation of the term environment unless
otherwise specified. Furthermore, all education takes place in the environment, is informed by
the environment, and applies to the environment, so all education is environmental education.
Thus, my use of the term education is intended to reflect the broad process of education which
takes place inside and outside of traditional classrooms. The broad process of education
certainly includes the specific practice of EE today and concept of EE described in the UNESCO
Report.
1.3

Context of Environmental Education

The case has been made for a broad concept of EE, based on its founding documents
and as a mostly theoretical pursuit. Now I examine the social environment in which EE takes
place. Garbarino (1996) described the environment in which many people in economic poverty
live as both socially and physically toxic.
Poor children live in the kinds of socially toxic environments that generate
multiple threats to development- academic failure, child maltreatment, learning
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disabilities, and others. That is one clear meaning of being poor in America.
Interestingly, this social toxicity parallels physical toxicity; low-income
populations are more likely to be exposed to chemical and radioactive waste
and polluted air and water. (Garbarino, 1996)
I hope to make the case that EE must attend to the social as well as ecological environment
more salient using a study on environmental perceptions in a high economic poverty region in
the United States. Kahn (1999) interviewed children about their perceptions of the environment
in a school in Houston, Texas9 predominately attended by Black students (99%), where most
students received free and reduced lunch (91%) and the majority of the children were labeled as
low achieving (60% based on state tests). One student was asked a preliminary question about a
bayou that flowed within a mile of the school.
Tell me Trina, do you know what a bayou is? Yes… it’s where turtles live and the
water is green because it is polluted. People-some people need to, um, some
people are nasty. Some people, you know, like some people go down there and
pee in the water. Mm hmm. Like boys, they don’t have nowhere to pee, and
drunkers, they’ll go do that, too. Okay. And sometimes they’ll take people down
and rape them, and when they finished, they might throw ‘em in the water or
something. So, what does it look like? How would you describe it? A bayou? It’s
big and long and green and it stinks … And turtles live in it. (p.96)
Trina was in third grade. It is clear that her basic knowledge of the ecosystem was entirely
interwoven with the realities of the city. This study will be revisited as it relates to moral
judgments later, but here, even if merely anecdotally, I wanted to illustrate that the distinction
between social and ecological problems is arbitrary. It is from a position of significant privilege
that one could suggest that, as an environmentalist, certain social issues are not within the

9

Kahn (1999) specifies that the majority of the participants in the study preferred to be referred to as
Black.
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scope of their concern. I doubt Trina had the luxury to dismiss concerns about rape and
murder to focus attention on turtles, for which she did seem to have some affinity.
An interesting result from a complementary study where Kahn (1999) interviewed the
Houston children’s parents was that 57% of parents considered drug education and
environmental education to be equally important and 29% of parents considered environmental
education to be more important. I wonder if the curricula of drug education programs might
have influenced the parents’ judgments. However, one parent explained that drug problems and
environmental problems both threatened lives in their community. For that reason they found
environmental and drug education equally important.
With the drugs, we’re nothing. Without the environment, we’re nothing. And
drugs is something I see every day. There are dealers across the street from me.
So I see this every day and it’s just killing us. I mean, it really is killing us, and
with the drugs we’re not going to have any youth… With the drugs you’re not
going to have a future and without any environment you’re not going to have a
future.
Well let’s put it like this here. If you don’t take care of one [drugs], it’s going to
kill you. If you don’t take care of the other [the environment] it’s going to kill
you. (Kahn, 1999, p. 122)
To further contextualize, parents described garbage piling up in the streets, sewage backing up
into their yards, and the prevalent stench of air pollution.
In this example, I have tried to illustrate that in the daily lives of many (most) folks there
is little distinction between the social and natural environment. I have also tried to make a case
for a broader conception of EE (with greater attention to social issues) by dictate (UNESCO
Report). And in the following chapter, I make a theoretical argument for the relationship
between social and environmental degradation.
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1.4

Moving Environmental Education into the Future
In the modern era, economic growth and development have always depended
on exploiting natural and human resources for the sake of economic production
and the creation of wealth. Such is the history of nation building: imperialism,
colonization, cultural violence, and ecological rape10. Growth, development,
resources, production, wealth- all of these metaphors have taken on positive
value in modern culture, yet each is linked to destructive and oppressive
relationships with human and nonhuman others. (Gruenewald, 2004)
It is crucial to understand where knowledge accepted as truth comes from and how it

has changed over time. Knowledge that we take for granted may, despite our intentions, carry
with it a history of degradation that we subtly drag forward by not interrogating the roots and
assumptions of that knowledge. However, Tbilisi provides a definition of EE satisfactory for the
project of restoration. I was certainly pleasantly surprised by the content of EE’s founding
documents which I assumed a certain level of familiarity with (without having read) based on
how prominently they are referenced by others. As I discovered, the foundations of EE - upon
which I construct a pedagogy for restoration - are very supportive of such an effort. But while it
is important to examine the past and present definitions of EE, there is no reason to remain
constrained by those definitions. As Noam Chomsky frequently reminds us, the world is too
complex for history to ever reproduce itself. Context changes and history is not static so our
approach to restoration must always be adaptive. I very decisively look to the imaginary to chart

10

I don’t condone using language of sexual violence to describe exploitation of the earth. I think it is
hyperbolic and contributes to a culture of rape. However, however the nature of our affiliation with
nature isn’t always a loving. What is the significance that “raping the earth,” is such a common phrase? In
the next section I examine Bookchin’s (1982) hypothesis that the subjugation of the earth follows the
subjugation of women.
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my own path into the future with an understanding that the task would be impossible
without knowing the past and present context of education and of the issues that must be
addressed.
I critically and hopefully look to the future but not to change for the sake of change or to
blind progress. Sandy Grande, an Indigenous scholar who identifies as a Quechua woman11,
sharply critiqued whitestream12 education’s influence on American Indian sovereignty and
identity and discussed the fallacy of “belief in progress as change and change as progress”
(2003, p.69). Grande (2004) provided nuance to the role of Indigenous knowledge in education
by reminding us that Indigenous knowledge is not historic and static, but that change isn’t
universally progress. She suggested that there is much to learn from the past and the present
but never denied the need to look to the future. What Grande (2004) insisted was that we look
critically and holistically to past, present, and future in attempt to transcend the confines of
modernism, capitalism, and colonialism without tokenizing or dismissing traditional and

11

Grande (2003) prefaces Red Pedagogy with the following:
I am a Quechua woman. This is not only who I am but also, in these “postcolonial” times, an
identity I feel increasingly obligated to claim. At the time of Spanish invasion, the Indigenous
population of Peru was approximately twelve million but after the first one hundred years of
conquest, numbers dwindled to 150,000- a decimation of nearly 80 percent. Despite centuries of
genocide, Peru today remains a majority Indigenous population, a statistic that speaks more to
the fortitude and resilience of Quechua and Aymara peoples than to the virtues of colonialist
regimes. This is evident in the fact that although Indigenous peoples continue to comprise the
majority, the historical-material spoils of imperialism (economic and political power) belong to
the white and mestizo minority. (p.ix)
12
Grande (2003) often uses the term whitestream rather than mainstream or Western. Although she does
not provide an explicit definition of the term, it effectively centers Indigenous thought and experience by
denying the assumption that dominant, mainstream, or Western ways of knowing and being include or
represent Indigenous knowledge and experience.
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contemporary Indigenous knowledge. We must carefully consider the relationship between
place, culture, and epistemology with the knowledge that Indigenous culture and epistemology
has forever been inseparable from place, as has been the case for most ways of knowing and
being throughout human history but is not the case for dominant Western culture.
There is a further interpretation of the fallacy that Grande (2004) identified that needs
to be considered. The juxtaposition of the impact that the original inhabitants of the land
currently occupied by the United States have had since time immemorial with the immense
social and ecological degradation that the “progress” introduced by white settler colonialism of
the past few hundred years paints a certain picture. It seems that the obvious question that
such juxtaposition raises is; what would the United States look like if it had never been colonized
by Europeans or if the relationship between European settlers and Indigenous peoples had
developed differently? It seems trivial to speculate either that it would be a perfect utopia in
harmony with nature or that a similar trajectory of technology, domination, and destruction
would have emerged and equally degraded the land13. In my mind, it is not trivial, however, to
examine counterexamples to the modern and imagine alternative trajectories.

13

Indigenous peoples of the land now occupied by the United States and more broadly the western
hemisphere are anything but homogeneous and it is important to avoid overgeneralization. Although vast
trade networks facilitated cultural and material exchange, development of cities, agricultural systems, and
governance varied significantly according to region. As in all places, pre-colonial powers rose and fell and
new societies emerged (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). However, no force before colonization ever threatened the
sovereignty of the peoples to such a great extent.
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In constructing a pedagogy for restoration the relation between past, present, future,
and imagination must all be continually addressed in relation to one another. Thus, I have begun
this paper by looking to past concepts of EE, present concepts of EE, and how that plays out the
context of US poverty in order to understand how we can begin looking to the future. Such
poverty is a symptom of social degradation that must be addressed through pedagogy for
restoration. In the Chapter 2 I attempt to understand the nature of degradation as both an
outcome of dominant Western epistemology and social structure. In Chapter 3 examine how we
develop our sense of morality in the context of degradation in order to understand how and
why we take restorative action. Finally, in Chapter 4, I explore a pedagogy for restoration.
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Chapter 2:

Oppression

Even before I ever read Marx I had made his words my own. (Freire, 1998a,
p.115)
In this chapter I attempt to understand, at a structural level, how and why oppression
happens. I begin by considering discourses of oppression and the implications of the oppressoroppressed dichotomy. Next Marxism is briefly introduced as a central theory on the nature of
human oppression and as a foundation upon which to investigate other social theories.
Following Marx, I delve into Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1944/2002) critique of the modes of
production of knowledge which raises fundamental questions of the relationship between
epistemology and oppression. Then ways of knowing in Indigenous and eastern philosophies are
considered in search of a way to proceed beyond the deconstructionism that critical theory
inspires. Finally Bookchin’s (1982) theory of human ecology positing that oppression is the result
of a departure from nature is investigated. I conclude the chapter by trying to put together the
social theory, epistemology, and social ecology in order to move beyond an effort to understand
the roots of oppression towards an understanding restoration.
2.1

Discourse of Oppression
Before proceeding with this investigation into oppression, I want to consider the

importance of language and discourse. Often the way we say something is no less significant
than what we say. Although our words don’t always match our intentions, if we’re not precise in
our use of language, we are not precise in our thinking. In this section I consider discourses
related to oppression and how language aligned with the status quo may detract from efforts to
challenge oppression.
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2.1.1

Oppressor-oppressed dichotomy
By calling people oppressed, without carefully considering what that implies we may

subtly validate oppression and undermine our intentions to fight oppression. The oppressoroppressed dichotomy labels some as oppressors and some oppressed (or colonizer-colonized,
dominator-dominated, etc.). The oppressor-oppressed dichotomy isn’t an accurate descriptor of
status or identity for most people. There are people who enact oppression and people targeted
by oppression. They are first and foremost people and their identities do not reduce to
oppressor or oppressed. Most people experience both to some degree but the significance of
either experience to one’s experience or identity certainly varies.
If people targeted by oppression are referred to as if it is part of their identity, it subtly
justifies their mistreatment by implying that their mistreatment is dictated by their identity. An
example may make the point more clear. If someone is referred to as a bum, hobo, or even with
a more life affirming term such as homeless person, we are not only communicating that they
do not have a home (as defined by the status quo), we are also communicating that they are the
type of person who is homeless. If we refer to someone without such labels, but as a person
who does not have consistent access to adequate shelter (or may choose not to utilize it for
various reasons), we make it clear that homelessness is not necessarily part of their identity, but
part of the experience that they are having. By avoiding such essentializing labels and seeing a
person having a particular experience, rather than someone whose identity dictates that
experience, we afford them the basic human dignity of self-determination. The experience of
having inadequate shelter may or may not be transient and one’s own agency (or perceived)
agency in the matter could only be determined on an individual basis. We should not assume
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that ‘homeless’ people need or want rescuing. Neither should we assume that they will
inevitably be ‘homeless’ because it is part of who they are.
Inflicted labels of identity are easily internalized and refusing essentialist concepts of
identity allows the person experiencing homelessness to speak back to their experience rather
than being defined by their experience. Thus, support efforts are can be undermined from the
start by the way we define the identity of those we aim to support. I see the task as one of
ensuring that everyone has access to basic shelter, support and services that they may need
while allowing them the freedom to choose how, when, and whether they utilize those
resources. When we aim to help people while inflicting and enforcing labels of identity, defining
their experience and their needs, and presuming that they need or want our help we may
unintentionally maintain an imperialist discourse of oppression that negates our wellintentioned efforts by maintaining the status quo and disempowering ‘oppressed peoples’.
2.1.2

Entitlement and deservingness
Lisa Marie Cacho (2012) similarly discussed how discourse on justice may undermine

work for justice. Cacho’s (2012) areas of concern are primarily the relationship between identity
status and rights. She suggested that those identified as illegal immigrants, gang members, or
terrorists are considered ineligible for rights based on assumptions of their status, regardless of
their actions. Cacho (2012) suggested that by arguing that people deserves rights by distancing
them from such statuses, we comply with a racist ideology that suggests some people should
have to prove their deservingness for rights while others are entitled to rights. For example,
“these people are not criminals, they are just trying to earn a living” is a frequently expressed
sentiment intended to illustrate categorical deservingness of rights for People of Color.
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However, expressions like, “not all white people are criminals” are so universally accepted
that they don’t need to be said because whites14 are entitled to rights. This is not to say that
there are not identities and statuses among whites who are also unjustly forced to prove their
deservingness of rights, but that the rights of whites are not categorically called into question.
The baseline should be that everyone deserves rights and that rights should not be contingent
on status or identity.
When we distinguish ourselves from unlawful and outlawed status categories,
we implicitly insist that these socio-legal categories are not only necessary but
should be reserved and preserved for the “genuinely” lazy (welfare recipients),
“undoubtedly” immoral (marrying for citizenship), and “truly” dangerous (gang
violence). When we reject these criminalized others of color, we leave less room
for questioning why such status categories are automatically and categorically

14

APA guidelines dictate that racial/ethnic identifiers be capitalized including White and Black (Publication
manual of the American Psychological Association, 2010).However, I intentionally challenge this
precedent by capitalizing racial/ethnic identifiers of People of Color but not whites. As a result of white
supremacy, whites rarely identify accordingly with skin color (a notable exception may be White
Supremacists) and have the privilege to racially and ethnically self-identify to a much greater degree than
People of Color and thus may identify as Jewish, European American, Irish American, etc.(Visconti, 2009)
while many diasporic Peoples of Color in America do not know their ethnicities so specifically due to
colonization and the enslavement of Black peoples (Potter, 1995).
Potter (1995) suggested that capitalization essentializes and homogenizes Peoples of Color. This is
absolutely not my intention; my attention is to address oppression and call attention to the prevalence of
culturally imposed markers of identity in a racialized society by avoiding colorblindness. My intent is to
challenge rather than essentialize racial determination.
Finally, I use the term whites in contradistinction to my earlier notes on using life affirming language. I do
this because (1) it makes me uncomfortable to be categorically referred to (as a white person) in such a
way while similar language is rarely questioned when categorically referring to ‘Hispanics’ or ‘Blacks’. That
discomfort is good and important and healthy and reminds me to use language carefully. (2) Oppression
and racism are unilaterally enacted by the dominant group (whites), so the rights and humanity of whites
are never categorically violated in the way that the rights of People of Color are. Thus, every time I use the
word whites in contradistinction to life affirming terms, I intend for it to serve as a reminder of the nature
and presence of oppression in life and in language.
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devalued. While these tactics may be politically strategic and even necessary at
times, it is important to be cognizant of the fact that they work because a
sympathetic public can register that some people are the wrong targets of
legitimate laws. They work only if a sympathetic public already accepts that
discrimination against not-valued others is legitimate and necessary. (Cacho,
2012, p.18)
These sorts of comparisons are symptomatic of an unjust dichotomy where some folks are
entitled to rights while others are required to prove their deservingness of rights. By making
implicitly comparative arguments of race and relation and insisting that one person or group
deserves rights we are implying that some other doesn’t.
However, as Cacho (2012) pointed out, it is sometimes practically necessary, and even
unavoidable to make such relational arguments. For example, in immigration law, and in US
more generally, heteronormative conceptions of family are highly valued (Cacho, 2012). For
example immigrants facing deportation are often portrayed and valued in accordance to
heteronormative family values (e.g., the father struggling to earn money to his family back
home, or the mother facing deportation which would tear apart her family). Certainly, I am not
in support of tearing apart families and I think it is a noble effort for someone struggling to make
ends meet to send money home. Thus, advocacy and activism related to immigration reform
often (maybe unavoidably) emphasize family values because they are likely to be effective.
However, such arguments are likely to be effective at the expense of less valued others (e.g.,
single transgender refugees). Cacho (2012) ultimately did not argue that, in practice, such
arguments are ineffective or entirely problematic, but that we must be extremely cognizant of
the ways the language of social justice may undermine social justice. “What’s at stake is figuring
out the criminalized and racialized parameters of rights discourses by realizing that the ways in
which a group’s demands for rights and recognition can highlight an/other racialized group’s
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ineligibility for those same rights”(Cacho, 2012, p.82). Because what we may ultimately be
constructing is a politics of misrecognition “that relies on tactical arguments that construct only
some members of a group targeted for state violence as having been falsely and unfairly
misrecognized by US law” (Cacho, 2012, p. 28) and more generally targeted and misrecognized
in society.
2.2

Production of Oppression
I begin my exploration of the mode of production and reproduction of environmental

destruction with a nod to the influence of Karl Marx. Marx is one of the influential thinkers of
my own worldview and the influence of Marx in the schools of thought of the majority of the
authors that I have referenced is easily recognizable (if not overtly stated). However, I have
made an effort to avoid an intransigent take on Marxism or any particular ideological allegiance
in order to look forward both critically and imaginatively.
Marx’s basic presumption was that the class struggle, with its associated oppression,
propels history and explains the nature of all social structure. Marx suggested that revolution
was necessary to redistribute the means of production which would in turn dissolve class
structure (Marx & Engels, 1847/2010). Marx certainly expressed great concern for the
exploitation of workers and (if only as a digression) expressed some concern for the natural
environment:
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more
massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding
generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man [sic], machinery,
application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways,
electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of
rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground – what earlier century had
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even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social
labour? (Marx & Engels, 1847/2010, p.17)
Marx identified the owners of material means of production as perpetrators of the exploitation
of human beings, but rarely (or never) examined the relationship between the processes of
production and destruction of nature. As vapid critic of the “idiocy of rural life,” and a vehement
proponent of industrialization, Marx did not consider that the very materialist nature of
production may inevitably be exploitative to humans and the natural environment (Marx &
Engels, 1847/2010). Thus, Marx may have had some awareness that exploitation of the planet
was a problem, but didn’t question the nature of a worldview that holds the earth as a resource.
Still, Marxist theory does provide the inspiration for the argument that social and environmental
degradation are deeply related to social structure and are readily analyzed as a single issue.
2.3

Epistemology of Oppression
Following Marxist thought, critical theorists Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002)

sought to understand the nature of oppression in a time when modern science very prominently
enhanced the scale of atrocity in WWII. In the midst of domination of Nazi fascism, Horkheimer
and Adorno (1944/2002) concluded that the production and distribution of knowledge rather
than capital (as Marx thought) was the fundamental source of oppression.
Knowledge, which is power, knows no limits, either in its enslavement of
creation or in its deference to worldly masters. Just as it serves all the purposes
of the bourgeois economy both in factories and on the battlefield, it is at the
disposal of entrepreneurs regardless of their origins. (Horkheimer & Adorno,
1944/2002, p.2)
While Marx critiqued capitalism, Horkheimer and Adorno critiqued modernism. They believed
that enlightenment, even in pursuit of liberation, disenchanted the world and that by
“conquering superstition” humans established rule over nature. They suggested that “What

42
human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and
human beings” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/2002, p.2). Enlightenment established hierarchies
of knowledge where experts or “masters” held the power. Thus where Marx primarily critiqued
material distribution in accordance to social relations through capitalism, but not the means of
production, Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) critiqued both the production and distribution
of knowledge. Ultimately, Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) felt that knowledge destroyed
meaning and enlightenment itself was domination.
Since Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) saw the very concept of progress as
domination, they looked to the past and particularly held art as a liberatory form of expression.
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) wrote “The urge to rescue the past as something living,
instead of using it as the material of progress, has been satisfied only in art, in which even
history as a representation of past life, is included” (p.25). Rather than suggest that historic
knowledge is a source of progress, Horkheimer & Adorno are suggesting that, through art, the
past lives in the present. In that sense, I think Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) saw the
study of history as encapsulated in art not as knowledge, but transcendence. It may not be too
much of a stretch, then, to suggest that Horkheimer and Adorno, amidst a world torn by WWII,
found their only escape and fulfillment in the transcendence that one can experience while
engrossed in great art. In that sense, their utopia was not externally realizable, but potentially
experienced internally, if only briefly.
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may be best known for their paradoxical assertion
that “myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology” (Horkheimer &
Adorno, 1944/2002). In the context of dominant US American cultural mythology the myth of
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human nature, the myth of pristine nature, and the myth of socially constructed nature have
profound implications that should be considered15. In my own experience, and popular among
certain environmental educators and writers such as David Sobel, the sort of transcendence that
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may have experienced through art is also satisfied in the
wonder of nature (Sobel, 2008). However, it may be that art encompasses our interpretation of
nature just as it does our interpretation of history. There may, indeed, be a deep connection
between ethics and esthetics where justice is an expression of beauty and beauty itself is justice.
In fact, Moore (2005) in an ode to Rachel Carson concluded:
There is moral significance in the search for meaning, and virtue in the life of
one who seeks- like Carson, attentive and grateful, careful with science and
open to mystery, humble and respectful, rejoicing in the fact of things, willing to
be surprised. I don’t know if humans are the only beings who wonder. But I do
know that we have a great capacity to wonder at the world that ticks and sighs
around us, and it may be that we will find the fulfillment of our potential as

15

This is intentionally left open ended and the fundamental mythologies of American civilization are
potentially and endless pursuit. However, I will briefly introduce some of the complexity surrounding the
myth of pristine nature as it relates to oppression. Early Western concepts of the wilderness or the wild
often regarded it as dangerous and undesirable. Throughout the colonization of America concepts of
wilderness contributed to the myth that America was a wild frontier to be settled. In reality, America was
not a wilderness and European and American settlers relied on the developed networks of trails, and
managed grasslands to establish settlements. The ‘wilderness’ settlers did encounter likely resulted from
their own role in disabling the Indigenous peoples from tending to the land. The policy of settling
wilderness was later formalized in 1823 by the doctrine of discovery which ruled that all land lay claim to
the first Christian Europeans to explore and settle it. This concept of wilderness was fundamental to the
colonization of America and genocide of native peoples. Additionally, the myth of pristine nature
continues to be a source of justification for the continued dispossession of Indigenous peoples of lands
promised by treaties following the invasion of America. This is now done in the name of preserving
wilderness rather than conquering it. A contemporary example that remains in dispute between the
sovereign Republic of Lakota and US over Black Hills (the site of Mt. Rushmore) which was established in
violation of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. The US government currently holds over a billion dollars in
trust as restitution, however the Lakota refuse to accept the payment because the land was never for sale
(Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014).
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human beings in our awareness of the astonishing world, our care, and our
thanksgiving.
I can’t help but speculate that Horkheimer and Adorno would dig such a sentiment. My take is
that they were so consumed by the atrocity of WWII that the potential to appreciate any
element of the present was overshadowed.
I favor a take on enlightenment founded in ancient Chinese and Buddhist traditions.
Enlightenment is accepting each moment exactly as it is (Garbarino, 2011). It is “intrinsically and
inevitably incomplete and approximate” (Garbarino, 2011, p.73) because it is an aspiration
rather than an outcome. While enlightenment is about accepting each moment exactly as it is,
understanding is inevitably subjective. The understanding associated with such enlightenment is
more about acceptance, peace and harmony than domination. The state of enlightenment that
Garbarino (2011) described as transformational grace is a sustained state of transcendence
quite similar to the transient state that Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may have found
only in art. Garbarino (2011) suggested that transformational grace is a way of being in and with
the world where life itself is the source of wonder and transcendence. I like the juxtaposition of
Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1944/2002) concept of (modernist/scientific) objectivity as
domination and Garbarino’s Eastern concept of objectivity as acceptance. Both views converge
in rejection of positivism with acceptance of myth and appreciation of esthetic.
Garbarino’s (2011) thoughts on enlightenment help us out of the hopelessness that
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may arouse. However, they were correct to criticize
dominant Western epistemology and Garbarino (2011) did not speak to structural change.
Grande (2004) is certainly very well versed if not significantly influenced by critical theory and
postmodern thought but she’s firmly rooted in Indigenous epistemology and ontology which
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seems to fuel her vehement cultural critique without the commonly resulting descent into a
deconstructionist, fatalist, or nihilist condemnation of every element of human experience and
knowledge as meaningless social construct. Grande (2004) identified colonization as the source
of oppression rather than capitalism and critiqued modern(ist) colonial modes of knowledge
production without assuming that alternative modes of knowledge production do not and
cannot exist. She suggested that “both Marxists and capitalists view land and natural resources
as commodities to be exploited, in the first instance, by capitalists for personal gain, and in the
second by Marxists for the good of all” (p. 27). Her critique of Marxism is aimed not at Marxism
in its entirety, but at what she considers to be a “profoundly anthropocentric notion that
presumes superiority of human beings over the rest of nature” rooted in humanism (p.27). She
concludes that “the real source of environmental destruction” is “colonization and the ill-effects
of its consuming habits” (Grande, 2004, p.65).
It seems many of the postmodernists and critical theorists including Horkheimer and
Adorno (1944/2002) were stumped upon realizing that oppression is a consequence of the
dominant epistemology with little conception of alternatives. Although I found Horkheimer and
Adorno’s (1944/2002) conception of art to be deep and poetic, they didn’t have much to offer in
the way of positive solutions. As Grande (2004) suggested, it may be that solutions to the
problems produced by epistemologies of domination cannot be solved in the same manner of
thinking. Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) may have lacked the necessary cross-cultural
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perspective to imagine solutions to the problems that their critique identified. Luckily as both
indigenista16 and academic, Grande (2004) is not bound by the confines of modern Western
social theory and identified Indigenous cultures as living counterexamples to the status quo. In
this way, Grande (2004) refuses the impossibility of what Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002)
considered theoretically utopian but practically unrealizable in the present: an alternative
trajectory.
2.4

Ecology of Oppression
Epistemology is culturally influenced and although our way of knowing may be

conducive to oppression, it does not explain how the gears were set in motion. What led to the
colonial mentality? Bookchin’s (1982) work on social ecology begins to chip away at the source
of oppression. Bookchin’s (1982) work followed directly from Marxist thought, but Bookchin’s
departure from (or advance of) Marxism exposed a fundamental weakness in Marxist theory:
What puzzled a few highly sophisticated Marxists in later years was how the
repression and disciplining of external nature could be achieved without
repressing and disciplining internal nature: how could “natural” nature be kept
in tow without subjugating “human nature?” (Bookchin, 1982, p.10)

16

Grande uses the term indigenista in contradistinction to whitestream feminism.
Though Indigenous women share with other women a position of marginality and the experience
of structural subordination, I believe their distinct subjectivity as colonized peoples ad members
of “domestic dependent nations” places the historical materiality of their lives more on a par
with Indigenous men than any other sub-category of “women.” I do, however, recognize the
salience of gender as a category as well as the importance of a gendered, pro-woman, antisexist
analysis. (p.156)
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Similarly to Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002), Bookchin (1982) saw a relationship
between domination of nature and domination of humans, but did not suggest that knowledge
necessarily detaches us from nature or causes domination. Bookchin (1982) asserted that “the
very notion of the domination of nature by man17 stems from the real domination of human by
human” (p. 1). Bookchin (1982) believed that the process begins with patriarchal morality and
wrote that
even before man embarks on his conquest of man – of class by class- patriarchal
morality obliges him to affirm his conquest of woman. The subjugation of her
nature and its absorption into the nexus of patriarchal morality forms the
archetypal act of domination that ultimately gives rise to man’s imagery of
subjugated nature. It is perhaps not accidental that nature and earth retain the
female gender into our own time. (p.121)
Bookchin (1982) hypothesized that in the process of developing human society, hierarchies
among humans were established and that differential class advancement among humans serves
as the means to exploit nature. As indicated in the quote above, Bookchin (1982) believed that
the fundamental source of all oppression is rooted in the oppression of women. However, the
development of society represents a departure from a natural order which may precede the
oppression of women. It becomes a bit of a chicken and the egg debate. There may be a single
root cause of all oppression or there may be many roots.

17

Bookchin (1982) does not use the term man in the archaic and plural sense, but asserts that “the split
between humanity and nature has been precisely the work of the male” (Bookchin, 1982, p.18).
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Finally, as Johnston (1994) concluded in the edited volume Who Pays the Price: The
Sociocultural Context of Environmental Crisis surveying international conflicts between
ecological health and human rights:
Environmental quality and social justice issues are inextricably linked. Efforts to
protect a “healthy environment” may, in some cases, result in human rights
abuse, and depending upon subsequent social response, may ultimately fail to
meet original environmental integrity objectives. And conversely, responding to
human rights needs while ignoring the environmental context infers temporary
intervention rather than substantive solution; it may thus serve to initiate or
perpetuate a cycle of human rights abuses. (p.235)
Johnston’s (1994) conclusion is pragmatic and actionable. While it is fascinating to examine
whether human exploitation of nature is at the root of human exploitation of humans or vice
versa, it may be unanswerable. It may also not be the most productive area of inquiry if the goal
is to end oppression. Even if we could be sure that the subjugation of women was at the root of
all oppression, that wouldn’t necessarily provide much insight towards ending all oppression.
However, some understanding of the interconnectedness of the oppression of nature and of
humans does provide insight towards the ultimate goal of restoration.
2.5

Restoration
One is not fully human until one acknowledges and affirms the humanity of
others—including one’s enemies. Ultimately, the enemy is within the human
family and not without. And once we acknowledge that, we will all have the
courage . . . [to] move beyond the darkness of mutually destructive hatred and
revenge into the light of reconciliation and forgiveness. (Mathabane, 2002, p.
A21, as cited in Gibbs, 2014, p.120)

As Johnston (1994) suggested our collective struggle against social and ecological
degradation must constantly and simultaneously consider environmental quality and social
justice issues. At its currently advanced stage, the social crisis and ecological crisis are entirely
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intertwined as are development and degradation. Social degradation directly causes
ecological degradation and ecological degradation causes social degradation. I hypothesize that
oppression, like a virus infects our way of perceiving the world (e.g., colonial epistemology and
internalized oppression) and thus spreads through all of our social structures regardless of
where it begins. In the effort for social and ecological restoration it is important to realize how
interconnected different expressions of oppression are. I don’t believe that we can make much
progress by approaching symptoms of this virus as singular and isolated issues. Ending any
oppression requires ending all oppression. Thus we must simultaneously focus on individual
instances and structural causes of both social and ecological degradation.
Bookchin (1982) found the end of human domination to be an ecological imperative
“because [human domination] threatens the integrity of organic nature, it will not continue to
do so given the harsh verdict of … nature” (p. 37). To be clear, Bookchin (1982) was suggesting
that feedback mechanisms of the ecosystem will remove or drastically reduce human
populations if we do not make significant changes. In my attempt to maintain a positive
approach, I reframe Bookchin’s (1982) prophecy. The iniquity that was described in the poem
from Egypt four thousand years ago and that Bookchin similarly referred to is not so simple as a
question of moral or amoral behavior but one of great complexity. A large portion of the
remainder of this paper is devoted to the philosophical, psychological and sociological
exploration of morality. I believe that human concepts of justice have been selected for by
evolution and as part of human ecology morality is not detached from the greater ecosystem. If
humans establish just ways of living and interacting with one another and with the planet, as I
will argue is part of human nature, we will not face the “harsh verdict of nature.”
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As Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) and later Grande (2004) suggested the social
systems of knowledge production are colonized by the virus of oppression. However, I don’t
believe that that the possibility of transcendent enlightenment is lost. I don’t believe knowledge
has to be domination but we do need a shift in our concept of knowledge. I believe that there is
an epistemology of domination and there is an epistemology of esthetic, of love, and of
association. I want to know the world the way I know a loved one, where the more I know them,
the more affinity I feel for and with them and the more I want to know them. The more I begin
to understand their internal states, their needs, their motivations, and the more deeply I care.
This way of loving knowledge and knowing love is an episteme of beauty and is the vocation of
humans. It is a way of being with the planet rather than on the planet. Freire (1998) wrote,
Women and men [sic] by the mere fact of being in the world are also necessarily
being with world. Our being is a being with. So, to be in the world without
making history, without being made by it, without creating culture, without a
sensibility towards one’s own presence in the world, without a dream, without
song, music, or painting, without caring for the earth or the water, without
using one’s hands, without sculpting or philosophizing, without any opinion
about the world, without doing science or theology, without awe in the face of
mystery, without learning, instruction, teaching, without ideas on education,
without being political, is a total impossibility. (p.58)
As Freire said, we are unfinished humans who may become aware of our own unfinishedness
and to be human is to search for completeness (Freire, 1998). Such an episteme is generative,
but never destructive. It cannot destroy an epistemology of domination but it allows a process
of healing.
Our struggles against oppression must begin with processes of decolonizing our own
minds (cf. Yellow Bird & Wilson, 2012) because domination is both epistemic and fundamental
to our discourse. I remain skeptical of all notions of modern development (e.g., economic
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development, resource exploitation, technology) as inherently and inevitably a form of
domination. However, this skepticism is based in my own tendency towards deconstructionism
and is likely symptomatic of a lack of perspective resulting from my own entrenchment in
modern Western epistemology. Such skepticism is the hurdle that we must each individually
overcome by decolonizing ourselves as part of the effort to end oppression in all of its forms. In
this way, pedagogy of restoration is both a process of self-restoration and the broader process
of restoration of the planet.
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Chapter 3:

Empathy and Morality

If we are to live in a world free from the threat of Holocausts, we will need to
create it. If we can understand some of the attributes that distinguished
rescuers from others, perhaps we can deliberately cultivate them. (Oliner &
Oliner, 1988, p.xviii)
This chapter explores the complex relationship between the development of an
individual’s moral principles, the natural environment and the social environment. Reciprocally,
the environment shapes and is shaped by human reality. Moral development takes place in this
dynamic environment and moderates an individual’s participation in, and construction of, social
structure. Social and ecological degradation, as a single issue, are outcomes of the way we as
individuals, groups and as a species, internalize or adapt and adjust social structures. An
understanding of the moral development process, as it relates to the process of socialization,
sheds light on the entire process resulting in the degradation of Earth. Through an
understanding of human morality, pedagogy for restoration begins to illuminate itself. This
chapter begins by examining what may be evolutionary roots for human empathy and the
potential pitfalls of such an approach. The following section explores the empathy and moral
development process including potential limitations to human empathy and morality and
philosophic concepts of morality. The remainder of the chapter explores how and why people
may act prosocially or antisocially as a result of their moral development.
3.1

Evolutionary Examination
Empathy is a necessary prerequisite for altruism and compassion, therefore, the
roots of human morality can be traced through our biology to the evolution of
our species. We are, by nature, moral creatures. (Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, &
McShane, 2006, p. 504)
An evolutionary approach to moral development suggests that “helping genes” have

been necessary for the survival of the human species (Hoffman, 1981). As social creatures the
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human species’ survival required that we not consider only our own self-interest in our
interactions with one another. Only by working together and considering one another’s needs
were we able to survive the test of time (Hoffman, 2000). Humans are thinking and feeling
beings “built in such a way that they can involuntarily and forcefully experience another’s
emotion – that their distress is often contingent not on their own but someone else’s painful
experience” (Hoffman, 2000, p.5). I find it incredibly profound that the human desire for justice
(as a consequence of empathy) is not rooted in an egoistic self-interest, or logical understanding
of the need for reciprocity, but an involuntary emotional component of our genetic makeup.
3.1.1

Social Darwinism
Before delving into a discussion on the evolutionary basis for human empathy, I want to

consider the potential pitfalls of such an approach.
The reality is that evolutionary perspectives on human behavior frequently
incite controversy, even among the scientists themselves. Evolutionary theory is
one of the most fertile, wide-ranging, and inspiring of all scientific ideas ...
However the legitimacy of this exercise is at the center of a heated controversy
that has raged for more than a century. Ultimately, the disquiet traces back to
past misuses of evolutionary reasoning to bolster prejudiced ideas and
ideologies … Most researchers within the social sciences and humanities remain
extremely uncomfortable with evolutionary approaches (Laland & Brown, 2011,
p. 2).
Early theories of natural selection were misinterpreted and distorted into Social Darwinism and
became instrumental in the formalization of the concept race and racial hierarchies as scientific
concepts (e.g., Morton, 1839) and inspired eugenics movements in the United States as well as
the Holocaust (McWorter, 2010). Although “past misuses of evolutionary reasoning” do not
condemn all modern evolutionary theory, we have not escaped (scientifically or socially) the
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legacy of racism and eugenics. Therefore we must be extremely cautious and critical when
utilizing evolutionary theory.
I want to consider Darwin’s own role in the distortion of the theory of natural selection.
Darwin did not share significant application of natural selection to humans publicly until he had
spent nearly ten years carefully considering it because he was well aware of the potential
implications of doing so (Laland & Brown, 2011).
It is largely by distorting Darwinian thinking that evolution has been used to
justify prejudice and inequality. Most of the negative features sometimes
unfairly attributed to evolution, including prejudice, racism, sexism, genetic
determinism, and Social Darwinism, do not come from Darwin but from others
who twisted his theory. (Laland & Brown, 2011, p. 47)
When Darwin did publish on the ways that natural selection acted on humans, some of those
considerations of race and sex reflect prejudice by today’s standards (Laland & Brown, 2011).
However, Darwin explicitly rejected Social Darwinism and much of the distortions of natural
selection would be unfairly attributed to him.
It was largely the work of Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton who distorted natural
selection into a theory of eugenics (Laland & Brown, 2011). However, the path from Darwin’s
theory of natural selection to atrocity would be unfairly attributed to any single individual. It
was a long progression of distortions of Darwin’s theory into a hierarchical conception of life
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where some species are ‘higher’ and some ‘lower18’ and the formalization of races among
humans that led to conceptions of racial hierarchy. This racial hierarchy was used to establish an
ideology of white superiority by suggesting that Europeans had larger brains and were the most
evolved race (Morton, 1839). Such racial hierarchy was used to justify the oppression of ‘lower’
humans, and in the most extreme cases, the genocide of undesirable races.
Ultimately, this warped concept of human evolution was the ideology behind the
Holocaust. However, there was an active eugenics movement in United States preceding the
Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust was a result of already widely prevalent Social Darwinism and
racial hierarchy (Edgcomb, 1993; McWorter, 2010). In fact, the Nazis explicitly stated that they
were enacting what US American eugenicists were writing and mocked the United States in
propaganda for calling Nazis barbaric while racism and eugenics (primarily through sterilization,
however, US American eugenicists were considering euthanasia) were enacted in US at the
same time (Edgcomb, 1993; McWorter, 2010). Furthermore, the Jewish refugees were accepted
in the United States based on racial quotas. Not only was the policy based on perceptions of the
number of Jewish people who could be racially assimilated, but they also considered the genetic
desirability of the refugees. Those from Western Europe and accomplished academics and
professionals were considered genetically superior and more assimilatable (Edgcomb, 1993;
McWorter, 2010).

18

Laland & Brown (2011) discuss notes written in Darwin’s own posthumously published journals where
he reminded himself to avoid higher or lower forms of life. By their accounts Darwin was very concerned
about potential misinterpretation and misuse of his theories.
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Clearly the misuse of evolutionary theory can result in atrocity. Modern genetics and
evolutionary theory share the same roots as those from which such atrocity grew. However, I do
not think this is cause to condemn all evolutionary theory and genetics or their potential. What
is necessary is that we interpret meaning critically and seek knowledge for the sake of wisdom
(cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001 on phronesis) rather than explicitly technological or economic progress. It
isn’t enough to come to empirically based judgments regarding epistemic truth. We must
consider where certain truths come from and how such truths have and can be used. We have
to consider practical application and implication of knowledge as both ethical and empirical.
The theory of evolution properly understood, could be imagined as a branching tree
where each branch represents speciation, but not progress towards some end goal or higher
species. Social Darwinism and eugenics reduce that tree to a branchless snag: “a linear,
progressive concept of change perhaps inevitably engenders prejudice as some evolved forms
must be regarded as more advanced, or ‘higher,’ than others” (Laland & Brown, 2011, p. 46).
3.1.2

Evolution of empathy and altruism
With the previous qualification, some understanding of what may be innately human

does provide insight into the nature of empathy and human morality. However, we must
constantly keep in mind that evolutionary dispositions do not dictate modern behavior in a
deterministic sense. It is likely that such genetic influences do relate to our evolutionary context
but innate and acquired behavior can never be considered independent of each other. Human
behavior is channeled but not predetermined by evolved predispositions (Laland & Brown,
2011).
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Altruism, simply defined, is voluntary behavior that promotes the needs of another at
some expense of the altruistic actor (Hastings et al., 2006) with no expectation of external
reward (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). There is fossil evidence in human history to suggest “early
humans did not live alone but in small, nomadic hunting and gathering groups. Such groups
produced more offspring (who presumably continued to live in groups) than those individuals
not living in groups” (Hoffman, 1981, pp. 111-112). Altruism is posited to be an adaptation to
group living. The Darwinian concept of survival of the fittest may appear very individualistic,
placing each individual in competition with one another. This would suggest an evolutionary
basis for egoistic, self-serving behavior – the opposite of altruism. The least altruistic individuals
would be the most likely to reproduce and any genetic disposition towards altruism would be
selected away (Hoffman, 1981). However, current understanding evolution recognizes the role
of natural selection in promoting both group and individual adaptations. In the case of
predation, a member of a social group may defend the group or draw the predator away at the
risk to their own life (Hastings et al., 2006). Conversely, in an entirely nonaltruistic social group
the individual may escape predation but reduce overall group survival. Furthermore, all
“individuals benefit when the group cooperates to defend itself from predators” (Hastings et al.,
2006, p. 485). Therefore natural selection would favor the social group with a predisposition for
altruism and cooperation because it would increase group survival (Hastings et al., 2006).
The evolution of concern for others (empathy) may be connected to the evolution of
mammals 180 million years ago. Mammals, especially, but not exclusively, nurture, nourish, and
protect their young, in contrast to most reptiles who abandon their eggs shortly after laying
them. Hastings et al. (2006) suggested that in these longer term relationships between parent
and offspring, the parent would be more frequently exposed to the feelings associated with
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pain, separation, and suffering of their offspring. Any trait that improved the ability of a
parent to detect and respond to their offspring’s feelings would improve their survival chance.
With this increase in survival of offspring, a predisposition for empathy as an affective and
cognitive process may have been selected for. This may also be supported by evolutionary
changes in the mammalian brain (Hastings et al., 2006).
Although I primarily focus on social dynamics among and between humans, I want to
note that empathy is not a uniquely human characteristic. Altruistic behavior has been observed
in other animal species from primates to rats. “Cooperation and helping behavior are observed
in species other than humans including several types of nonhuman primates, birds, hunting
dogs, dolphins, and whales” (Hastings et al., 2006, p. 485). Humans may also feel empathy or
similar feelings of compassion or concern based in moral principle for non-human animals and
the natural environment (Opotow, 1990; Plous, 2003).
There are many influences determining when and whether an individual will act
altruistically or cooperatively. In some species kin selection disposes individuals to favor those
most genetically similar to them (Laland & Brown, 2011). Considerations of reciprocity certainly
are also very influential in social species. Vampire bats for example, will regurgitate food for
other bats who return to the roost at risk of starvation having not found enough food. Since
they live in relatively stable groups, it seems that although no immediate benefit is observed,
the bats have some expectation that the favor will be returned if they find themselves facing
starvation. In that way, their altruism is constrained by a demand for reciprocity (Laland &
Brown, 2011). Among early humans, such reciprocal altruism likely involved identifying cheaters
who receive benefits and do not reciprocate and may have influenced group selection.
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Reciprocal altruism may also be fundamental to human concepts of justice (Laland & Brown,
2011).
Simple theories of social and biological determination dictated by evolutionary
predispositions towards helping one another are not able to account for the complexity of social
dynamics among modern humans. Furthermore, I don’t see utility in determinism which seems
to me like a slippery slope to fatalism. Genetics alone rarely influence human behavior
independently of our unique accumulation of life experience. Even if sociobiology and related
fields eventually provide a complete understanding of human nature, there would be no reason
or even possibility to submit to it. As Freire (1998) suggested, we are conditioned but not
determined and by becoming aware of the ways we are conditioned we can transcend those
conditions. Still, keeping Horheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) in mind, it’s difficult to reconcile
the relationship between knowledge and domination. They suggested that to know nature was
to dominate it and the same could potentially be true of human nature (Horkheimer & Adorno,
1944/2002). I remain in Freire’s (1998a) corner with critical hope and believe the more we
understand human nature, the better equipped we will be to circumvent some aspects (e.g.,
selfish genes) and foster others (e.g., altruism) through socialization.
Furthermore, we should not consider elements of ‘human nature’, such as altruism,
cooperation, and morality as static. Certainly if these dispositions evolved they continue to
evolve. Human nature two million years ago certainly is not the same as human nature is now, if
such a thing even exists. At best early human history can provide clues, but not answers to the
timeless questions of human nature.
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Bookchin (1982) suggested that civilization itself is a potentially deterministic
influence on human behavior and wrote that civilization almost autonomously shapes humans
and advances not with humanity, but despite us. Bookchin (1982) meant that we have
established a society structured in a way that humans internalize and reconstruct social
structure without consciously doing so and thus civilization is capable of reproducing itself
without anyone explicitly consenting. Humans have become uniquely disconnected from the
natural world and are no longer governed exclusively by the laws of nature. The governance of
humans now plays a significant role, alongside the laws of nature, in shaping the future for
human society and the entire planet. I hypothesize that humans can move beyond, or into
alignment with, what may or may not be human nature through education, socialization, and
governance.
3.2

Empathy
As discussed in the previous section, it is likely an interaction between genetic

dispositions and the socialization process that determines our behavior. Regardless of the
influence that genetic disposition has on behavior, educators can’t do much to influence
anyone’s genetics, but we can certainly be influential in the socialization process. The following
is an attempt to understand the processes that ultimately cause people to care about the
ecological integrity of the planet and the wellbeing of fellow humans. With occasional
digressions back into evolutionary influences, I focus on an understanding of social on
psychological processes of empathy and moral development. I believe that this model for moral
development offers significant insight for educators, but all models by definition, represent
processes that are not entirely understood. The following model of moral development cannot
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possibly account for the development or actions of all people. It offers a unique insight along
specific dimensions, but provides little or none along others.
Hoffman’s (2000) theory suggests that empathy is an involuntary and emotional process
that leads to feelings of distress when witnessing another’s pain. Such distress encourages one
to assist the person in pain and to avoid causing others pain. According to Hoffman (2000) this
process is the basis for human morality. The model provides incredible insight into human
behavior and I examine it very thoroughly.
Empathy is most simply described in terms of its outcome where someone experiences
feelings more congruent with another’s situation than with their own (Hoffman, 2000) One
outcome is state matching: feeling what another feels. However as Garbarino (2011) suggested,
empathy is never complete and someone can never know exactly what another is experiencing
(cf. Decety & Jackson, 2006). State matching is an affective (feeling) process. There is also a
distinctly cognitive (thinking) form of empathy: an awareness or recognition of another’s
internal states (Hoffman, 2000). In reality cognitive and affective empathy are generally
experienced in tandem. Strictly cognitive empathy could cause someone to empathically feel
anger on behalf of another who was treated unjustly even though that person may feel pain or
fear. Strictly affective empathy should dictate that the observer has similar feelings of pain and
fear to the victim. In reality, the observer may empathically feel some combination of anger,
fear, and pain. Hoffman (2000) emphasizes affect, but conceptualizes empathy as a process of
thinking, feeling, and acting rather than a simple outcome (e.g., affective state matching).
Hoffman’s primary concern is empathic motivation for prosocial behavior and does not
generally disambiguate empathy and sympathy. Thus, before continuing, I find it important to
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explicitly make the caveat that an affective response is not necessary for one to feel concern
(sympathy) for another (Decety & Michalska, 2010). As explored in the following section,
empathic over-arousal (too much empathy) may actually reduce sympathy.
3.2.1

Prosocial motivation
The human capacity for empathy leads people to have feelings of empathic distress

when others are hurt or mistreated (Hoffman, 2000). The long term outcome for the observer is
the formation and internalization of moral principles that function to avoid or alleviate future
empathic distress and associated feelings of guilt. Hoffman (2000) described guilt as “a painful
feeling of disesteem for oneself, usually accompanied by a sense of urgency, tension, and regret,
that results from empathic feeling for someone in distress, combined with awareness of being
the cause of that distress” (p.114).
Guilt is a powerful motivator, but there are other possible motivators. For example,
reciprocal altruism suggests that we may be motivated to help one another by the expectation
that if we help someone, they will return the favor when we are in need (Laland & Brown,
2011). However, I want to consider the possibility of intrinsic motivation to help others without
any associated survival strategy or feelings of guilt. I want to briefly consider joy. Guilt more
significantly than joy motivates us to avoid harming one another and the ways in which we do
nice things for one another may be less empathically and morally motivated. Still, I want to take
a moment to consider the importance of positive motivation. Writing of involvement in social
and political activism, Berman (1997) posited that “joy comes from living in such a way as to
promote good in the world, being fully present in one’s efforts, and experiencing a sense of
connection with others with a struggle, and with the welfare of the planet as a whole” (p.78).
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Haidt (2003) considered “an emotion triggered by people behaving in a virtuous,
pure, or superhuman way,” such as helping someone in need, and referred to it as elevation.
Haidt (2003) suggested that elevation is experienced affectively as warm, pleasant, tingling
feelings, or openness. Upon witnessing such virtuous acts and experiencing elevation, one is
uplifted and motivated to behave virtuously and help others (Haidt, 2003). Studies following
Haidt’s (2003) concept of elevation have supported the relationship between witnessing a good
deed, experiencing elevation, and engaging in prosocial behavior (Thomson & Siegel, 2013).
Garbarino (2011) similarly referred to “transformational grace,” which could be described as a
state of being intensely and perpetually positively motivated. I suspect that we can only come
to know joy and grace through guilt and shame and that neither pair could exist in the absence
of the other. However, despite the significant prosocial role of guilt, much of the contemporary
work of positive psychology suggests a greater human potential through positive motivation.
3.2.2

Empathic arousal
Hoffman (2000) identified five ways in which empathy is aroused in humans: mimicry,

classical conditioning, direct association, mediated association, and role taking. Mimicry is a
two-step process that occurs in rapid succession. Humans tend to (1) automatically imitate the
facial expression, vocal expression, and posture of one another, and then (2) experience
feedback based on that imitation which causes them to feel a related emotional state. Mimicry
could be considered an egoistic experience of empathy because the observer’s feelings result
from their own imitation of someone else’s expression, but not from their recognition of the
other’s feeling. Mimicry is considered the most basic form of empathy and has been observed in
infants in their first day of life. It may also underlay all of the other ways in which empathy is
aroused. A final note on mimicry- the simple act of mimicry, not only arouses empathy as a
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prosocial motive, but may in itself, be a prosocial act. Mimicry communicates awareness,
involvement, connection, and understanding, of another’s emotional state and even solidarity
between the observer and the other (Hoffman, 2000).
Classical conditioning can also be interpreted similarly to mimicry, as a two-step process
occurring in rapid succession. However, rather than the first step being imitation, the observer
associates the observed situation or display of emotion with emotions that they have previously
experienced. The second step is a similar process of feedback, which is again quite egoistic,
where the observer experiences the emotion that they associate with that observation. The
conditioned emotion isn’t necessarily the same emotion that the observed other experienced.
Classical conditioning has been observed in one day olds when a sucking response was
conditioned to stroking the newborn’s forehead (Hoffman, 2000).
Direct association is an empathic response to a situation where the observer has had a
similar experience. The observer associates the similar experience directly with the situation
that they are observing and feels empathy related to their recollection of the similar experience
(Hoffman, 2000). For example, a child could feel empathic pain in response to seeing their
parent cut themselves, because of their recollection of the pain of having been cut in the past. In
the same example, mimicry might be at work if the child winced in response to their parent’s
facial and vocal expression of pain and experienced empathic distress as a direct result of their
own expression of pain. Also in the same example, classical condition might be at work if the
child became afraid because they had frequently observed that their parent becomes angry
when they get hurt. These three modes of empathic distress are considered to be automatic,
quick acting, and involuntary (Hoffman, 2000). The preceding affective forms of empathy are the
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earliest to “come online” in the course of infancy and early childhood development (Decety &
Michalska, 2010).
Mediated association generally requires language and is a more developmentally
complex process (Hoffman, 2000). Most frequently the empathic feelings are moderated
verbally. For example, someone could arouse an empathic response by saying, “I am sad.” The
observer would process this information and may feel empathic distress that would likely
involve some component of the other modes of empathic arousal. Mediated association can
also be cognitively mediated. Hoffman (2000) gives an example where someone regularly spoke
to their grandmother who was in a coma. The grandchild felt empathy based on their previous
relationship with their grandmother, knowledge of the patient’s situation and the assumption
that their grandmother could hear them, while receiving no cues indicating their grandmother’s
internal state. It becomes clear that mediated association requires a certain level of abstraction
and theory of mind (conception of others as distinctly unique from the self with their own
internal states and goals). Theory of mind is not necessarily prerequisite to the first three modes
of empathic arousal which could conceivably be entirely egoistic. Most neurotypical adults have
a theory of mind. Other animals, such as chimps, also have a theory of mind (Call & Tomasello,
2008). Interestingly, much of the evidence that supports Call & Tomasello’s (2008) conclusion
involves chimps attributing theory of mind to humans. However, as humans, we have hotly
debated whether chimps have a theory of mind for 30 more than years (Call & Tomasello, 2008).
The final mode of empathic arousal that Hoffman (2000) discussed is role-taking
(perspective taking). This is the act of cognitively putting yourself in another’s place and
imagining how they might feel. Role-taking is developmentally advanced and the ways in which
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an observer practicess role-taking is reflective of their personal development. Role-taking may
be either self-focused or other-focused. Self-focused role-taking is the act of observing someone
else and imagining how you would feel in their situation. It is possible, but not ensured that this
will lead to the observer having empathic feelings that are similar to the other. Other-focused
role-taking is the act of observing someone else and imagining how they feel. This requires the
observer to have the ability to conceptualize others as separate and unique individuals. Otherfocused role-taking can be enhanced by the observer’s knowledge about the person that they
observe.
For example, if someone witnessed a mugging, self-focused role-taking could lead the
observer to feel angry while the victim feels unsafe and frightened. It is easy to imagine how this
could lead to victim blaming, especially if the observer was an able-bodied master of karate who
would feel safe confronting the mugger. If the victim was a less able-bodied or elderly individual,
other-focused role-taking might result in the observer feeling a more empathic understanding of
the victim’s fear. How and why folks act on empathic distress will follow, but in the former case,
if the master of karate chose to help, a self-focused role-taking might lead them to help by
confronting the mugger and other-focused role-taking might be more likely to lead them to
focus their effort on comforting or protecting the victim.
Self-focused and other-focused role-taking can both be prosocial motives and neither
necessarily results in the empathic observer having similar feelings to the one who they observe.
While other-focused role-taking is a more cognitively advanced task, both can serve as prosocial
motives. Commonly role-taking is a combination of self and other-focused. Additionally, all of
the modes of empathic arousal complement each other and may be experienced in various
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combinations. In the case of the mugging example, it is likely that the observer would feel
empathy not only based on role taking, but also by observation of the victim’s reaction in the
form of mimicry, classical conditioning, or direct association, or the victim’s verbal response,
through mediated association.
In relationship to ecological degradation mediated association and perspective taking
warrant further exploration. Plous (2003) observed humans feeling empathy for other animals
depicted being beaten. (Franklin et al., 2013) provided neurological support for Plous’(2003)
claim that humans feel empathy for non-human animals and that many of the same regions of
the brain associated with empathy become active whether observing a human or other animal
suffering. However, Franklin et al. (2012) noted that the processes are not a match and that
different regions of the brain are significantly more active when observing human suffering.
Franklin et al. (2012) suspected that this difference may be related to the way humans
differently perceive animals which may relate to culture and individual differences. It seems
conceivable that some humans would directly associate a non-human animal’s pain with their
own experiences of pain. However, knowledge or beliefs about other animal species (for
example beliefs about similarity to non-human animals) probably do cognitively mediate the
empathy that we feel for them (empathic bias is explored in the following section). Thus, by
encouraging people to take the perspective of a non-human animal, they feel greater empathy,
and thus concern for the animal (Berenguer, 2010; Schultz, 2000).
In the case of application of empathic arousal to broader environmental issues, certain
environmental (social & ecological) knowledge related to the consequences of our actions likely
mediates our empathic arousal regarding environmental issues (Berenguer, 2010). Furthermore,
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although the welfare of animals is intrinsically important, concern for an individual nonhuman animal has been shown to increase concern, more generally for the environment (Myers,
Saunders, & Garrett, 2003, 2004). Thus, encouraging empathic concern for animals is important
not only for animals as individuals and as a species, but for ecological restoration as a whole. I
revisit concern for other animals in the Moral Limitations and Conflicts section.
3.2.3

Discipline and intervention
Hoffman (2000) suggested that feelings of empathic distress motivate prosocial or

helping behavior and moral internalization through a translation from empathy to sympathy and
associated feelings of guilt. The modes of empathic arousal that have so far been discussed,
primarily assume that the empathic observer is an innocent bystander and has not been
involved in the transgression that resulted in the emotional state of the target. Hoffman
suggests that children develop morally through their own transgressions and resulting
disciplinary action. Based on those experiences, children begin to make inductions to more
general situations and self-discipline through guilt. Moral development through induction builds
capacity for feelings of guilt over inaction or anticipatory guilt over inaction that encourage
helping behavior in situations where the actor is an innocent bystander. It also fosters a
conception of one’s role as a virtual transgressor in situations where one may feel complicit in a
transgression that they are not directly involved in.
Socialization is the key to understanding moral internalization. Hoffman (2000)
specifically investigates the role of power in discipline/intervention, most significantly by
children’s parents, but not exclusively. The way that children are disciplined in situations where
they are the transgressor hugely influences how and when they will feel guilt and how helping
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behavior will be triggered or catalyzed in the future. An understanding of this aspect of the
socialization process in moral internalization will set the stage for understanding the myriad
forms of guilt that humans feel, empathic biases, moral exclusion, and the moral principles that
guide our interactions with one another.
Hoffman (2000) defines three forms of discipline: power assertion, love withdrawal, and
induction. Power assertion can be physical, as punitive or constraining discipline, or nonphysical. Power assertive methods of discipline may be softened with explanations but all rely
primarily on an assertion of power of a guardian or other authority figure over the child. An
example of a punitive-physical power assertion is spanking a child and an example of
constraining is picking up and moving the child. An example of a non-physical power assertion is
a firm and authoritative correction, like, “No! Don’t ever do that again.” While this is the least
conducive method to empathy development, Hoffman (2000) points out that unqualified power
assertion is necessary in emergencies. Power assertion can also be used in conjunction with
other discipline methods. Love withdrawal may be silent or explicit. An example of silent love
withdrawal is ignoring a child who is misbehaving and an example of explicit love withdrawal is
sending a child to their room, or saying, “I don’t like you when you act that way.” While power
assertion is more likely to result in a child feeling fear, love withdrawal is more likely to result in
anxiety.
Inductive interventions are most conducive to empathic and moral development. In
inductive intervention, the child’s guardian or other authority figure helps a child who has acted
as transgressor to understand how their actions affect others. An example is a guardian telling a
child, “when you hit them, it hurt them and made them cry. You should never hit someone
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because it hurts them. If you said you were sorry, they would feel better.” Developmentally
appropriate inductive-interventions accomplish two things that the other forms of discipline do
not. First, they call attention to the emotional distress of others triggering the child’s own
empathy and fostering the child’s empathic distress. Second, they help the child understand
their role in causing the emotional distress of the other and helps the child to feel empathybased guilt. This encourages children to avoid the transgression in the future and to make
reparations when they do transgress. This establishes an emotional guilt-script that children
eventually internalizes and follows without the guidance of a guardian or authority figure:
Transgression -> Induction -> Empathic Distress and Guilt -> Reparation.
As with the modes of empathic arousal, methods of discipline rarely fall neatly into just
one category. Often discipline involves components of all three. I recall an incidence of bullying
on a nature hike that I led. One of the kids had been consistently bullying the others and at one
point the kid picked up a stick and chased another other down the trail with it. The immediate
need was to stop the dangerous situation. I’ve rarely raised my voice to children, but I yelled for
them to stop and put down the stick. They stopped near me and started arguing. I said
something to the effect that I didn’t care who started it but it needed to stop. Once it seemed
like the immediate danger was diminished we discussed what had happened. Both kids were
still angry and I was also upset and our attempt to discuss the situation was not very productive.
I had the entire group hike silently for the next ten minutes or so and asked them to think over
what had happened. This also gave me a chance to calm down and think about the situation.
When we stopped, we gathered in a circle and I explained that I didn’t mean to yell at them, but
that I was scared someone was going to get hurt. As a group we discussed what had happened
and brainstormed how to get along better and resolve disagreements as a group for the rest of
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our time together. At the time, I wasn’t thinking about different methods of discipline or how
they relate to moral development. I was just reacting. I share this story because I think it
illustrates the types of discipline and their relationships in a common situation. My initial
reaction was very power assertive, then I attempted induction, which was unsuccessful because
tensions were too high, so I used something like love withdrawal by asking them to hike silently
for 10 minutes. After that, I tried to soften this love withdrawal with an explanation and apology
and then tried induction for the second time which seemed more successful than my first
attempt. I don’t know if I handled the situation well and I often worry that the kid who had
chased the other with the stick will wind up in trouble in the future. However, I’ve better
understood the concepts of moral development through consideration of my own life. I doubt
that one experience on a class field trip significantly affected the kid’s established behavior and
bullying often correlates with anti-social behavior in adult and the consequences are much more
significant.
3.2.4

Guilt
With an understanding of the complexities and abstractions involved in guilt and the

related empathic biases, the ways in which we come to establish our moral principles and
specifically our concepts of justice become apparent. Hoffman (2000) identified the
prerequisites for guilt as: an awareness of another’s distress, a sense of control over one’s
actions, an awareness of the consequences of one’s actions, the ability to attribute causality to
those actions, and the ability to tell the difference between intentional actions and accidents.
This begins to extend the concept of guilt beyond guilt associated with transgression (having
directly caused the pain of another) and anticipatory guilt (relating to guilt felt prior to or in
contemplation of a potential transgression), and guilt over inaction (guilt felt for not helping in
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bystander context) to guilt in a more abstract sense, such as guilt over virtual transgressions.
Virtual transgressions are transgressions where a transgression isn’t directly committed,
however the transgressor (reasonably or unreasonably) perceives that their behavior caused
harm.
Relationship guilt occurs in close personal relationships (Hoffman, 2000). It can result
from transgressions, ranging from forgotten appointments to betrayals of confidence, or it can
relate to a feeling guilty for another’s distress when there is no indication that it is the result of
one’s own transgression. This is commonly, but not exclusively, felt in romantic relationships,
when someone feels that their partner is upset and assumes, even when told otherwise, that
they must have done something wrong and they feel guilty for it. Similarly, responsibility guilt is
related to feelings of responsibility for another’s wellbeing. Responsibility guilt doesn’t
necessitate a close relationship. For example, in a disaster, a city official might feel responsibility
guilt for the suffering of folks in that city, despite evidence that there was nothing the official
could have done to prevent it (Hoffman, 2000).
Developmental guilt includes guilt related to separation from friends and family, guilt
over achievement, and guilt over affluence. Hoffman (2000) stated that
an individualistic, competitive society like ours can make growing up and
pursuing normal personal goals and interests the context for virtual
transgressions involving ‘developmental guilt.’ (p.182)
It is important to understand that virtual transgressions result in real guilt and are only virtual in
the sense that they are not perpetrated with an intention or awareness of their potential for
harm (Hoffman, 2000). I think virtual transgressions are easiest to understand in the context of
separation guilt. When a young person leaves home for the first time to attend college and
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leaves behind friends and family, they may experience a feeling of guilt. This is a virtual
transgression, but there is a very real chance that their friends and family will miss them and
suffer emotional distress. Assuming that the student is not attending college out of malice or
contempt for their friends and family, this would not be considered to be a transgression in the
dominant US American culture. It is considered a developmentally normal process for young
people to leave home to attend college so it is a virtual transgression.
Guilt over achievement is incrementally more complex with regard to the virtual nature
of virtual transgressions (Hoffman, 2000). Rooted in social comparison, achievement is
commonly a competitive endeavor. In school, kids may feel guilty for earning high grades while
other students are less academically successful because they recognize the effect of social
comparison on a peer’s self-esteem. In other cases, achievement may be earned at the direct
expense of another. Receiving a top scholarship, winning first place in a competition, or earning
a promotion, all dictate that someone else didn’t get the scholarship, didn’t win, or didn’t get
the promotion.
Guilt over affluence requires some form of exposure to folks who are less fortunate and
cultural context that does not provide justification for disparities in wealth and racial
superiority. Guilt over affluence is guilt felt having more than others. While transgression guilt
may be alleviated by a single act of restitution, those who feel guilt over affluence may feel
compelled to participate in sustained activity to relieve human suffering (Hoffman, 2000).
As with bystander guilt, if one does nothing one continues to feel guilty; blames
victims; cognitively restructures to justify inaction, deny or justify ones
affluence: “They have their pleasures and enjoy the way they live”; “I worked
hard for what I have.” (Hoffman, 2000, p.186)
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Guilt over affluence begins to push the limits of the virtual nature of virtual transgressions- at
least to those with socialist perspective. Many transgressions only remain virtual, in a capitalist
system, with norms of meritocracy, and with the contribution of ignorance, moral bias and
moral exclusion. Without such defenses, I find affluence and the following transgressions are
not virtual because they are at the direct expense of other people. Guilt by association refers to
guilt caused by association with a particular social group that one considers culpable. In the case
of affluence, it may be class association. Guilt by association could also relate to association with
a political or religious group. More generally, guilt over affluence and guilt by association are
guilt felt over relative advantage (Hoffman, 2000). This might more aptly be referred to as
privilege guilt in a social justice context.
A final consideration, as alluded to in the description of guilt over affluence, is victim
blaming. Victim blaming is a process of justifying the suffering of others. Especially in a
bystander situation, victim blaming “puts psychological distance between bystander and victim
and reduces the bystander’s empathic distress and motivation to help” (Hoffman, 2000, p.94).
This is especially common when the bystander doesn’t feel able to help.
What may transform empathic distress into guilt feeling, is that one cannot
justify and therefore does not deserve the advantages one has over the victim;
that one’s advantage, surviving or being affluent while others starve or die,
violates the principle of fairness, justice, or reciprocity. One has an empathic
feeling of injustice that is transformed into guilt feeling, because one is the
beneficiary of the injustice. (Hoffman, 2000, p.190)
An illustration of the role of guilt is provided by one of the Holocaust rescuers interviewed by
Oliner & Oliner (1988):
It was unfair that I was safe simply because I was born a Protestant. That was
the main reason for me. What I did was a question of justice. It was a humble
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thing because I was in a privileged situation compared with other people who
didn’t deserve their situation at all. (p.166)
In summary, there are four categories of guilt arousing processes, according to Hoffman
(2000): (1) guilt resulting from external intervention such as induction with children, (2) guilt
spontaneously (as a result of internalization) following a perceived transgression, (3) guilt
spontaneously following an ambiguous situation such as relationship guilt, (4) guilt following
inaction as a bystander. Finally, “empathy-based transgression guilt may be the prototype for all
empathy-based guilt, real or imagined” (Hoffman, 2000, p.193). According to our feelings of guilt
and the inductions that we make in response we begin to construct moral frameworks regarding
appropriate ways of interacting with one another.
3.3

Limitations of Empathy
Hoffman’s (2000) examination of the limitations of empathy is strictly in consideration

of empathy as a prosocial motive. Empathy is addressed as a process including empathy and
sympathy rather than the simple outcome of emotional state matching. Hoffman (2000) did
explicitly refer to humans as highly or less empathic, in reference to capacity for an empathic
outcome such as feeling what another feels. However, the value of understanding the
limitations of empathy is in understanding empathy as a process where the most important
outcome is not state matching but motivation to help. Although the intensity of emotion
experienced by an empathic witness may be a significant motivator, those who Hoffman (2000)
suggested are less empathic may be motivated cognitively. Thus the focus on empathic
limitations is focused on ways in which (cognitive and affective) empathy may preclude helping
behavior.
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The limitations of empathy include potentially self-destructive and certainly limiting
reactions to empathic distress, differences in the character of the empathic individual, and
empathic biases that may interfere with the guilt-scripts that motivate us to help each other.
The limiting reactions to empathic distress include empathic over-arousal, compassion fatigue,
individual character differences, and empathic bias.
3.3.1

Empathic over-arousal and compassion fatigue
Empathic over-arousal is an “involuntary process that occurs when [an] observer’s

empathic distress becomes so painful and intolerable that it is transformed into intense feelings
of personal distress, which may move the person out of the empathic mode entirely” (Hoffman,
2000, p.198). Instances of empathic over-arousal may also result in egoistic drift, where the
empathic distress triggers a process where someone gets so caught up in their own feelings that
they are forced to attend to their personal distress and disengage from the from the feelings
associated to the person experiencing distress. However, empathic over-arousal can also serve
as a prosocial motive by intensifying a person’s attention and helping behavior, even to the
point where it becomes all-consuming if the situation does not become so overwhelming that
they disengage entirely (Hoffman, 2000).
Compassion fatigue results from prolonged or continuous states at or near the point of
empathic over-arousal. These processes may also result in “vicarious traumatization” (trauma
and empathic disorders are briefly discussed following the discussion of limitations to empathy).
One way that folks defensively cope with or avoid compassion fatigue results from habituation.
Continued exposure to another’s distress over time, may result in a process of habituation,
which diminishes empathic distress to the point where a person may become indifferent to
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another’s suffering (Hoffman, 2000). Hoffman (2000) primarily used examples of medical
professionals to illustrate these concepts such as a medical student unable to cope with regular
interactions with a terminally ill patient and a doctor who seems unaffected. However
compassion fatigue, habituation and trauma also relate to situations where youth are regularly
experiencing violence (see 3.9 Outlying Behavior p.145) (Garbarino, 1996). Berman (1997) and
Oliner & Oliner (1988) both discussed the importance of community in overcoming compassion
fatigue, among contemporary US American activists by the former, and Holocaust rescuers by
the latter. Many of the folks, who continually placed themselves in situations arousing severe
empathic distress discussed their reliance on a supportive community (S. Berman, 1997; Oliner
& Oliner, 1988).
3.3.2

Character difference
There are also individual characteristics that affect how an individual might respond to

the emotional distress of another. The first is described as empathic tendency and suggests that
some folks are more empathic than others (Hoffman, 2000). This refers to the empathic
outcome of emotional state matching. Those who are considered highly empathic, in some
cases, may be less able to help, due to their empathic distress (Hoffman, 2000). Those who are
better equipped to regulate their emotions, handle anxiety, and cope with empathic distress are
better able to avoid empathic over-arousal (Hoffman, 1981). One method of regulating
emotions is distancing oneself from a patient or victim (Hoffman, 2000). By recognizing the
other as distinct from the self and “maintaining a sense of whose feelings belong to whom,”
(Decety & Jackson, 2006, p.56) empathic over-arousal may be reduced or avoided. The process
of distancing may result in more pronounced dissociation. Oliner & Oliner (1988) found feelings
of dissociation from Holocaust victims to be equally common among rescuers and non-rescuers.
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Finally, a sense of self-efficacy also contributed to helping behavior and reduced the risk of
empathic over-arousal (Hoffman, 2000). Those who feel more able to help are more likely to
help and feel less overwhelmed by the empathy that they feel. This is easy to understand in the
context of guilt scripts and in the identification of empathy as a prosocial motive. Empathic
distress is relieved by helping. However, helplessness and hopelessness can be exacerbated by
the described character differences in increase empathic bias.
3.3.3

Empathic bias
Empathic bias may be related to human nature but are also deeply related to

socialization. Empathic bias falls into two categories, familiarity bias, and here-and-now bias.
Familiarity bias refers to an empathic bias towards those who one is familiar with including bias
that favors one’s in-group, one’s friends, and those who one finds to be similar to one’s self. The
evolutionary argument for familiarity bias is that humans evolved in small groups where
resources were scarce and the small groups of early humans were in competition for resources
so an empathic bias towards one’s own in-group favored group survival (Hoffman, 2000).
Hoffman (2000) cites in-group bias as a factor in violent crimes where perpetrators feel
diminished transgression guilt by distancing themselves from their victims by derogating them
or even viewing them as subhumans. This was certainly the case during the Holocaust (Oliner &
Oliner, 1988). The nature of the relationship between friends fosters greater understanding of
one another and a stronger sense of preference for one another and is referred to as friendship
bias. It remains unclear, however, in Hoffman’s (2000) work, whether the actual feelings of
empathy are stronger between friends, or if the bias is due to the voluntary and reciprocal
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nature of friendship. Still, the bias towards prosocial behavior between those who we have
close personal relationships with (e.g., friends and family) is evident.
Similarity bias can also be considered more generally. Real or perceived similarity (with
examples in gender and personality) results in greater expressions of empathy (Hoffman, 2000).
Oliner & Oliner (1988) found that many rescuers seemed to assume Jewish people were similar
to them, regardless of any experience with them. Actual familiarity with the Jewish people as
measured by rescuer accounts of social relations with Jewish people and knowledge of Jewish
culture was not found to be an indicator for or against rescue. I posit that an observer must feel
some sense of connection to the target in order to feel empathy. A perception that the target is
similar to ones self (even in the vaguest way) establishes some affinity with (if not for, as in
friendship bias) the target. Such an association may be necessary for empathy. Increased
familiarity with the target may further increase the empathic connection, especially if the
observer is fond of the target. Similarity bias has also been shown to affect human empathy for
non-human animals. We feel greater empathy for animals that we perceive to be more similar
to us such as monkeys than animals that we perceive to be less similar like pheasants (Plous,
2003).
Empathic bias is likely a significant factor in racism. In non-human species kin-selection
suggests a bias towards the most genetically similar members of a species (Laland & Brown,
2011). However in humans, it has been well proven that similarities in phenotypic variation such
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as skin color do not correlate with genetic similarity (Guest, 2014). Humans have never
become genetically different enough from other contemporaneously living humans to prevent
interbreeding19 thus significant genetic drift among any sub-population of humans is extremely
unlikely (Guest, 2014). Homo sapiens have always shared the same genetic pool and genetic
variation has occurred in geographic clines (Guest, 2014). Archaic Homo sapiens (Neanderthals)
are believed to have coexisted with modern Homo sapiens for around 4,000 years from 32,000
years before present (yBP) to 28,000 yBP, and a consensus on the cause of disappearance of
Neanderthals has not been reached (Guest, 2014). However there is evidence that Neanderthals
and modern Homo sapiens did interbreed and Neanderthal genes may be present in the modern
human gene pool (Guest, 2014).
There may have never, at any point in human evolution, been a genetic basis for
multiple races among humans (if the inability to interbreed defines speciation). Evolved bias
towards one’s own family and friends is reasonable, but an evolved preference for a larger
ethnic or racial group, beyond a concept of an extended family, must be primarily socially
influenced. None of this denies the very real existence of familiarity bias, but if causality for a
racial in-group bias was attributed to genetics rather than socialization it would it would imply
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Definitions of speciation are quite controversial. The commonly held definitions of speciation is that
cross-breeding is either impossible, sterile, or results in sterile offspring (e.g., mules) (McWorter, 2010).
As race was beginning to being scientificly formalized in the United States it was proposed in 1943 that
humans of mixed race suffered from health problems and were generally infertile (McWorter, 2010). As
discussed in the section on the evolution of empathy, the use of concepts of species to establish races
among humans is a distortion of genetics as a tool for racial oppression. As a final note, McWorter (2010)
notes that the commonly held definition of species (based in sexual reproduction) is frequently used to
derogate non-heterosexual and transgender individuals.
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that there is some evolutionary basis for race. Race is entirely socially constructed but
empathic bias based on familiarity may be biological. If, through socialization we are racialized
then racial in-group bias becomes real even if there is no genetic precedent for it. Simply stated:
“situations defined as real are real in their consequences” (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.260).
We may feel more similar to others based on familiarity or in-group membership and
thus be disposed to empathic bias. For humans to have a sense of familiarity based on likely
common experiences related to the process of racialization seems reasonable. At the individual
level, and when not taken to the extreme, this is not necessarily problematic and can quite
healthy (e.g., affinity groups). Obviously, this becomes problematic when one person views
another as so dissimilar they fail to feel any sympathy (see 3.7.1 Moral exclusion p.116). This
becomes extremely problematic when a powerful group acts drastically according to their own
in-group bias and systematically denies justice to those outside their group.
The final type of empathic bias is here-and-now bias and suggests that humans have
heightened receptivity to the events that are spatially and temporally immediate (Hoffman,
2001). This suggests that people would feel a greater sense of empathy in a situation where they
are a bystander or transgressor than in virtual transgressions. During the Holocaust, 70% of the
rescuers made their decision to help within minutes of consideration and more than half were
motivated to help by the immediacy of the violation of the social norms that they valued (Oliner
& Oliner, 1988). Furthermore, 78% of rescuers took their first action because someone asked
them for help, making the situation real and immediate (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).
Although this chapter is dedicated to a descriptive investigation of the moral
development process, I refuse to leave this section on the limitations of empathy stand as an
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account of human deficits. Regardless of whether empathic limitations part of human nature,
we are not bound by them. The limitations to human empathy present educational opportunity
to strive with our students to reach a greater potential. It is clear, even before delving into
human morality and the moral development process that fostering and facilitating empathic
induction is a significant point of behavioral intervention. We can facilitate experiences to build
self-efficacy and teach coping skills to encourage sympathetic action and reduce empathic overarousal. We can help students to see the connections between their local actions and global
consequences and the interconnectedness of the world to reduce here-and-now bias. We can
also support students in exploring their own identities and honoring world cultures with crosscultural curriculum and encourage appreciate the similarities and difference among all peoples
to encourage empathy by positively utilizing similarity and familiarity biases (see 4.4 Pedagogy
of Identity p.220). Finally, the limitations to empathy are functionally necessary to a certain
extent. We simply don’t have the capacity mentally, emotionally, or practically, to feel empathy
and sympathy and to take restitutionary action in response to every transgression and injustice
in the world. As Hoffman (2000) suggested,” if people empathized with everyone in distress and
tried to help them all equally, society might quickly come to a halt” (p. 14).
3.4

Morality
The development of empathy and its relation to guilt, in consideration of empathic bias,

and contemporaneous cognitive development shape one’s moral development (Hoffman, 2000).
According to one’s experience throughout the empathy and moral development process one’s
sense of morality may differ significantly from others. Thus, it is useful to disambiguate morality
into distinctly philosophical and psychological components. The psychological component
relates to how one’s sense of morality develops and the philosophical component relates to the
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nature of morality (Peter H. Kahn, 1999). Hoffman (2000) generally proceeded without such
disambiguation and favors a psychological approach to morality focused on development.
According to Hoffman (2000) one’s philosophic concept of morality is significantly a result of
socialization in the moral development process (following David Hume20).
I proceed with Hoffman’s (2000) framework for morality which provides significant
depth and insight, but it will be useful to begin with a brief exploration of morality as a more
distinctly deontological idea. Kahn (1999) considered morality more philosophically than
Hoffman (2000) and suggested that morality is objective (Immanuel Kant as interpreted by Eliot
Turiel). Kahn (1999) defined two categories of moral judgments: obligatory moral judgments
and discretionary moral judgments. Obligatory judgments are defined to be (1) universally
applicable to all morally similar situations, (2) not contingent on societal rules, laws or,
conventions, (3) justified by principles such as fairness, justice, welfare, or rights. However, Kahn
(1999) did not ignore cultural context in the universality of obligatory moral judgments as
illuminated by the following example: devout Hindus believe that is immoral for a widow to eat
fish. At first glance there seems to be nothing universal about this, but in the context of Hindu
culture, if the widow eats fish it would torment her husband’s spirit and cause the widow to

20

As discussed in the introduction and in the context of the evolution of empathy, I find it important to
know the history of ideas. I would have loved to have explored the history of moral philosophy, moral
psychology, and human development more fully in order to understand how our understanding of these
topics may have developed in social and historical context. However, these are timeless questions, and
the body of work is too vast to even adequately cover current understandings. With this in mind, I have
tried to at least mention some of the influences of the scholars those more familiar with the field (or
those seeking to learn more) have a sense of the traditions that are being explored.
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suffer. Kahn (1999) pointed out that these beliefs may differ from our own personal beliefs
but that the “underlying concern for the welfare of others is congruent with our own” (Peter H.
Kahn, 1999, p.204). Kahn’s (1999) pluralistic considerations are very strictly limited by the
concept of moral universality, though.
The second qualification that obligatory moral judgments are not contingent on societal
rules, laws, or conventions relates to the universality of the principles. Children seem to easily
conceptualize this. When presented with a scenario where the principal of a school has
announced that it is OK to hit other students, and asked if it would be OK to hit another student,
most children will respond that would still not OK because it is never OK to hit someone.
However, if presented with a scenario where the principal has declared that is OK to call
teachers by their first names rather than Mr. or Mrs. and asked if that OK, most children
respond that would be as long as it is ok with the teacher. The distinction is that the first case
violates a moral that most children learn and internalize early in life and the second is just a
social convention and that violating the first causes harm while the violating the second does
not cause harm. The former is considered the moral domain and the latter is the conventional
domain.
Social conventions and moral norms are culturally constructed and may serve to
maintain order and structure to social interactions and thus may be prosocial. For that reason,
following norms and conventions is often a moral judgment even if the norms or conventions
are not morally obligatory. However, moral norms are not necessarily prosocial or aligned with
one’s individual moral judgments which may lead to significant conflict. Thus, it may be very
difficult to determine which domain a conflict resides in and may not be as objective as Kahn
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(1999) and the social domain theorists suggest, where the moral domain always trumps the
conventional. If morality is relative, then what is posited to be morally universal is actually
relative to the status quo and obligatory moral judgments would largely reduce to a matter of
conformity. I explore moral relativism in greater detail in the Moral Limitations and Conflicts
section.
Discretionary moral judgments are beyond what is obligatory or what is demanded by a
situation. They may be judgments that would encourage morally “good” (or supererogatory)
actions that are not morally mandated (obligatory judgments). Thus, inaction wouldn’t be
considered immoral. One example of a discretionary moral judgment that Kahn (1999) gives is
the decision whether or not to make a charitable donation. Not donating to charity isn’t
generally a moral transgression (in Western culture), but many would suggest that it is a good
thing to do.
Kahn (1999) also categorized moral judgments into positive and negative morals (i.e.,
do’s and do-not’s). Kahn (1999) found that positive-discretionary moral action to be the most
praiseworthy, followed by positive-obligatory moral action, and negative obligatory moral action
least praiseworthy. The interpretation that Kahn (1999) focused on is that the least
praiseworthy actions are so stringently applied that they are not praiseworthy. Thus, we place
greater emphasis on negative morals (Kahn, 1999). This seems consistent with Hoffman’s (2000)
emphasis on guilt as a motivator because it primarily motivates folks to avoid transgressions. It
also reflects an orientation towards action over inaction (e.g. picking up litter over not littering).
For example, action in accordance with a negative-obligatory morals, such as not littering
doesn’t win praise, while violation of a negative-obligatory moral (littering) brings scorn. In
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contradistinction action in accordance with positive-discretionary morals, such as picking up
litter is praiseworthy, while inaction (not picking up every piece of litter we pass) usually
warrants neither praise nor scorn.
In consideration the reality of degradation in the world, Kahn’s (1999) presumption that
morality is universal led to its logical conclusion: “it is less the case that societies differ morally,
and more the case that some societies (ours included) are involved explicitly in immoral
practices” (Peter H. Kahn, 1999, pp.205-206). I refuse such a deficit approach and find it
imperative that this be reframed. Kahn’s position is a rational conclusion given the assumption
of obligatory moral judgments that are always entirely salient. Rather than believing in “iniquity
that smites the land21,” I follow Hoffman (2000) in more nuanced exploration of moral
development. As Hoffman (2000) explained, in the course of moral development, differing
experiences (and character differences) may cause people recognize and respond to moral
conflicts differently and with greater or lesser influence on different moral principles. Hoffman’s
(2000) approach leaves more room for a sympathetic perspective on human behavior and
seems less conducive to such broad condemnation of societies as explicitly immoral. However,
bear in mind that while Hoffman (2000) attempted to understand variability in moral judgments,
Hoffman (2000) also rejected moral relativism.
3.5

21

Moral Development

As the author of the poem cited by Glasser (2007) did. Recall that he was contemplating suicide.
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The moral development process that Hoffman’s (2000) theory modeled is very similar
to the empathy development process. Hoffman’s (2000) theory assumes affective primacy and
focuses most significantly on socialization but does not ignore the influence of cognitive
development as explored by Piaget and Kohlberg. In this section I center Hoffman’s moral
development model, while attempting to consider, critique, and integrate multiple moral
development models. Moral development begins with personal experiences as a bystander or
victim and socialization-primarily in the home through induction guided by a parent or guardian
(Hoffman, 2000). The induction step continues with socialization beyond the home: in peer
interactions, in school, and by media. Thus begins a process of abstraction and organization of
moral principles based on those experiences. Finally a phase of commitment takes place, where
the moral principles are accepted and internalized. Beyond that point triggering events may
make the principles more concrete and dictate moral action or restructuring of moral principles.
The nature of triggering or catalyzing events will be examined at the end of the chapter.
The foundation of moral development as conceptualized by Hoffman (2000) is empathy
development. The capacity for (or more precisely tendency towards) empathy develops in
accordance with the brain’s development. Infants experience empathy globally and do not
distinguish others emotions from their own. For example, the newborn reactive cry is a
tendency for newborn infants to cry when they hear another infant cry (Hoffman, 2000).
“Indistinguishable from the spontaneous cry of an infant who is in actual discomfort,” it is “an
innate, isomorphic response to a cry of another being of the same species” (Hoffman, 2000,
p.65). Later in early childhood, children become aware of others distress but they respond as if it
were their own. Thus, their response to another’s distress is to seek comfort for themselves.
Next the child’s experience with empathy becomes quasi-egocentric (generally early in their
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second year). In this stage, the child is able to distinguish another’s distress from their own,
however they still have difficulty conceptualizing others as having unique inner states. Thus, a
prosocially motivated quasi-egocentric child would attempt to comfort another child by the
same means that they would comfort themselves. Finally, by late in the second year children
begin to understand others as unique individuals with distinct needs and motivations and begin
to more significantly practice more developed forms of empathy (i.e., mediated association and
other-focused role-taking). Later, and into adulthood children begin considering not only the
immediate distress of an individual, but their life condition (Hoffman, 2000).
An early concept of right and wrong that precedes significant empathic and moral
development is deference to authority (Gibbs, 2014). A child in the egocentric stage of empathy
development may not significantly consider how their actions affect others, but they will likely
be aware of rules and the consequences for breaking those rules (e.g., never hit because you get
in trouble if you hit). The moral development process most significantly begins when the child
starts to make inductions in accordance with empathic distress or guilt experienced as observer
or transgressor. These inductions lead young children to generalized conclusions about the
consequences of their behavior and ultimately, based on those consequences, the child begins
to formulate concepts of right and wrong. For young children, empathic induction likely
addresses the most immediately salient elements of the transgression and the target’s response
(e.g., never steal sister’s toy because she will cry). As children cognitively develop their induction
process becomes more encompassing and the inductions are integrated into a more
comprehensive moral framework. As children enter school their social environments and
influences begin to expand. Children continue making inductions, achieve a greater social
understanding beyond the home, and their perspectives become less egocentric. This process is
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the result of cognitive and affective development as well as socialization (Gibbs, 2014;
Hoffman, 2000).
The abstraction and organization stage involves peer interactions where a child begins
to accommodate other perspectives and claims (Hoffman, 2001). This decentering and demand
for social reciprocity enables the child to understand bias in their own and others’ claims, and
induction helps the child become receptive to others claims and forms empathy-based concepts
of fairness (Hoffman, 2001). However, theorists such as Kohlberg suggested the cognitive
development process leads to universal tendencies in human cognition, and in turn morality
(Gibbs, 2014). Gibbs (2014) seeks a middle ground and argues for affective-cognitive co-primacy.
Following Gibbs (2014) I favor co-primacy. Depending on one’s own experiences and cultural
context different emphasis on various moral principles may take precedent (Hoffman, 2000).
However, cognitive development likely increases a child’s tendency22 towards greater social
understanding (Gibbs, 2014). Furthermore there may be elements of morality that universally
result from the way our brains develop and function (i.e., objective morality). The most
important conclusion for my purposes is that all but the most extreme of outliers (see 3.9
Outlying Behavior p.145) develop a moral framework through some process of abstraction and
organization.

22

Gibbs (2014) according with neo-Piagetian thought, does not consider such cognitive development to
limit children’s capacities, but to influence their tendencies.
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The demand for reciprocity among humans may a universal process. Although
interpreted and emphasized differently among individuals and cultures, reciprocity seems to be
universally considered among humans (Gibbs, 2014). It is possible that reciprocity is a social
norm that is widely (or universally) present in human societies for its “functional value for
promoting and stabilizing social relationships” (Gibbs, 2014, p.56). It may also be that reciprocity
is universally a result of cognitive construction and “a natural preference for balance and
harmony” (Gibbs, 2014, p.56). I favor Gibbs’ (2014) conclusion that reciprocity is both cognitivedevelopmental and normative. An affective response to violations of reciprocity and motivation
to restore harmony may not be significantly influenced by the domain in which reciprocity
resides. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to expect that regardless of degradation of society
some social norms must be aligned with the moral judgments of the majority of individuals.
After all, social norms are socially constructed. Regardless of the subjectivity implicated by a
moral model that maintains the primacy of socialization, there must be a universal need for
some sort of fairness or harmony among (but not exclusively among) humans.
On the point of reciprocity and subjectivity, the cognitive-developmental theory
warrants more attention. As one advances through Kohlberg’s moral stages, their concept of
reciprocity is expected to change. Hoffman (2000) saw reciprocity as neutral and with the
potential for prosocial or non-prosocial motivation. However, based on Kohlberg’s theory, Gibbs
(2014) suggested that reciprocity becomes distinctly and universally prosocial because the
emphasis shifts from the ‘immature’ tit for tat mentality to the ‘mature’ consideration of how
one prefers to be treated in one’s treatment of others. Essentially, the ‘mature’ form of
reciprocity is a merged form of reciprocity and perspective taking without a strict (or vengeful)
demand for reciprocation from others. This advancement through the stages is characterized by
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a transition starting with deference to authority, to the recognition of multiple perspectives
(relativism) and then to a universal moral framework.
Kohlberg cunningly established a universal invariant sequence of moral development
that suggested a universal concept of morality was a result of advancing through a hierarchical
concept of morality. Thus,
Unbridled relativism seemed to Kohlberg to be inherently unstable from internal
contradictions: if all morality is subjective, arbitrary, and relative, then why
wouldn’t those characteristics apply to the attendant claim that one should not
impose one’s morality on others? Accordingly, relativism undermines itself.
Hence, sooner or later (at least for reflective adults, postmodernists
notwithstanding) … the internal contradictions of meta-ethical relativism should
eventually “disequilibrate” or perplex the thinker and prompt a
“reequilibration” leading to movement beyond unbridled relativism to the
achievement of post-skeptical rationalism. (Gibbs, 2014, pp. 87-88)
Finally, Kohlberg posited that such rationalism would give way to universal moral judgments in
the highest levels of moral development which are reached only by a minority of individuals.
“Even in the adult years, only 13% fully or partially reached [the highest stages], and all of those
had some graduate education” (Gibbs, 2014, p.90). As Gibbs (2014) suggested, this is extremely
problematic “because any theory-defining level, even in broadened form, misrepresents moral
judgment maturity as the exclusive province of [those who are] philosophically or theoretically
articulate” (p.90).
Hoffman (2000) did not dictate a hierarchical or invariant sequence, beyond basic
assumptions of human growth and development. However, nothing (to my understanding)
about Hoffman’s (2000) theory suggests the impossibility of a cognitively influenced tendency
towards specific developmental results as Kohlberg posited. In fact, co-occurring cognitive
development is assumed throughout the model. As Hoffman (2000) also explicitly rejected
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relativism, some ideal result of the developmental process is implicit (e.g., objectively correct
moral judgments23). As Berman (1997) suggested, children selectively appropriate the material
provided to them and their moral judgments are not entirely dependent on socialization. Thus,
the theories are not a match, but neither are they incompatible. I see both deontological and
consequentialist theories as important pieces in a puzzle that remains unentirely solved. In a
complex physical and social world it is certain that multiple influences including and beyond
those that we have explored influence the development of our sense of right and wrong.
Finally, once someone forms moral principles (described in the following section) they
begin to commit to them. Commitment represents internalization, self-image, and a sense of
responsibility associated with moral principle (Hoffman, 2000). Hoffman (2000) noted that
during adolescence abstraction and organization process is significantly reconsidered when “one
constructs one’s own set of general, relatively abstract, though emotionally charged moral
principles” (p.260). However, once one has committed to and internalized moral principle, those
principles are relatively stable.
Profound confrontations which test our commitment to moral principles are referred to
as triggering events (Hoffman, 2000). Triggering events may produce emotional responses that
cause one to reexamine their life choices and may produce new moral perspectives and sense of
responsibility (Hoffman, 2000). Such triggering events may threaten an individual’s self-image
(Hoffman, 2000). In the case of the Holocaust some rescuers expressed that they could not have
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Moral relativism is considered apart from the moral development process later in this chapter.
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lived with themselves if they had not helped (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). However, while one’s
commitment to moral principle may motivate consistent behavior, it may also encourage an
individual to interpret their own behaviors in a biased way in order to maintain a perception of
moral consistency and reduce cognitive dissonance (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). Many nonrescuers interviewed by Oliner & Olinner (1988) were appalled by events that they witnessed
during the Holocaust but felt that there was nothing that they could do. One possibility is that
those non-rescuers maintained that belief as a defense against threats to their own self-image
after inaction. I do want to be clear that I do not mean to condemn non-rescuers. Simply stated,
it is easy to believe that you are the type of person who would have been a rescuer, but few are
faced with a conflict of such profound significance where a definitive moment puts that selfconception to the test (Hoffman, 2000). Catalyzing action is discussed further at the end of this
chapter.
In summary, children develop their sense of morality through socialization where they
come to generalized moral conclusions through empathic arousal, associated feelings of guilt,
and induction. This process is facilitated by the cognitive development process and furthermore
children may come to logical understanding of morality that is independent of socialization as a
direct result of the development and function of their brain. They organize these moral concepts
into a moral framework which becomes internalized and relatively stable. Beyond that point,
triggering experience may facilitate reassessment of one’s moral principles.
Before continuing to discuss specific moral principles as outcomes of the moral
development process, I will briefly consider the influence of school and the influence of
parenting on children’s development. The implications of both digressions are discussed further
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in Chapter 4: Pedagogy for restoration. However, I feel that both influences may be significant
to the development process and thus warrant consideration here.
3.5.1

Influence of parenting
The guardian(s) or parent(s) who raise a child was considered by Oliner & Oliner (1988)

to have the greatest influence on the child’s moral development (following Bowlby’s attachment
theory). Some go so far as to suggest that one’s personality is largely determined and stable
from a very young age and this position remains prominent today (e.g., Nave, Sherman, Funder,
Hampson, & Goldberg, 2010). This is not universally accepted, neither is it always interpreted
deterministically, but it does warrant some consideration of the influence of parenting on moral
development despite the focus of this paper on education. Furthermore, much of the insight
derived from Oliner & Oliner’s (1988) consideration of parenting may also apply to teaching.
Specific insights on parenting also serve as contextual understanding for educators in a
schooling environment.
The use of power assertion by parents, guardians or other authority figures is significant
in a child’s character development (S. Berman, 1997; Freire & Freire, 1992/1994; Hoffman,
2000; Oliner & Oliner, 1988). As explored in preceding sections, power assertive intervention by
an authority in children’s conflicts does not promote the use of induction which is vital for moral
development. Such intervention emphasizes obedience, an external locus of control, and does
not facilitate learning of skills to cope with and resolve future conflicts. Oliner and Oliner (1988)
suggested significant developmental consequences of excessive power assertion which would
cause children to become “constricted”
Constricted persons are described as those who
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are centered on themselves and their material needs. They tend to see
relationships in terms of exchanges of material goods and benefits rather than
in terms of connectedness or ethical responsibility. Their failure to act on behalf
of others is an expression of their tendency to distance themselves from
relationships that impose burdens on them. In the social and political arena they
tend to define the world in terms of hierarchy of power and feel powerless to
influence change. They tend to be passive and externalize blame for their
circumstance. (S. Berman, 1997, pp. 88-89)
By contrast, extensive personalities are described as those who
increasingly [incorporate] standards for personal integrity and care within their
own value systems. While they may articulate such standards as cognitive
principles, they experience them viscerally. They provide an organizing
framework for their life activities and assignments of right and wrong. Even
minor infractions distress them, and fundamental violations threaten them with
a sense of chaos. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.250)
Less power assertive and more inductive parenting techniques were considered more conducive
to extensive personalities (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Extensive persons were posited to have what
Berman (1997) called “leaky margins” where “ego boundaries sufficiently broadened so that
other people were experienced as part of the self” (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.183). Oliner &
Oliner (1988) considered extinsivity a quality conducive to altruistic behavior. Einolf (2010)
followed Oliner & Oliner’s (1988) work and attempted to measure extensivity and correlate it
with prosocial behavior. Einolf (2010) found “quantitative evidence to support of the validity of
the construct of extensivity, and the theory that extensivity motivates prosocial behavior.”
Notably, Einolf (2010) correlated extensivity with prosocial behavior less profoundly altruistic
than the actions of the Holocaust rescuers such as donating time or money to charity.
I see constricted or extensive personalities as two extremes of a conceptual spectrum
that all people exist within. I believe that Oliner & Oliner (1988) offer these archetypes as a way
to recognize the influence of power and the importance of the use of induction for children.
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However, Oliner and Oliner (1988) did not find that those involved in rescue efforts were
exclusively extensive (see 3.11 Section Conclusion: It Takes All Types p.176).
I do not suggest that parents should be informed by academic theory in order to avoid
raising constricted children. I posit that all parents, by social, moral, and evolutionary dictate
want the best for their children. In this regard, Friere (1994) shared an important lesson on the
application of moral development theory to the practice of parenting. Friere (1994) had
observed “the almost complete absence, not only of violent corporal punishment, but any
punishment of children” (p.13) in coastal fishing communities in Brazil and compared it to the
emphasis on corporal punishment in inner-city Recife. Friere (1994) thought that the way of life
in the fishing communities “had some connection with the taste for a liberty diametrically
opposed to the use of violent punishment” (p.13). Friere (1994) considered this to be a
“problem of the relationship between authority and freedom, which would necessarily involve
the question of punishment and reward in education” (p.22). Inspired by Piaget’s theory on
moral development, Friere (1994) eagerly gave a talk on role of power assertive parenting in
fighting oppression. In response a member of the audience who Friere (1994) describes as a
peasant said:
It’s one thing to come home, even tired, and find all the kids bathed, dressed
up, clean, well fed- not hungry- and another to come home and find your kids
dirty, hungry, crying, and making noise. And people have to get up at four in the
morning the next day and start all over again- hurting, sad, hopeless. If people
hit their kids, it’s not because people don’t love their kids. No, it’s because life is
so hard they don’t have much choice. (p.25)
Friere (1994) calls this “class knowledge” and described how this lack of understanding had
offended the audience.
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It was the culmination of the learning process that I had undertaken long ago –
that of the progressive educator: even when one must speak to the people, one
must convert the “to” to a “with” the people. And this implies respect for the
“knowledge of living experience” of which it is possible to go beyond it. (p.26)
Freire (1994) was reiterating the importance of popular education which he had first written
about in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970). This concept will be explored further in Chapter 4.
The lesson that Freire (1994) shared speaks to the necessity of attention to social
context. I don’t suggest the man in the story was advocating for parents to hit their kids, but
that “hurting, sad, hopeless” people see few good options. The man communicated how deeply
insulting it is to insinuate that parents don’t know or want what’s best for their children and that
someone unfamiliar with the context of their own lives could prescribe solutions. A similar
sentiment, often expressed in regard to education, is that a student’s parents don’t care about
their children’s education. However, those who make such accusations rarely consider the
context of the families they refer to. Again, I posit that every parent cares about their children’s
education, but that many parents are faced with few good options where attending to their
family’s basic needs takes priority over school. Furthermore schools may not be providing the
education that parents need or want for their children. We learn from Friere (1994) that theory
doesn’t simply and universally apply to the real world. It must be applied and adjusted in the
context of a relationship with those we work with.
In summary, parenting is influential in the moral development of children. Increasing the
use of inductive methods of discipline and reducing power assertion and especially punitive
discipline almost certainly, but not exclusively, fosters extensive personalities. In turn, these
children may be more likely to participate in democracy, to help others, and generally to be
engaged citizens (S. Berman, 1997). This is not, however, the only path to such behavior. Finally,
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as learned from and by Friere (1994) it is not enough to simply state that parenting should be
done “better” and to assume that parents don’t know or want what is best for their children. An
extensive society is conducive to extensive parenting and this is where the discussion of
parenting ends and the discussion of a restorative pedagogy begins.
3.5.2

Influence of school
Hoffman (2000) discussed the changing emphasis of moral principles in schooling that

takes place at around fifth grade. Around that time the earlier emphasis from parents and early
primary schooling shifts from self-improvement to social comparison. Before the shift, caring
and achievement apply in different contexts. After the shift caring and achievement often apply
in the same context and conflict with each other due to the competitive nature of school and
society in US America.
The principles of “equality” and “need,” associated with caring early in life, are
largely left behind; the shift to social comparison adds competitiveness to peer
relationships and prepares children cognitively and emotionally for the merit
based justice orientation that will dominate their adult lives. (Hoffman, 2000,
p.258)
This led Hoffman (2000) to question the impact this shift has on children:
That children are socialized initially to share but later taught to value merit
suggests a discontinuity in justice socialization: children must begin to unlearn
“equality” in favor of “merit.” We can only guess the long-term effects of
discontinuity between “equality,” intense motivation to compete, and
achievement guilt, until research provides more definitive answers.” (p.258)
I appreciate that Hoffman (2000) identified this discontinuity and wish it had been explored
further. As Gibbs (2012) argued, descriptive accounts may downplay the severity of issues and
become value specific in their attempt at neutrality. The psychological, philosophical, and moral
nature of moral research dictate that empiricism must be coupled with wisdom and
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furthermore, must be value specific and always focused on improving life. This means that
moral researchers must focus on prescription as well as description.
While more knowledge, especially in moral conflicts, might be desirable, our knowledge
is already practically infinite (Haidt, 2006). We collectively know more than anyone can know
individually and we certainly know enough to be doing things better. If the drive for empirical
knowledge is simply a vocation and not the pursuit of wisdom that would improve lives and
furthermore prevents action through the endless call for more research, then empiricism
maintains the status quo and is a tool of oppression. It would be true, as Horkheimer and
Adorno (1944/2002) wrote, “On their way toward modern science human beings have discarded
meaning” (p.3). Indeed, such empiricism would be one of the master’s tools. However, if such
empiricism contributes to a greater understanding and to wisdom and action then it can be a
tool of liberation. This is not to suggest that no one in or beyond the field is doing anything, but
that we all need to do more. Neither do I intend to condemn Hoffman (2000). If anything my
critique is aimed at modernism and academia.
I find this to be the conflict that I have struggled with throughout my career as a student
and especially in the course writing this thesis. The analysis paralysis that has plagued my life as
a graduate student is a source of constant frustration and not actively working for what my
research dictates is immensely frustrating. I imagine that the frustration Berman (1997)
expresses to such issues may be similarly motivated:
With current educational practices focused primarily on individual competence
within a competitive society, treating social responsibility in most school
districts is a rhetorical slogan rather than a practical reality. Current methods of
instruction and current classroom and school structures promote obedience and
alienation rather than thoughtfulness, engagement, and commitment. We have
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lobotomized children, separating their social consciousness from their individual
identity. (p.185)
We are actively harming our children and investigations into how we are harming them are
important, but it is crucial that we actively work to reduce and stop the source of harm. If we do
not take action, we might very well continue to identify the conditions that will lead us into
oblivion as we march into the abyss. This concern is revisited in the conclusion of this work.
3.6

Moral Principles
Thus far, human morality (including empathy) has been considered to be a fundamental

component of humanity. Human morality encourages us to cooperate and to resolve conflicts
between our own self-interest and the interest of others without harming one another.
Obviously, conflict resulting in significant harm continues to occur in human civilization (see 3.3
Limitations of Empathy p.75 and 3.7 Moral Limitations and Conflicts p.113). The fact cannot be
ignored that some act with malice or without regard to the interests of others (see 3.9 Outlying
Behavior p.145). However, aside from such outliers and deviants, most of us develop a set of
principles which act in consideration of (if not accordance with).
As already stated, Hoffman (2000) generally conceptualized moral principles as
psychological outcomes of moral development through affective socialization
(consequentialism), while others see them as purely philosophic and absolute concepts
(deontology). However, the principles themselves are significantly cognitive. Once empathy and
moral principle ‘bond,’ the cognitive task of identifying or recognizing violations of justice can
trigger affective or empathic responses. The bonding of affect and cognition that Hoffman
(2000) described is referred to as “hot cognition.” Since moral principles are stored in long term
memory and require more cognitive processing and affective empathy (e.g., mimicry,
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conditioning, and direct association), is a nearly instantaneous process, empathy can be a
powerful retrieval cue for moral principles (Hoffman, 2000). Empathy and upholding moral
principles both have the capacity to motivate prosocial action and both in tandem often
motivate people to a greater degree than either alone. However, it is also possible for empathy
and upholding moral principle to conflict causing diminished motivation (Decety & Cowell,
2014). In some cases, empathy for an individual may overcome considerations of fairness for a
collective. This is certainly evident in the human tendency towards nepotism (see 3.7 Moral
Limitations and Conflicts p.113). Thus, the following exploration of moral principle should be
considered in relation to human empathy.
In this section the moral concepts of rights, caring and justice will be explored. Three
principles of justice are presented: merit, equality, and need. Next social and ecological
implications of each concept are briefly considered. I take the position that none of the concepts
are naturally more or less prosocial, but that they can be interpreted in myriad ways. The
following moral principles motivate both obligatory and discretionary judgments. If any
objective morality does exist, it seems that there must be multiple ways of coming to such
universal judgments.
3.6.1

Rights
In this section rights are explored as the fundamental set of rules regarding how we

treat one another. Rights may be the most fundamental moral principle underlying all moral
judgments. Most individuals, in the context of their own culture, have an intuitive sense of rights
which they hold to be universal. The central consideration in this discussion of rights is whether
universal rights exist or if they are simply social conventions. The implications of universal rights
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versus those of rights dictated by consensus are then considered. Finally, I identify specific
rights that are either universal or nearly universally agreed upon social conventions.
Rights must protect and limit self-interest and collective interest. Universal rights (e.g.,
human rights) apply equally to everyone while conventional rights are specific to the context of
a particular group (e.g., civil rights). The ideal role of conventional rights is to both protect
universal rights and to establish specific context-dependent rules for society, but the distinction
is not always clear. Conventional rights may be socially constructed in consideration of
philosophic ideals of universal and unalienable rights. For example, the right to bear arms is not
guaranteed to all people in all societies. It does, however, relate to what many consider to be a
universal right to liberty. But, most humans consent to limitations of their personal liberty and
the personal liberty of others in order to promote and optimally protect the liberty and safety of
all. It seems that unqualified human right to liberty is neither universal nor conventional24.
Many philosophic approaches to rights attempt to identify the nature and universality of
rights. A foundationalist approach to rights seeks to find a basis for universal human rights
beyond social construction and consensus (Schapiro, 2005). One such philosophic approach
suggests that the laws of nature dictate certain rights (natural law and natural rights). In this
philosophic tradition natural law is considered to be the law of God. Others have sought
ecologically or biologically dictated foundations for rights (Fruehwald, 2010). Many reject a
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Maybe anarchists, most profoundly assert the right to freedom. However, although anarchism includes
diverse schools of thought, all but the most individualistic concepts seek harmony and mature reciprocity.
Thus, the personal right to freedom is limited by moral consideration of others.
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foundationalist approach entirely and prefer practical considerations of rights in order to
establish a baseline for human by consensus (Freeman, 1994). Some even suggest that the only
reasonable basis for rights is to construct rights in reaction to historical violations. Finally, others
see rights as entirely subjective social conventions with no possibility of universality.
Although a deep exploration of the foundations of rights cannot be accomplished here, I
explore such a possibility very tentatively as an illustration of foundationalism. I make a basic
assumption throughout this paper that all life is worthy of life. A cursory interpretation of such
an assumption would be that every living thing has the right to continue living. Predation and
natural causes present obvious exceptions to that right. However, natural selection dictates no
natural right for a species to exist. In fact, species who do not adapt to environmental changes
or who are outcompeted go extinct. This becomes a treacherous position as a foundation for
human rights because it may be that there is no foundational right for any species to live.
Obviously the above was a contrived example, however it illustrates the controversy
over a foundational approach to rights deferring to a higher power (natural selection, cognition,
God, etc.). The foundational approach may call into question or even deny practical rights that
are clearly prosocial. However, the opposite extreme where no foundation can be accepted may
suggest that rights are entirely normative and contingent. Lack of foundation for international
human rights efforts may call the validity of their judgments into question when identifying
human rights violations. Practical investigation of the function of rights in consideration of one’s
own moral position, offers more utility. If a right functions to protect human welfare regardless
of context it could be considered a universal right.
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In return to the central question introduced at the beginning of this section: are
rights universal? There can be no simple conclusion.
A conception of human rights should be flexible enough to allow space for the
human creativity it seeks to defend and to address the changing conditions of
the world that may threaten its values … One must make a nonrational decision
either to accept or reject solidarity with humanity. (Freeman, 1994)
It is not the identification of universal rights, but the commitment to protecting and respecting
the welfare of others that must take precedent. The only entirely and unquestionably universal
right is the right to be morally considered. Thus, I favor a universal ethic of care to universal
considerations of rights. However, this is no excuse not to construct and consent upon practical
rights. As in other pragmatic considerations of human potential throughout this work, I suggest
that rights should be iteratively consented upon, evaluated, and reassessed at the individual
level, among communities and nations, and globally in accordance with changing conditions on
Earth.
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be the most prominent
effort towards reaching universal rights by consensus (UN General Assembly, 1948).
Jacques Maritain, a leading French philosopher and one of the participants in
the negotiations that resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
illustrate[d] [the] nonfoundational approach. In response to expressions of
surprise at mustering widespread agreement to the Universal Declaration,
Maritain stated … "yes, we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks
us why." (Schapiro, 2005)
Maritain was acknowledging the fact that the authors and signatories were motivated by
differing theoretical considerations but found consensus in the function of rights. The
declaration makes no appeals to God or the law of nature. Indeed, such explicit foundations
would be grounds for much debate and empirical criticism. Instead, it is an entirely functional
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and context-independent document proposing freedom and dignity for all humans- subject
to broad interpretation. Some of the rights dictated by the declaration are the right to life,
dignity, security of person, and the denouncement of slavery, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention
or exile (Assembly, 1948).
Finally, I want to consider the possibility and implications of extending the concept of
rights beyond humans. Based on my previous analysis I suggest that rights are a human
construct. I don’t dismiss the possibility of natural rights which would apply to animals, or the
possibility of such formalized moral concepts among other animals. However, regardless of
foundation, human conceptions of universal rights should apply to our consideration of nonhuman animals and the earth. Most human societies do establish conventional rights (e.g., laws)
for the treatment of animals. We similarly have laws and agencies dedicated to protecting
natural environments. A universal declaration of animal rights or planetary rights may not exist
as such, but many international agreements do protect ‘rights’ of animals and the environment.
For example, the International Whaling Convention universally banned commercial whaling. I
propose that human concepts of rights exclusively apply to human behavior. For example,
sharks do not observe the internationally consented upon right of whales not to be hunted.
Thus, animal rights would be unnecessary the absence of humans not because non-humans lack
intrinsic value, but because animal rights focus on protecting non-humans from humans.
In summary, I suggest that rights are near-universal. In the complexity of human social
interaction and environment, rights can neither be static, nor context-independent. However,
promoting and protecting human welfare (and the welfare of non-human animals) by
establishing a set of near-universally consented upon rights serves great function in society. For
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example, someone may observe another’s right to security of person despite being very
angry at them and potentially even feeling that they would justified to hurt that person based
on considerations of the other’s merit. Thus, although rights are impersonal, such general
agreement on rights moderates the potential subjectivity of individual moral judgments (see 3.7
Moral Limitations and Conflicts p.113). By establishing rights, certain harmful behavior on the
part of individuals or governments is universally discouraged. In the resolution of conflict folks
likely consider multiple moral principles in their judgments25.
3.6.2

Care
Care extends beyond rights which may be considered morally obligatory into the realm

of ‘goods’ (discretionary judgments). Rights encourage consideration and protection of one’s
basic needs while care encourages both broad consideration of wellbeing and attention to
individuals’ needs. Hoffman (2000) defined caring as a somewhat utilitarian (consequentialist)
principle that aims to accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number. However, Oliner &
Oliner (1988) defined an ethic of care as “a dominating sense of obligation to help all people out
of a spirit of generosity and concern for their welfare” (p.217). I see care as a potentially
universally prosocial moral principle dictating that everyone deserves to have their basic
physiological and psychological needs met. Thus, care is a mature concept of reciprocity and
neglect and abandonment are moral violations of care because everyone has a duty to help
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Most people probably do not consider moral principles explicitly or discretely, but such principles likely
make up a holistic concept of morality.
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anyone in need. Oliner & Oliner (1988) indicated that 76% of the interviewed rescuers were
motivated by an ethic of care.
The ethical values of care and inclusiveness that distinguished rescuers were not
merely abstract or philosophical preferences. Rather, they reflected a key
dimension of rescuers’ personalities – the way they characteristically related to
others and their sense of commitment to them. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.169)
Some of the sentiments expressed by those rescuers were:
I think if somebody is in a bad situation, you have to help them. (p.170)
We had to give our help to those people in order to save them. Not because
they were Jewish, but because every persecuted human needs some help, just
as my father found help when the Turks killed the Albanians26. (p. 169)
One rescuer who risked their life to help a Nazi soldier said that “the moment the man was
badly wounded, he was not an enemy anymore but simply a human being in need” (p.288). This
rescuer was certainly motivated by care and empathy. An observer may be empathically
motivated to help someone in need and also feel obligated to help based on a principle of caring
(Hoffman, 2000). Affectively motivated induction may have also been fundamental to the
formation of one’s principle of care. However, a principle of care alone, in the absence of
significant empathy, has been found to be a sufficient prosocial motivator (Oliner & Oliner,
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Oliner & Oliner (1988) focused heavily on the role of parenting in personality development as discussed
in the previous section. The ethic of care is associated with, but not exclusive to, extensive personalities.
Oliner & Oliner do investigate normative sources of motivation such as religion and culture. However,
Oliner & Oliner (1988) did not significantly investigate the role of one’s knowledge of family history.
Recall, that I found myself significantly motivated by my family history (specifically the Holocaust). My
intuition is that many committed to practical and theoretical work for justice are motivated by knowledge
of family history. This may be worthy of deeper investigation, but I have not pursued it in this paper.
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1988). Hoffman (2000) concluded that “empathy and caring principles are thus independent,
mutually supportive, hence congruent dispositions to help others” (p.255).
Finally, an ethic of care easily extends to non-human animals and the planet. Animal
shelters, sanctuaries, and rehabilitation centers represent an ethic of care for animals. Such
efforts tend to focus on animals valued by humans based on our perceived similarity, cuteness,
or in the interest of preserving biological diversity. However, this is not exclusively so, and some
animal protection efforts may exclusively represent and ethic of care. It becomes more difficult
to gauge the role of self-interest in humans on ecological protection efforts, however many do
see intrinsic value in nature.
3.6.3

Justice
Considerations of justice are often made in consideration of rights and care which

dictate that a basic standard of behavior and treatment of others applies broadly. However, the
primary concern of justice considerations is what is fair. Justice considerations potentially reflect
more immature reciprocity, however mature reciprocity is not incongruent with any justice
principles. I focus, as Hoffman (2000) did, on distributive justice and the principles of merit,
equality, and need. Hoffman (2000) described distributive justice as the correlation between
reward and deservingness in the distribution of resources. However, Clayton & Opotow (1993)
conceptualized that distribution of resources is not strictly material but includes “such sociallyvalued goods and resources as love and caring, services, goods, money, information, and status”
(p.300). Thus, other conceptions of justice such as punitive and procedural justice are readily
considered within a broad conceptualization of distributive justice.
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Punitive (or retributive) justice is readily examined as the distribution of punishment
where relations of power are particularly influential. Punitive justice is largely based on an
immature form of reciprocity where the severity of punishment is reflective of the
egregiousness of the offence. However, the Māori concept of restorative justice provides an
alternate to punitive justice. Restorative justice is focused on making amends for transgressions
and restoring justice rather than punishing injustice. In the restorative justice process the victim
and offender meet with their families, community, and facilitators to have a discussion about
the incident. The offender is provided the opportunity to make restitutions, restore damaged
relationships and potentially be accepted back into the community. The process of restitution is
not predetermined by the facilitators, but the offenders may voluntarily offer apologies, gifts, or
money.
In the documentary, Restoring Hope: An Indigenous Response to Justice, Mike Hinton, a
restorative justice facilitator in South Auckland said:
Restorative justice isn’t about forgiveness, alright? That’s a byproduct of what
happens at the conference. It’s about communication. And I’m probably gonna’
upset a few people by saying this: an eye for an eye probably doesn’t work that
well. And maybe it’s a practice that we should not look at. Maybe something
like communicating, understanding, respecting, and acknowledging differences;
taking responsibility for hurt and harm, and making amends would work a little
bit better, today. We can grow as people. Our process helps people grow. It
helps them heal and grow. (Carnachan & Parnell, 2013)
By denouncing “an eye for an eye” (‘immature’ reciprocity) Hinton illuminated restorative
justice as a form of ‘mature’ reciprocity. In New Zealand, the restorative justice process is in
conjunction with the penal system and outcomes of the restorative justice process are
considered by courts, but some offenders also face jail time. However, the intention of
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restorative justice is to restore balance, heal, and move forward rather than to punish the
offender.

Similarly, distributive justice relates to the fairness of social interactions and decision
making and can be considered distributive because distributive justice begins with the
distribution of membership into a community (Opotow, 1990). One’s membership in the
community (in the moral sense) influences whether or not they are considered to have the
rights of community members including moral consideration (see 3.7.1 Moral exclusion p.116).
Thus, I proceed with considerations of justice based on principles of distributive justice.
Oliner & Oliner (1988) stated that around 15% of the rescuers they interviewed were
motivated primarily by a broad sense of justice congruent with Kahn’s (1999) definition of
obligatory morality and significantly cognitive. Some of the sentiments expressed by those
rescuers were:
I found it incomprehensible and inadmissible that for religious reasons or as a
result of religious choice, Jews would be persecuted. It’s like saving somebody
who is drowning. You don’t ask what God they pray to. You just go save them.
(p.166)
Jewish people had as much right to live as I did. (p.167)
All men [sic] are equal and are free and equal by right. Consequently I am
against all dictatorial systems. (p.167)
The above quotes appeal to ‘fairness’ based on appeals to rights and caring. Other justice
considerations appeal more clearly to the specific principles of justice, however, generally
judgments of fairness are made in consideration of multiple principles.
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A merit based principle of justice reflects consideration of one’s deservingness in
determination of fairness. The basic sentiment is that “you reap what you sow”. Hoffman (2000)
finds merit to be the dominating moral principle in modern Western culture. In the distribution
of goods, merit may dictate a capitalist system where some deserve more material wealth than
others based on their contribution to the economy. In a more procedural sense, the merit of
one’s behavior may determine what is considered fair treatment. In the most severe cases
judgments of merit may be used to strip someone of their rights. Merit based considerations
may be conducive to victim blaming. For example, if someone is suffering one may judge that
either not worked hard enough or they have done something to deserve their circumstance.
Although I have raised potential pitfalls of merit based considerations, justice considerations
based on merit are not intrinsically non-prosocial, especially when considered along with
principles of rights and care. It is prosocial to recognize positive contributions of others. Humans
may not be so intrinsically motivated that we would all strive for ‘goodness’ in the absence of
any external consideration of merit. I only argue, that merit must be moderated by other moral
considerations.
An equality based principle of justice dictates that everyone deserves the same rights,
resources, and rewards. In the distribution of goods, equality may dictate a communist system
where everyone deserves equal material wealth. In a more procedural sense, judgments of
equality would likely defer to appeals of equal rights and dictate that everyone should be judged
on the same basis with less consideration of their personal experience and needs. It is
important to understand the difference between equality and equity. Equality suggests that
everyone deserves the same thing, while equity is a more general concept of fairness in
consideration of the individual needs. Equality, like rights, may sometimes encourage
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impersonal judgments. In consideration of equity, equality it is not necessarily universally
prosocial to treat everyone equally.
A need based principle of justice dictates that people deserve to have their basic needs
met regardless of their personal merit or contribution. This is similar to the moral voice of care.
An ethic of care would likely encourage considerations of justice based on need, but care is a
broader concept of morality and need is specifically related to justice. In the distribution of
goods, need may dictate a socialist system where the emphasis is on meeting individuals basic
needs (e.g., universal healthcare!). The basic sentiment is encapsulated by the slogan
popularized by Karl Marx, “from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.”
Merit, equality, and need represent a spectrum of the emphasis of fairness
considerations from deservingness (merit) to entitlement (need). Prototypical examples of an
emphasis on a particular principle exist, but I have argued that moral judgments usually reflect
more complex consideration involving multiple principles. Furthermore, a particular situation
may encourage emphasis on different moral principles depending on the nature of the
interaction and the relationship between the parties (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). For example, in
close personal relationships, a strict demand for reciprocity may communicate a lack of value of
the relationship (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). Merit may be more congruent with a strict demand
for reciprocity (immature reciprocity) and need with mature reciprocity, however, this is not
exclusively so.
As already noted, moral principles and empathy have the potential to enhance or
diminish each other (Decety & Cowell, 2014). As Hoffman (2000) explored, the prominence of a
particular principle and it’s congruence with empathy depend on the situation. Consider two
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examples: (1) A classmate asks you for answers to an assignment that you worked very hard
on (2) You witness a drunk driver have a collision. In the first case, some might help their
classmate without question out of a sense of care. Others might consider their classmate’s
merit, it would make a difference whether they had made an effort or spent the previous night
drink beer and playing video games while you spent the entire night on the assignment. Even if
one lacked merit, you may be persuaded by need if they lament that they risk failing the class.
Finally, they may make an emotional appeal causing you to help despite it being unfair. Helping
someone with their homework is potentially good (discretionary judgment) but not obligatory.
In a situation of greater gravity, such as the second example where a drunk driver may be in
significant danger, their clear lack of merit may be less influential in one’s decision to help. One
may simultaneously believe the driver deserves punishment and that they deserve to be helped
regardless of their merit depending on the severity of the accident.
Justice considerations shed more light on the complexity of judgments regarding
ecological degradation. One must judge whether animals and planet deserve consideration
(explored in the following section) and balance human interests with ecological interests. These
considerations become much more subjective than universal rights or care for non-humans. For
example, considerations of merit may determine that some species or habitats are more worthy
of consideration and protection than others. Similarly, one may consider humans superior such
that human interest always trumps ecological interest.
3.7

Moral Limitations and Conflicts
So convenient a thing is it to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to
find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do. (Benjamin Franklin
as cited in Haidt, 2006, p.66)
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Just as empathy as a prosocial motive has limitations, so does moral principle. I
choose to believe that very few humans deliberately engage in antisocial behavior or otherwise
deliberately cause harm to one another without justification (see 3.9 Outlying Behavior p.145).
Instead, I believe that the process of moral development, in the context of social norms,
influences the primacy of conflicting moral principles, conception of moral encounters, and
moral judgments and actions.
Turiel (2005) discussed the events surrounding the integration of University of
Mississippi in 1962 and suggested that those supporting and opposing the integration of the
University were acting on commitment to principles. It would be easy to suggest that Governor
Barnett’s attempt to block integration of the University and causing President Kennedy to bring
in the National Guard (more than 30,000 troops) were symptoms of some gross iniquity
prevalent at that time in the South (of USA.). However, Turiel (2005) considered Governor
Barnett’s defense of segregation to represent moral “conviction, commitment, and courage”
(p.17). Similarly, James Meredith, an African American man, struggled for equality and
integration displaying the same (I believe greater) “conviction, commitment, and courage.”
Meridith took his case to the US Supreme Court who ordered his admission into the University
of Mississippi (Turiel, 2005). Although Turiel (2005) does not does not explicitly refer to either
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Meredith or Barnett’s actions as moral, I want to consider the possibility that both were
acting morally27.
It is possible that Barnett was acting morally. But first, I want to consider the possibility
that he wasn’t. Barnett expressed pride as a Mississippi segregationist and defended his
position, but it is impossible to understand his motivations based on historical accounts. In many
cases the appearance of moral conviction is more important to an individual than actual moral
conviction (Haidt, 2006) and that must be doubly true for politicians. Furthermore, humans have
a tendency to fabricate post-hoc explanation and justification for our behavior, often without
actually understanding our motivations (a process called confabulation). We are not necessarily
even aware that our justification or explanation was not the true motivation of our behavior
(Haidt, 2006). Additionally, people have a self-serving bias where we often see our own actions
through “the rose-colored mirror,” justifying actions that we would almost certainly condemn if
carried out by anyone but ourselves. There is no reason to assume Barnett was acting morally.
However, Barnett may have been acting morally. How could it be possible that
Meredith, an African American man fighting for civil rights, and Barnett, a white man fighting to
defend the discriminatory practice of segregation, both be acting morally? Regardless of

27

I want to be absolutely clear that I do not approve of Barnett’s stance on segregation. Neither, do I
accept an entirely relativistic stance where his actions were permissible according to cultural and
historical context. Moral relativism is explored later in this section. For now, suffice to say that I think it is
possible that Barnett acted morally and that what he did was wrong. I don’t consider moral action to be
universally right. I consider it to be action in accordance with one’s own moral judgment (i.e., the belief
that it was the right thing to do).
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whether Governor Barnett acted with conviction, commitment, and courage, it was not the
same as Meredith’s. Although the most deplorable tyrants and heroic liberators of history may
be similarly motivated by a sense or partisanship and their actions judged through a particular
socio-historic lens, the tyrant co-opts justice while the liberator loves and serves justice. If
anything could ever be considered universally wrong, it must be oppression. However, the
remainder of this section explores how and why moral behavior may fall short. My presumption
is that the majority of people do act morally, but that the way we perceive and respond to moral
conflicts is very subjective. I neither accept morality as universal nor do I resign to the
permissiveness associated with moral subjectivity. For now, I simply suggest that moral behavior
can be harmful.
3.7.1

Moral exclusion
In the case of Governor Barnett and James Meredith, it is likely that Barnett did not

believe that, as an African American man, Meredith deserved the same rights as whites. Such
exclusion may be justified by a principle of merit. Thus, the concept of moral exclusion sheds
some light on the case.
Moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the
boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply.
Those who are morally excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or
undeserving; consequently, harming them appears acceptable, appropriate, or
just. Moral exclusion... links a wide range of social issues, such as abortion,
species conservation, nuclear weapons, and immigration policies, because our
position on these issues depends on whom we include or exclude from our
moral boundaries. (Opotow, 1990)
Opotow (1990) found three “attitudes that comprised moral inclusion: (1) believing that
considerations of fairness apply to another, (2) willingness to allocate a share of community
resources to another, and (3) willingness to make sacrifices to foster another’s wellbeing.” These
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attitudes are all compatible with Hoffman’s (2000) theory on moral development driven by
guilt. However, Opotow (1990) offers significant insight in how human boundaries of moral
exclusion and inclusion expand and contract. These borders change with the status quo and with
conflict, and are not absolute, but better thought of as degrees of inclusion or exclusion.
One of the psychological origins of moral exclusion is conflict. Danger of any type,
conflict, and stress “reinforce group boundaries and change information processing strategies
and choice of justice rules” (Opotow, 1990). With conflict group cohesion increases and concern
for justice to those outside of the group decreases. Outsiders may be increasingly endangered
and subject to extreme forms of oppression such as exploitation, slavery, and extermination, but
the less overt forms of dominance should not be overlooked. In situations of conflict, resolution
looks very different between folks who consider one another to be within their own scope of
moral inclusion. In these cases, conflict is “regulated competition of equals, conducted
according to rules of fair play, such as a duel or bidding war; with those outside, conflict is
unregulated, no-holds-barred power struggle among unequals, such as guerilla warfare”
(Opotow, 1990). Conflict also tends to constrict ones borders for moral inclusion, while
diminished conflict offers opportunity for the borders to expand (Opotow, 1990). This is
consistent with the in-group empathic bias and its evolutionary hypothesis that conflict over
completion for resources in human evolution produced preferential selection of human traits
favoring in-group bias. However, this suggests that the bias is not hard coded in our DNA, or
even explicitly social, but a result of immediate and present conflict. It seems that through
efforts to reduce conflict, such as reparation, compensation, or simply helping folks meet their
basic needs, we would all create space for our moral borders to extend.
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The other psychological origin of moral exclusion that Opotow (1990) discussed is
unconnectedness. This stems from the innate human tendency to differentiate and categorize
objects. When this is applied to social categorization it may rationalize injustice by affirming a
sense of separateness between a witness and someone experiencing injustice. Oliner & Oliner
(1988) discussed how Nazis used different tactics in each country in accordance with the prewar
status of Jewish people in those countries. For example, in the Netherlands Nazi efforts to
morally exclude Jewish people preceded efforts to enact genocide.
The Nazis did not want to shock Dutch sensibilities and provoke widespread
resistance. Instead, they gradually disenfranchised, impoverished, and isolated
Jews in a period when German domination over Dutch gentiles was still
relatively tolerable, thereby dissociating the later as much as possible from
Jewish suffering. (p.133)
Opotow (1990) explained that conversely to this sense of unconnectedness, perceiving someone
as connected to oneself hinders moral exclusion. This may include “belonging to the same
community, perceiving another as a worthwhile being, or discerning any thread of
connectedness” (Opotow, 1990). This connection leads to increased empathy and ultimately
helping behavior. This sense of connectedness is highly sensitive to conflict and increased
severity of conflict corresponds with increased feeling of unconnectedness and reduces helping
behavior (Opotow, 1990). Oliner & Oliner (1988) discussed the effects of social categorization
independently of its potential for producing feelings of unconnectedness, stating that “both
positive and negative stereotypes lend to thinking of Jews as a group rather than as individuals”
and that “rescuers saw Jews more frequently as individuals” (p.151). In Opotow’s (1990)
discussion of the intersection of psychological and sociological forces at work in moral exclusion,
they conclude that, “the bidirectional influence between individuals and society in perpetuating
moral exclusion suggests possible ways to interrupt the cycle of harm” (Opotow, 1990).
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Opotow (1990) reviewed various conceptions of the boundaries of moral inclusion
suggesting that one of the more prevalent conceptions is that the boundaries should be drawn
around membership status of the human species. A prevalent outcome of this conception is
debate over who can be considered human. Categorizing humans by race, class, and gender has
been a common tool in the enactment of oppression to deny the humanness of a person,
people, or peoples in order to deny their inclusion in moral considerations. Singer (1975)
instead, believed that the boundaries should be constructed around cognitive awareness and
that nonhuman sentient beings deserve inclusion in moral consideration. Opotow (1990) also
discussed the belief that all life should be treated with reverence, and thus, considered to be
within the moral boundaries as, for example, Jains believe. This begins to illustrate that societal,
cultural, and religious norms heavily influence not only the construction of moral principle, but
also its application. As discussed in the construction of moral principles, there is certainly an
individual, non-deterministic element influencing how we define our own moral boundaries.
3.7.1.1

Moral exclusion and ecological issues
Many controversial issues can be considered issues resulting from differing moral

boundaries. The central issue in the abortion debate is also readily reduced to a consideration of
moral inclusion. The point at which a fetus is considered worthy of moral inclusion and the
impact that has on the degree of moral inclusion of the pregnant woman encapsulate all of the
arguments in this debate from both sides (Opotow, 1990). Opotow (1990) also gave an example
regarding whaling and suggested that many US Americans are outraged by Japanese whaling
practices because the moral boundaries of US Americans include whales to a greater degree
than the Japanese. However, whaling was a large industry in US in recent history. Moral
exclusion and differing moral boundaries provides insight to conflicts in other animal rights
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activism, as well, where animal rights activists are commonly criticized for caring more about
non-human animals than humans. As Plous (2003) argues, the process of excluding non-human
animals from moral consideration psychologically parallels the process of excluding other
humans.
The concept of moral exclusion and moral boundaries sheds light on the relationship
between environmental and social degradation, as well. Let’s return to the study where Kahn
(1999) interviewed Black children in Houston, Texas about their perceptions of nature. In
response to a question about what the children thought about when they thought of nature, 7%
mentioned drugs or violence and 17% reported that it was an environmental issue that they
discussed at home (Peter H. Kahn, 1999). I was struck by one child’s responses to the
interviewers attempt to understand how they connected with non-human animals. The child
said that they had a cat and the interviewer asked if the cat was important to them. The child
responded, “No. I have other things that’s important to me. If I eat or not. Or if anybody in my
family is gonna die, because I don’t want nobody in my family to die” (Peter H. Kahn, 1999,
p.109). The same child expressed similarly demoralizing concerns to the interviewers other
questions relating to their connection with and concern for nature. When the interviewer asked
the child about parks, their response illustrated concern for dangers of broken glass and gun
violence. It seems evident that such immediate concerns would preclude ecological ones.
The majority of children in the Houston study did provide moral justification for
judgments relating to the environment. Most of the justifications were anthropocentric and the
children expressed very few biocentric justifications. Kahn (1999) stresses that “anthropocentric
reasoning should not be discounted” (p.113) in either the larger context of environmentalism or
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in the context of the children in Houston. In fact, Kahn (1999) suggests that “the Houston
children articulated forms of anthropocentric reasoning that many would argue are not only
philosophically valid, but practically speaking- in terms of effecting societal change- an
imperative”(p.113). With the Houston study in mind, I suggest that anthropocentric and
biocentric perspective taking and motives are equally important in the struggle for restoration
and position the needs of the planet and the needs of humanity in congruence.
An alternate conception of moral justifications involves microjustice (focused on the
individual) and macrojustice (focused on the group) (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). In environmental
conflicts, macro level judgments favor the needs of the collective (Clayton & Opotow, 2003).
Depending on the specific situation and who is morally included, neither macro nor micro level
judgments are strictly anthropocentric or biocentric. Clayton & Optow (2003) found that macro
level considerations were more common for pro-environmental arguments and micro level
considerations, such as the rights of landowners, were more common in anti-environmental
arguments. However, neither micro nor macro level justifications deny consideration of selfinterest because collective welfare is instrumental to individual welfare. Although humans have
the capacity for altruism, we must also consider our own self-interest to ensure that our basic
needs are met.
This calls into question to nature of biocentric reasoning and led some environmental
philosophers to speculate that all human reasoning is anthropocentric (Peter H. Kahn, 1999). In
the attempt to understand how people are morally motivated, the micro/macro conception
provides more insight. However, I have tried to embrace both/and thinking and micro/macro
considerations easily incorporate biocentric/anthropocentric considerations .This does not
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diminish the value of biocentric perspective taking (in distinction from strictly biocentric
reasoning) which has been shown to be a powerful motivator for pro-environmental moral
judgments and empathy (Berenguer, 2007, 2010). Nor, as Kahn (1999) points out, should
anthropocentric perspectives be undervalued in their power as a prosocial and proenvironmental motivator.
Building on Kahn’s (1999) earlier work, Severson & Kahn (2010) tested whether
children’s perspective anthropocentric or biocentric perspective taking was more dependent on
the situation that they were considering than their values. Severson & Kahn (2010) posed a
hypothetical situation where there was no anthropocentric stake in nature. Aliens had come to
an earth uninhabited by humans and caused harm nature (including pets, wild animals, orchards
and forests). The children were asked if it would be wrong for the aliens to do such harm and
the majority answered that it was wrong to do harm to nature even without the presence of
humans. This suggested that
If children are asked questions about environmental harms when humans are
involved, then biocentric reasoning appears seldom, and it appears late in
development. But if children are asked questions about environmental harms
without the pull of human consideration, … then biocentric reasoning appears
often and early. (Severson & Kahn, 2010, p.255)
With these perspectives on biocentric and anthropocentric reasoning and the micro/macro level
judgments in mind, I will examine an example from Kahn’s (1999) Houston study. When a child
was asked if it is all right to throw trash in the bayou, they answered
[It’s not alright] because some people that don’t have homes, they go and drink
out of the rivers and stuff and they could die because they get all that dirt and
stuff inside their bodies. (Peter H. Kahn, 1999, p.101)
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This appears to be obviously anthropocentric but in consideration of the micro/macro model
of justice, it is not so simple. This child may be demonstrating moral concern for the bayou at
the macro level where the value of the bayou is for water as a collective resource. While the
child’s explanation centers humans, specifically people experiencing homelessness, that doesn’t
necessarily morally exclude others (other people and the natural environment) from the
collective. I believe that this illustrates only that the child was immediately concerned about
homelessness and does not necessarily illustrate an anthropocentric orientation. As evidenced
by Kahn & Severson (2010), their answerer may have reflected a more significantly biocentric
orientation if asked in a different way. Especially since the question relates to anthropogenic
harm, it may warrant a more anthropocentric judgment.
A final consideration related to moral exclusion is denial of self-involvement (Opotow &
Weiss, 2000). One may consider their own actions unrelated to the wellbeing of others, not
because they do not consider them worthy of moral consideration, but because they deny that
their actions affect the other. Through denial of self-involvement, one may believe that they do
not pollute so they are not involved in the ecological crisis (Opotow & Weiss, 2000). “Another
route to denial of self-involvement recognizes a problem as real but focuses on parts of the
problem that exonerate oneself and therefore denies one’s contribution to the problem”
(Opotow & Weiss, 2000, p.486). One such example could be someone’s proud ecological
commitment to drive a hybrid car… 30,000 miles per year. Self-exclusion also applies to racism.
Conceptions of self-exclusion may allow folks to believe that racism is a terrible, awful thing that
thankfully, they are not involved in, or that they have successfully put an end to. An example of
the latter is efforts by a university to increase racial diversity while ignoring institutional racism.
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3.7.1.2

Subjugation of animals
I haven’t focused too intently on the subjugation of animals because I don’t want to

dismiss or trivialize the subjugation of humans. In consideration of the child in Houston who said
they didn’t care about their cat because they cared if they would eat or not (Kahn, 1999), I think
emphasis on animal rights and ecological rights are, for good reason, poorly received in the face
of such severe violations of human rights. However, there are many parallels between the
oppression of humans and the oppression of other animals. In this section, I will explore the
relationship between the mistreatment of non-human animals and the mistreatment of
humans.
Even if one does not consider other species worthy of moral consideration, humane
treatment of non-human animals likely parallels our humane treatment of one another.
Although Kant did not consider animals to have any intrinsic value, Kant recognized that by
mistreating animals, humans degraded their own humanity.
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he
does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is
inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show
towards mankind [sic]. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice
kindness towards animals, for he [sic] who is cruel to animals becomes hard also
in his [sic] dealings with men [sic]. (Kant, 1963)
Thus, Kant argued that the kindness that humans show to other species is an indicator for
human morality but not within the domain of morality and felt that humans should treat other
animals with kindness in order to preserve their own humanity.
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Similarly, Plous (2003) considered “historic attempts to portray human targets of
prejudice as animal-like” (p.510) as an attempt to use speciesism (a term for prejudice against
non-human animals) to justify human oppression. Plous (2003) wrote,
African Americans have been depicted as apes, Jews as vermin, women as prey,
homosexuals as beasts, fat people as cows and pigs. Yet the very act of “treating
people like animals” would lose its meaning if animals were treated well. Just as
racism, sexism, and other prejudices share a similar mindset, many of the
psychological factors that underlie speciesism serve to reinforce and promote
prejudice against humans. These factors include power, privilege, dominance,
control, entitlement, and the need to reduce cognitive dissonance when
committing harmful acts. (p.510)
Thus, Plous (2003) not only saw the treatment of non-human animals as an indicator for human
morality, but saw a complete parallel between the mistreatment of humans and the
mistreatment of other species. Additionally, Plous (2003) held that animals all have intrinsic
value and that treating animals better benefits all animals (including humans).
These considerations of the humane treatment of non-humans are an important
consideration in social justice work. In societies where the mistreatment of other animals is
normalized, arguments for human liberation often dismiss or condone the subjugation of nonhuman animals. For example, Freire’s (1970/2000) position, which is hugely influential in social
justice work, was that oppression of humans denies both oppressor and oppressed of their
humanness and reduces them to the status of animals. However, Freire did not challenge the
status of animals and instead attempted to distance humans from other animals. Thus, by
condoning the mistreatment of animals and distancing humans from other animals, the
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structures of oppression including hierarchy and domination remain unchallenged and
undermine efforts for human liberation28. As I suggested after reviewing Bookchin’s (1982)
considerations of the relationship between subjugation of women and subjugation of the earth:
any expression of oppression will spread like a virus throughout humanity.
In summary, not only is consideration of animals vital in understanding the structural
influence of oppression on human moral considerations, but caring for animals contributes to
the liberation of all animals (humans included). By focusing explicitly on the rights of a narrow
community, such as humans, we imply that other communities don’t deserve rights and we
debate over who should be allowed membership in that community. It may serve the welfare of
human and non-human animals to instead extend moral consideration to other animals and
establish universally consented upon rights to all animals29. Many of the rights that are
associated with humanness should be extended to non-human animals such as the right to live
freely, the right to basic survival needs, and the right to live at all.

28

In a letter published posthumously, Freire (2004) significantly deviated from his humanist tradition and
may have been beginning to formulate a more holistic view of oppression. Freire (2004) wrote on the day
of a brutal murder of Pataxó Indian,
The fact in itself that this tragic transgression of ethics has taken place warns us how urgent it is
that we fight for more fundamental ethical principles, such as respect for the life of human
beings, the life of other animals, of birds, and for the life of rivers and forests. I do not believe in
love among women and men, among human beings, if we do not become capable of loving the
world. Ecology has gained tremendous importance at the end of this century. It must be present
in any educational practice of a radical, critical, and liberating nature. (p.47)
29
There are obviously certain differences between humans and other animals that dictate that human
moral considerations do not apply in precisely the same way to other animals. One significant factor is our
very limited ability to communicate with other species.
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A final consideration at the interface of animal rights and conservation is zoos. Zoos
are largely justified by their role in promoting “species conservation in natural habitats” (Myers
et al., 2004, p. 559). Zoos provide opportunity for humans to experience non-human animals in
simulated natural habitats and such experiences may foster empathy for non-human animals
and lead to greater concern for animals and the natural world. However, in a study on children’s
conceptions of the needs of animals, Myers et al. (2004) noted that “few subjects explicitly
acknowledged freedom to roam as an important need, when it may be a precondition for
meeting all other needs in an appropriate habitat” (p.560). Myers et al. (2004) concluded that
while data suggested that such value for freedom is related to the developmental stage of
participants, the significance of normalization of the captivity of animals in urban environments
could not be determined. Thus, zoos may have positive and negative influence regarding the
subjugation of animals (including humans).
I maintain that the struggle against oppression requires uncompromising opposition of
all oppression. I oppose the subjugation of all animals and the normalization of animals in
captivity potentially perpetuated by many zoos. However, this has more to do with the
treatment and portrayal of animals in captivity than holding animals in captivity. Many beautiful
animal sanctuaries provide the best possible conditions for animals who due to domestication,
capture, or abuse cannot be safely reintroduced into the wild. Many of the facilities offer limited
public access and facilitate educational experiences with constant emphasis on the welfare of
the residents.
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3.7.2

Cultural normative limitations
The Nazi’s had a term, lebensunweten Lebens meaning “life unworthy of life” (Opotow,

1990) and “Nazi propaganda defined Jews as outside the pale of humanity” (Oliner & Oliner,
1988, p.6). Such condemnation and exclusion of the Jewish people was systematically
normalized and enforced by the Nazis. This caused Hoffman (2000) to declare:
Since the Holocaust, cultural relativism is dead. We no longer have the luxury of
assuming every culture’s values or guiding principles will pass the moral test and
that each good is as good as the any other. (p.273)
It seems self-evident in consideration of the Holocaust that certain atrocities are universally and
unquestionably wrong. However, cultural relativism may not be so easily dismissed. This section
explores the influence of culture in attempt to understand how moral injustice could occur with
majority complicity on the scale of a society. The section begins by examining moral relativism
and ethical objectivism. Next, the influence of cultural norms on individual and group moral
judgments is examined while entertaining the possibility that such perceived injustice is
objectively immoral and the possibility that morality is entirely subjective. Finally, I conclude
with a pragmatic approach to morality in search of a middle ground between relativism and
universalism.
Before continuing I want to consider the framing of the Holocaust as the epitome of
moral failure due to relativism. First, it stretches the concepts of moral and cultural relativism
because German culture wasn’t the culprit. What the Nazis (not the Germans) attempted was to
establish a different epistemology- a competing reality where any dissenter was deemed
unworthy of life. The Nazi party was no more representative of German culture than it was of
dominant Western culture. If cultural relativism is denounced by citing the Holocaust, then the
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denouncement is of the moral validity of judgments relative to dominant Western culture.
However, many of the liberating forces were also part of dominant Western culture. Thus,
cultural relativism does not account for the Holocaust.
A second consideration of framing of the Holocaust as the epitome of moral failure is
that Earth has not witnessed a single Holocaust, but many holocausts occurring before and after
WWII. Defining the Holocaust as the single most profound atrocity in the history of Western
culture dismisses a history of atrocity perpetrated and perpetuated by dominant Western
culture. If we are to suggest that moral relativism be denounced based on extreme cases, why
not cite colonialism or slavery? I suggest that it is because the moral deficiency is easily
recognizable in those cases as a deficiency of European and European-American culture and in
the case of the Holocaust, it is easy to maintain the moral standing of European-American
liberators. The pursuit of moral universalism must overcome ethnocentrism and egocentrism
that underlie assertions of objectivity and lead to judgments of superiority.
Still, Hoffman (2000) raises an important question regarding the possibility of ethical
objectivism. Regardless of the above considerations, most people, despite the subjectivity of our
own experiences and differences in culture, maintain similar basic ideals about what is right and
wrong. Such concepts were considered in the preceding discussion of rights. Despite the
subjectivity of our individual experiences and the influence of normative forces like culture,
there is some innate intersubjectivity among all humans. This intersubjectivity allows us to
cooperate and generally resolve moral conflicts constructively. When significant harm is
perceived as the result of judgments made by majority consensus of a society, cultural relativism
and ethical objectivism become important considerations.
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Cultural or moral relativism suggests that morality is subjective and differs in
accordance with culture. The presumptions of relativism are: (1) we are not able to know the
moral truth of our judgments apart from our own culture (2) our moral judgments do not apply
to those who do not share the same moral truths (Cook, 1999). Thus, moral behavior is dictated
by cultural norms and judgments are only universally right or wrong in the context of a
particular culture (e.g., in Hindu culture it is wrong to…). Moral relativism taken to the extreme
suggests that all moral judgments are arbitrary and no moral claim could be better than any
other. Ethical objectivism makes the opposite claims suggesting that we can and do know moral
truth and that it does apply to those who do not share the same convictions. The
consequentialist position on moral objectivism is that right and wrong are determined by the
outcomes of moral judgments and relies on a judgment of the desirability of those outcomes.
The deontological position is that there are universal principles which rationally dictate whether
or not a judgment is morally right or wrong (as illustrated by Kahn’s (1999) definition of
obligatory moral judgments).
Regardless of whether one believes that cultural norms validate moral judgments, there
is no escaping the fact that culture is influential in individual moral judgments. Certainly the
influence is not deterministic and individuals have the ability to resist or comply with cultural
norms. We should never assume cultures are homogenous or static or that all individuals
approve of all of the practices of their culture. Martin Luther King Jr. expressed this sentiment
beautify when addressing the American Psychological Association in 1966.
There are some things in our society, some things in our world, to which we
should never be adjusted. There are some things to which we must always be
maladjusted if we are to be people of good will. (as cited in Turiel, 2005, p.4)
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King’s statement may represent a consequentialist perspective on the moral truths
underlying the civil rights movement. In fact, throughout American history, cultural critique
unapologetically condemning the outcomes of cultural practices has propelled our social
progress (e.g., civil rights movement). King made it clear that the injustice he spoke of was just
as wrong elsewhere in the world as in the United States.
The relativistic rejoinder to such a powerful stance on justice may suggest that the
identification of injustice was relative to the status quo.
It is easy for us to feel appalled at the way nobles exploited their serfs,
plantation owners exploited their slaves and male chauvinists exploited women.
But were these land-owners, slaveholders, and male chauvinists fundamentally
different from us, or were they simply responding to different pressures and a
different status quo? The prevailing power balances, then, seem to affect even
the most aloof reformers’ conceptions of social justice. (Austin & Hatfield, 1980,
p.53)
The above passage does not suggest that it is arbitrary to feel appalled by past injustice, but that
we must understand the context for injustice. We have to be sympathetic but not permissive
when critically examining the cultural influence of behavior that we consider harmful to
ourselves or others.
When behavior is culturally normalized, individuals may not recognize their compliance
as a moral judgment. The cultural normativity of the behavior may additionally be seen as
validation of the moral judgment to comply. Therefore we must critically examine our own
enculturation. If we seek moral objectivity we must consider how Western norms have been
conducive to Western atrocity. Rather than denouncing the moral judgments of others we must
accept that Westerners may not be the moral light of the world (we don’t have the greatest
track record). However, although Western culture dominates Western society, Western society
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is not culturally homogenous. Thus, we must look inward to critique the normative forces of
our own cultures and societies and look outward, not in judgment, but in humility. As Grande
(2004) wrote
Dominant patterns of belief and practice are … integrally related to the cultural
and ecological crises. Thus, the need for understanding other cultural patterns
as legitimate and competing sources of knowledge is critical. (p.65)
However, Grande (2004) did not assert that colonized peoples exist beyond critique and
referred to the idea as “not only short sighted but also patronizing” (p.84). She clarified that
voices of Indigenous and other non-Western peoples become increasingly vital,
not because such peoples categorically possess any kind of magical, mystical
power to fix countless generations of abuse and neglect, but because nonWestern peoples and nations exist as living critiques of the dominant culture,
providing critique-al knowledge and potentially transformative paradigms.
(Grande, 2004, p.65)
Thus, through exploring relativism we may find moral truth. However, there may be multiple
moral truths and truth may not be static or absolute. We must be firmly rooted in our own
identities and concepts of morality while simultaneously respecting, honoring, and learning from
differing practices in other cultures.
In summary, humans experience life subjectively and our perceptions, experiences and
identities influence our moral judgments. At issue is whether moral judgments can be right or
wrong. I suggest that we know certain universal rights and wrongs, but others most certainly will
continue to emerge and evolve over time. Genocide, slavery, murder, rape, and mutilation are
examples of things that are unquestionably wrong. In less extreme cases, moral judgments are
much more subjective and objective rights may be unknown or nonexistent.
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Pragmatic ethics establish a reasonable middle ground between objective moral
judgments and subjectivity based on consequentialism. Sayre’s (1991) environmental ethics fit
well into my broad conception of the environment as natural and social. Sayre (1991) proposed
an alternative view according to which the aim of environmental ethics is (1) a
clear understanding of how moral norms actually come to be instituted in a
given society, (2) the analysis of the practical effect of such norms from an
environmental perspective, and (3) an examination of the relative desirability of
alternative norms in light of their environmental effects. (p.195)
All that remains is to sort out what is desirable. Although it is certainly a point of subjectivity, we
all have to choose a point where we stand firm in our own moral convictions on what is good
and what isn’t. For example, I believe that all life is worthy of life. In my own self-conception,
the value that I place on life transcends concepts of cultural and moral relativism.
Sayre’s (1991) ethics most importantly call for understanding. In all but the most
extreme cases, moral judgments can identified as harmful without condemning the moral
judge(s) as individuals or a cultural group. When behavior that is accepted/normalized is
harmful, I believe we have a duty as humans to intervene. However, intervention cannot be an
imperialistic effort at coercion which is both a violation of rights and an ineffective means of
changing behavior. We have to heed Sayre’s (1991) advice and recognize how and why the
harmful behavior may be a function of cultural and moral norms. We must meet people where
they are, help them expand their perspectives, see the consequences of their actions, and
voluntarily come to new moral positions. However, we must also be prepared to expand our
own perspectives and recognize the consequences of our own actions. I’m reminded of the
narrative of a Christian missionary who lived with Pirahã Indians in the Amazon Rainforest with
the goal of learning their language in order to convert them but wound up not converting
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anyone (Everett, 2008). Instead, Everett (2008) was personally transformed by the
experience and gained new respect for the Pirahã way of knowing and being entirely in the
present moment. The lesson is that we need to know people before we make assumptions
about their judgments or behavior.
In conclusion, I do not reject the possibility of moral objectivity, but I make no claims
that humans know such objectivity in the complexity of human social relations. I am unwilling to
quickly condemn cultural or individual practices as immoral and I hold that undesirable behavior
isn’t always immoral because judgments involve subjectivity. Consequences of judgments,
however, are less subjective, and when one’s moral judgments cause harm, intervention is
necessary. In the most extreme circumstances, such as violent assault, considering the
possibility that the transgressor is acting morally, gently intervening, and having a conversation
about the transgression would be unreasonable. In such cases, only the moral judgment of the
person or people intervening could possibly dictate the appropriate response.
3.7.3

Social death
Lisa Marie Cacho (2012) takes a structural approach to understanding (in)justice through

the concept of social death. Social death is significantly related to moral exclusion and empathic
bias. However, Cacho’s (2012) method of exploring social death as a process of exclusion
provides a more sociological than psychological perspective. Social death is the outcome of a
process where those deemed “dangerous, undeserving or unintelligible” are stripped of political
legitimacy and moral credibility and denied the right even to demand rights. The socially dead
are legally and morally “ineligible for personhood” (Cacho, 2012).
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Criminalization is one of the methods of exclusion resulting in social death.
Criminalization is the variety of “ideological and material processes that turn some people into
criminals by making it all but impossible for them to be law-abiding” (Cacho, 2012)
because “certain vulnerable and impoverished populations and places of color” are targeted by
policies of regulation and containment (p.5). Cacho argued that because legal policy is generally
accepted as
both ethical and irreproachable, the act of law-breaking reflects poorly on a
person’s moral character. If following the law (legitimate or not) determines
whether a person is moral or immoral, it is all but impossible for people
assigned to certain status categories to represent themselves as moral and
deserving. (p.4)
Therefore Cacho (2012) addressed legal, social, and moral exclusion singularly for the targets of
criminalization and social death.
The targets of criminalization are inescapably prejudged as immoral and criminal and
“deemed deserving of discipline and punishment but not worthy of protection. They are not
merely excluded from legal protection but criminalized as always already the object and target
of law, never its authors or addressees” (Cacho, 2012, p. 5). The progression in judgment from
illegal to immoral and therefore undeserving of rights renders the targets ineligible for
personhood. This “not only forecloses empathy but does so through producing people and
places always already subject to a form of discrimination believed to be both legitimate and
deserved” (Cacho, 2012, p. 82).
Cacho (2012) is suggesting that laws (as practically synonymous with morals) are written
against specific racialized identities making not only someone’s behavior illegal, but their very
existence.
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People subjected to laws based on their (il)legal status – “illegal aliens,” “gang
members,” “terrorist suspects”- are unable to comply with the “rule of law”
because US law targets their beings and their bodies, not their behavior. They
are denied not only the illusion of authorship but even the possibility of
compliance. (Cacho, 2012, p.6)
Cacho (2012) supported this proposition by analyzing media portrayals and legal proceedings
related to immigration, terrorism, and gang violence and showed that status and identity dictate
the way law targets individuals. One example of the way that identity and criminality are deeply
intertwined was provided by the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Cacho (2012) juxtaposed
images in the media of a Black man wading through floodwaters with food from a grocery store
with a nearly identical image of white couple who had taken food from a grocery store. The
Black man was portrayed as a criminal who looted property, while the white couple portrayed as
victims who found food in a grocery store (Cacho, 2012). Cacho (2012) concluded that only a
black body makes certain crimes (looting) visible. More precisely, Black is criminalized as a de
facto status crime.
De facto status crimes can be defined as specific activities that are not only
transparently recognized as “criminal” when they are attached to statuses that
invoke race (gang member), ethnicity (“illegal alien”), and/or national origin
(suspected terrorist). (p.43)
A compelling case that Cacho (2012) examined was the case of eight high school
teenagers who planned and executed a targeted attack on Mexican migrant workers in July,
2000. The teenagers explicitly sought out to attack “illegal immigrants” (incidentally, none of the
migrant workers were undocumented). They nearly beat a man to death and beat, robbed and
harassed several other migrant workers for three hours while shouting racial slurs. In the
ensuing trial the teenagers were portrayed as victims of gang enhancement charges (Proposition
21) that dictated that they should face enhanced sentencing and be tried as adults, which were
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clearly not intended for people like them. National media attention and public sympathy
were invoked for these otherwise ‘good kids’ who just made a ‘mistake’. As Cacho (2012)
concluded “The primary question regarding the assailants’ case was whether their irrefutable
guilt tainted their innate innocence” (p.29). Their innate innocence was related to their status as
affluent white US American citizens. At the same time, many other Youth of Color received
enhanced sentences under Proposition 21 with very little public media attention. The clear
subtext is that the status of gang member is inseparable from race, status categories, and
criminalized identities (Cacho, 2012).
Another component of social death is that not all identities are unquestionably
protected and privileged. While some people/s are considered entitled to rights, others must be
deemed deserving of rights.
When a group’s rights are presumed to be entitlements, discussions about
injustice can focus on whether people’s rights have been respected. But when a
group’s rights are not socially recognized, discussions revolve around whether
or not the aggrieved group even deserves to speak out against discrimination or
exploitation, which effectively subverts or forecloses any dialogue about the
actual injustices. (Cacho, 2012, p.139)
African Americans, in this light, are often portrayed as having “earned” rights (as citizens), while
Latina/o migrant workers are portrayed as undeserving of rights (as immigrants). This rhetoric is
used to put civil rights and immigrant rights at odds because civil rights are considered to have
been earned while immigrant rights are not (Cacho, 2012). Cacho (2012) points out that it is the
same institutions that render these folks socially dead that must be appealed to in order to
establish deservingness of rights. An appeal for rights made within a system that functions to
deny rights may be a case where the master’s tools, indeed, will never dismantle the master’s
house. Thus deservingness “is an unachievable prerequisite for the conferral of rights and
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dignity that functions to align paid and unpaid workers with the regulating institutions and
ideologies that keep them economically exploitable and legally vulnerable” (Cacho, 2012, p.12).
The rights we need to be talking about are universal human rights. If rights are
distributed based on deservingness then even those who are morally included, are only
conditionally included and must continue to prove their deservingness and always unprotected
from moral exclusion and social death. Cacho (2012) suggested that we must “set aside the
notion that rights are contingent (with citizenship as the prerequisite) and conditional (with
deservingness as the provisio)” (p. 141). In summary,
As criminal by being, unlawful by presence, and illegal by status, [the socially
dead]do not have the option to be law abiding, which is always the absolute
prerequisite for political rights legal recognition, and resource redistribution in
the United States. When the subjugation is engendered, justified, and
maintained by the law, legal recognition cannot be a permanent or meaningful
solution to subjugation. Criminalization justifies people’s ineligibility to
personhood because it takes away the right to have rights. Consequentially,
criminalization makes sense of the contradictions that ensue when according
unequal access to legal universality. (Cacho, 2012, p.8)
Finally, Cacho (2012) concluded with the value of hope:
The space of social death is a desperate space, overwrought with and
overdetermined by ideological contradictions of ineligible personhood … And
yet the space of social death is always graced with hope, courage and/or
youthful idealism, where those who decide to take responsibility for the
unprotected are always looking for and stepping on the pressure points that can
barely manage the contradictions that their very being inspires. (Cacho, 2012,
p.145)
3.8

Hip Hop Interlude
Reserving the category of “resistance” for activists, organizers, and leaders
underestimates and depreciates everyday forms of resistance, such as strategies
to subtly subvert exploitation or artistic approaches to reclaim and “redecorate”
public space. In fact, we may not only misread resistance as deviance, but in
doing so we run the risk of patronizing youth, workers, and communities as
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childishly disobedient rather than consciously and deliberately defiant. (Cacho,
2012, p. 162)
I can’t possibly recognize and honor the myriad ways of knowing and being of the world
and by the nature of this project academic theory and research dominate. However, as an active
participant in dominant culture with the audacity to think I have anything to say about a struggle
against oppression, it would be an act of oppression to ignore American cultures who stand
against oppression (not only Hip Hop, but many Indigenous, immigrant, and diasporic artists,
peoples, and cultures). Potter (1995) wrote that
it is vital to recognize that there are material inheritances- such as slaverywhose reverberations need not be recorded by a seismograph in a sealed
laboratory, but can be and are felt in the everyday life of black diasporic
cultures. (p.6)
One such culture is Hip Hop. Those who live and practice Hip Hop are the experts most qualified
to speak to the urban experience. For that reason, I find it imperative to take a brief intermission
to consult Hip Hop on the urban30 experience and its influence on morality.
The products of hiphop (e.g., albums) foster a certain experience to those who consume
them, but the culture of Hip Hop is lived experience. Folks who do not share the lived
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‘Urban’ is a bit of a vague and euphemistic term that is often used to dodge issues of race, poverty, and
class. Nygreen, Ah Kwon, and Sánchez (2006) challenged this “dominant discourse that frames urban
youth as disengaged or troubled” and suggested urban is “a euphemism for underserved, poor,
marginalized, ethnic minority” peoples (p.108). I have avoided using the term as a label of identity (e.g.,
urban youth) in attempt not to be presumptuous about the identities of the referents of the term because
urban refers to a type of environment. For that reason, I do discuss urban environments and the
experiences that may be common urban environments (e.g., “the urban experience”). This is still a
euphemistic term that is loaded with assumptions and generalizations related to race and socio-economic
status, but I attempt to avoid explicitly making such assumptions and use the term ‘urban’ for lack of a
good substitute.
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experience (such as myself) cannot claim to know it through consuming the products.
However, we can and should interpret the products empathically. The music, visual, and
performing arts of Hip Hop (and the arts of many cultures) are deeply subversive, defiant, and
educational while simultaneously emotional, poetic, and beautiful. These artists deliver critique
in a way that is reaching and moving folks who academics don’t reach and won’t move.
Three pieces by artists who I believe to be widely influential (and whose work I love) are
quoted in their entirety. Each piece offers a different perspective on the urban experience. All
three pieces relate to criminal(ized) behavior and violence in urban environments. The first
piece, The Message by Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five (1982) represents deterministic
perspective on human behavior where the hardships of urban life lead to criminal(ized)
behavior, jail, and ultimately death. The second piece, Love’s Gonna Get’cha by KRS-One (1990)
offers a socially conditioned perspective where the protagonist of the song struggles with their
agency to reconcile criminal(ized) behavior with survival needs. The third piece, Hell Yeah by
Dead Prez (2004) provides a perspective more focused on individual agency and portrays
criminal(ized) behavior as a subversive act against unjust social structure.
All three artists as well as countless others write and perform about many topics and I
don’t mean for this to be a representation of Hip Hip or each artist’s collection of work. It would
be too simple to suggest that each of the three pieces reflect an overarching school of thought
in Hip Hop that has progressed through the decades. However, I hope to illustrate the richness
of the discussion taking place in Hip Hop by including three pieces spanning more than 20 years.
The Message was a foundational piece in Hip Hop and it’s a certainty that each successive piece
is written at least vaguely in response to it.
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As a final note, I have decided to quote each piece in its entirety because I feel that
it would be an appropriation for me to alter the pieces or quote only segments that portray the
work in the light that I am interpreting it.
In hip hop, there are, no doubt, expressions of sexist, racist, homophobic,
capitalist constructions; however, there is also a disruption of these oppressive
discourses, often within the same performances. (Baszile, 2009)
Hip Hop is deeply and necessarily contradictory, complex, nuanced, and perfect in its
imperfection because it is reflective of the contradictions of the society in which it exists. It’s not
refined and sanitized like academic work that is how it is supposed to be.
Ultimately, the critical point here is not—I believe—whether hip hop is good or
bad, but that it in essence represents the struggle for freedom (even when
acted out in negative ways) on behalf of young people who negotiate and
perform self-meaning within a largely different sociopolitical context from
previous generations. (Baszile, 2009)
The pieces use language that I do not use. However, I will not take any part in censoring
artwork. It must be taken as a whole package.
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3.8.1

Grandmaster Flash – The Message

It's like a jungle sometimes
It makes me wonder how I keep from goin' under
It's like a jungle sometimes
It makes me wonder how I keep from goin' under
Broken glass everywhere
People pissin' on the stairs, you know they just don't care
I can't take the smell, can't take the noise
Got no money to move out, I guess I got no choice
Rats in the front room, roaches in the back
Junkies in the alley with a baseball bat
I tried to get away but I couldn't get far
'cuz a man with a tow truck repossessed my car
Chorus:
Don't push me 'cuz I'm close to the edge
I'm trying not to lose my head
Uh huh ha ha ha
It's like a jungle sometimes
It makes me wonder how I keep from goin' under
Standin' on the front stoop hangin' out the window
Watchin' all the cars go by, roarin' as the breezes blow
Crazy lady, livin' in a bag
Eatin' outta garbage pails, used to be a fag had sex and
danced the tango, skip the life and dango
A Zircon princess seemed to lost her senses
Down at the peep show watchin' all the creeps
So she can tell her stories to the girls back home
She went to the city and got so social security
She had to get a pimp, she couldn't make it on her own
[Chorus]
My brother's doin' bad, stole my mother's TV
Says she watches too much, it's just not healthy
"All My Children" in the daytime, "Dallas" at night
Can't even see the game or the Sugar Ray fight
The bill collectors, they ring my phone
and scare my wife when I'm not home
Got a bum education, double-digit inflation
Can't take the train to the job, there's a strike at the station
Neon King Kong standin' on my back
Can't stop to turn around, broke my sacroiliac
A mid-range migraine, cancered membrane
Sometimes I think I'm goin' insane
I swear I might hijack a plane!
[Chorus]

My son said, Daddy, I don't wanna go to school
'cuz the teacher's a jerk, he must think I'm a fool
And all the kids smoke reefer, I think it'd be cheaper
if I just got a job, learned to be a street sweeper
Or dance to the beat, shuffle my feet
Wear a shirt and tie and run with the creeps
'cuz it's all about money, ain't a damn thing funny
You got to have a con in this land of milk and honey
They pushed that girl in front of the train
Took her to the doctor, sewed her arm on again
Stabbed that man right in his heart
Gave him a transplant for a brand new start
I can't walk through the park 'cuz it's crazy after dark
Keep my hand on my gun 'cuz they got me on the run
I feel like a outlaw, broke my last glass jaw
Hear them say "You want some more?"
Livin' on a see-saw
[Chorus]
A child is born with no state of mind
Blind to the ways of mankind
God is smilin' on you but he's frownin' too
Because only God knows what you'll go through
You'll grow in the ghetto livin' second-rate
And your eyes will sing a song of deep hate
The places you play and where you stay
Looks like one great big alleyway
You'll admire all the number-book takers
Thugs, pimps and pushers and the big money-makers
Drivin' big cars, spendin' twenties and tens
And you'll wanna grow up to be just like them, huh
Smugglers, scramblers, burglars, gamblers
Pickpockets, peddlers, even panhandlers
You say I'm cool, huh, I'm no fool
But then you wind up droppin' outta high school
Now you're unemployed, all non void
Walkin' round like you're Pretty Boy Floyd
Turned stick-up kid, but look what you done did
Got sent up for a eight-year bid
Now your manhood is took and you're a Maytag
Spend the next two years as a undercover fag
Bein' used and abused to serve like hell
'til one day, you was found hung dead in the cell
It was plain to see that your life was lost
You was cold and your body swung back and forth
But now your eyes sing the sad, sad song
Of how you lived so fast and died so young so...
(Grandmaster Flash & Furious Five, 1982)

3.8.2

Boogie Down Productions – Loves Gonna Get’Cha (Material Love) on Edutainment

Ya know that's why man I be telling you all the time man, you
know love, that word 'love,' is a very serious thing, and if you
don't watch out I tell ya, that (Love's gonna get you) because a
lot of people out here say "I love my car" or "I love my chain" or,
or "I-I-I'm just in love with that girl over there" so, for all the
people out there that fall in love with material items, we gonna
bump the beat a little something like this
I'm in junior high with a B-plus grade
At the end of the day I don't hit the arcade
I walk from school to my mom's apartment
I got to tell the suckas everyday "Don't start it,"
Cause where I'm at, if you're soft, you're lost
To stay on course means to roll with force
My boy named Rob is chillin' in a Benz
In front of my building with the rest of his friends
I give him a pound, oh I mean I shake his hand
He's the neighborhood drug dealer, my man
I go upstairs and hug my mother
Kiss my sister, and punch my brother
I sit down on my bed to watch some tv
(machine gun fire) Do my ears deceive me?
Nope, that's the fourth time this week
Another fast brother shot dead in the street
The very next day while I'm off to class
My moms goes to work cold busting her ass
My sister's cute but she got no gear
I got three pairs of pants that with my brother I share
See there in school see I'm made a fool
With one and a half pair of pants you ain't cool
But there's no dollars for nothing else
I got beans, rice, and bread on my shelf
Every day I see my mother struggling
Now it’s time I've got to do something
I look for work I get dissed like a jerk
I do odd jobs and come home like a slob
So here comes Rob his gold is shimmery
He gives me two hundred for a quick delivery
I do it once. I do it twice
Now there's steak with the beans and rice
My mother's nervous but she knows the deal
My sister's gear now has sex appeal
My brothers my partner and we're getting paper
Three months later we run our own caper
My family's happy everything is new
Now tell me what the fuck am I supposed to do?

Money's flowing, everything is fine
Got myself an Uzi and my brother a nine
Business is boomin' everything is cool
I pull about a g a week--fuck school
A year goes by and I begin to grow
Not in height but juice and cash flow
I pick up my feet and begin to watch tv
Cause now I got other people working for me
I got a 55-inch television you know
And every once in a while I hear 'Just Say No,'
Or the other commercial I love
Is when they say 'this is your brain on drugs,'
I pick up my remote control and just turn
Cause with that bullshit I'm not concerned
See me and my brother jump in the BM
Driving around our territory again
I stop at the light like a superstar
And automatic weapons cold sprayed my car
I hit the accelerator scared as shit
And drove one block to find my brother was hit
He wasn't dead but the blood was pouring
And all I could think about was warring
Later I found that it was Rob and his crew
Now tell me, what the fuck am I supposed to do?
[Chorus]

Chorus:

My brothers out of it, but I'm still in it
On top of that I’m in it to win it
I can't believe that Rob would dis me
That faggot, that punk, he's soft--a sissy!
I'm driving around now with three of my guys
The war is on, and I'm on the rise
We rolled right up to his favorite hangout
Said 'hello' and then the bullets rang out
Some fired back so we took cover
And all I could think about was my brother
Rob jumped up and began to run
Busting shots hoping to hit someone
So I just stopped, and let off three shots
Two hit him and one hit a cop
I threw the gun down and began to shout
'Come on, I got him, it's time to break out!'
But as we ran, there were the boys in blue
Pointing their guns at my four man crew
They shot down one, they shot down two
Now tell me what the fuck am I supposed to do?

That's why, (loves gonna get you)
(loves gonna get you)(loves gonna get you)(loves gonna get you)
You fall in love with your chain
You fall in love with your car
Love's gonna sneak right up and snuff you from behind
So I want you to check the story out as we go down the line
(loves gonna get you)(loves gonna get you)(loves gonna get you)

Ya know a lot of people believe that that word 'love' is real soft,
but when you use it in your vocabulary like you're addicted to it,
it sneaks right up and takes you right out. So, for future
reference remember: it's alright to like or want a material item,
but when you fall in love with it and you start scheming and
carrying on for it, just remember, it's gonna get'cha
(Boogie Down Productions & KRS-One, 1990)
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3.8.3

Dead Prez - Hell Yeah on RBG (Revolutionary but Gangsta)

Holton Street
Dean Street, click clack
President, uh huh
Nostrand Ave, DPz
Orange Ave, RBGs
Tee Town, who wanna ride
Brooklyn, come on, come on
Sitting in the living room on the floor
Hunger pang got me on some migraine shit
But I'm gonna maintain
Nigga got two or three dollars to my name
And my homies in the same boat going through the same thing
Ready for a caper, better plot for the paper
We been living in the dark since April
On the candle, gotta get a handle
My homie got a twenty-five automatic added to the camper
Nigga get the phone book look up in the yellow page
Lemme tell you how we gonna get paid
We gonna order take-out and when they send the driver
We gonna stick the twenty-five up in his face
Let's ride, stepping outside like warriors
Head to the notorious Southside
One weapon to the four of us
Hiding in the corridor until we see the beams from the car
headlights
White boy in the wrong place at the right time
Soon as the car door open up he mine
We roll up quick and put the pistol to his nose
By the look on his face he probably shitted in his clothes
You know what this is
It's a stick up
Gimme the do' from your pickups
You ran into the wrong niggas
We running down the block hot with these stacks of boxes
So we split up and met back at the apartment
Chorus:
Hell yeah! - Yo ain't you hungry my nigga?
Hell yeah! - You wanna get paid my nigga?
Hell yeah! - Ain't you tired of starving my nigga?
Hell yeah! - Well lets ride then!
Hell yeah!
Hell yeah!
I know a way we can get paid you can get down but you can't be
afraid
Let's go to the DMV and get an ID
The name says you but the face is me
Now it's your turn take my paper work
Like 1, 2, 3 let’s make it work
Then, fill out the credit card application
And it’s gonna be ‘bout 3 weeks a waiting
For American Express
Discover Card
Platinum Visa, Mastercard
Cause when we was boosting shit we was targets
Now we just walk right up and say charge it

To the game we rocking brand names
Well known at the department store chains
We even got the boys in the crew a few things
Po Po never know who to true blame
Sto' after Sto' you know we kept rolling
Wait two weeks report the car stolen
Repeat the cycle like a laundry mat
Like a glitch in the system it's hard to catch
Coming out the mall with the shopping bags
We can take it right back then get the cash
Yea, get a friend and then do it again
Damn right that's how we paid the rent
[Chorus]
I know a caper
We can get some government paper
You know food stamps can we really do that
Hell yea, right there for the taking
Fuck welfare we say reparations
And, you know the grind
Get up early get in the line and just wait
Everybody on break that's part of the game
And when they call your name
Ms. Case Worker let my state my claim
I'm homeless, jobless, times is hard
I'm bout hopeless
But I gotta eat regardless
No family to run to I'm twenty two
Now tell me what the fuck am I supposed to do
My sad story made her feel close to me
I made her feel like it was an emergency
When I came to the crib niggas couldn't believe
I came back with a big bag of groceries, hell yeah
Every job I ever had I had to get on the first day
I find out how to pimp on the system
Two steps ahead of the manager
Getting over on the regular tax free money out of the register
And when I'm working late nights stocking boxes
I'm creeping their merchandise
And don't put me on dishes I'm dropping them bitches
And taking all day long to mop the kitchen shit
We ain't getting paid commission, minimum wage, modern day
slave conditions
Got me flippin' burgers with no power
Can't even buy one off what I make in an hour
I'm not the one to kiss ass for the top position
I take mine off the top like a politician
Where I'm from doing dirt is a part of living
I got mouths to feed I gots to get it
If you claiming gangsta, then bang on the system
And show that you ready to ride
Till we get our freedom
We got to get over
We steady on the grind
(Dead Prez, 2004)
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3.8.4

Concluding notes on Hip Hop
The preceding lyrics are simply intended to illustrate the attention to urban social

conditions and diversity of thought on the significance of the influence of those conditions
among Hip Hop artists. I’m certain that all of the theory discussed in this paper is addressed in
outside of academia and significantly in the art of Hip Hop. I return to Hip Hop as pedagogy in
section 4.4.3 on page 232.
This section on Hip Hop precedes the following section explores outlying behavior, in part,
to provide perspectives on how and why some folks may act in such a manner, specifically
considering environmental influences. Additionally, the lyrics illustrate how conflicting needs
and interests in the context of a fundamentally unjust social structure may render simple
categorization of behavior as prosocial or antisocial inadequate. Certain antisocial behavior may
be an attempt to reconcile injustice; this may be what Dead Prez (2004) referred to as
“revolutionary but gangsta.” I would not categorize their music as ‘gangster rap,’ on the above
track they are deliberately examining the subversive nature of criminal(ized) behavior from the
perspective of those targeted by oppression in urban environments. I hope the reader will keep
these perspectives and lived experiences in mind in the following exploration of outlying
behavior.
3.9

Outlying Behavior
Empathy potentially exists in everyone, it may be reduced by irritability,
fearfulness, and other temperamental factors, and by depressive and autistic
tendencies that interfere with mimicry, role-taking, and other empathy arousing
processes. Combining these temperamental factors with nonnurturant,
excessively power-assertive life experiences may well produce individuals who
cannot empathize (psychopaths?) (Hoffman, 2000, p.282).
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To be frank, I do not have the background or expertise to adequately explore
differences in the moral development of individuals who are outliers in the process of empathy
and moral development as I have described it. However, as an educator and an outlier, I hope to
offer a sympathetic perspective and a passionate refusal to believe that anyone is
fundamentally incapable of prosocial behavior.
3.9.1

Autism Spectrum Dis/Order

The concept of ‘Autistic Psychopathy’ was introduced by Hans Asperger in 1944 (Jones
et al., 2010). People diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder may experience empathy
differently, but there is no reason to suggest that autistic people lack the ability to care for
others or to develop moral principles.
The essential features of autism spectrum disorder are persistent impairment in
reciprocal social communication and social interaction (Criterion A), and
restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities (Criterion B).
These symptoms are present from early childhood and limit or impair everyday
functioning (Criteria C and D). (American Psychological Association, 2013)
Criterion A raises questions about how autism spectrum disorder (ASD) relates to the empathy
and moral development process. The DSM-5 (2013) elaborated on Criterion A:
A. Persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction across multiple
contexts, as manifested by the following, currently or by history (examples are
illustrative, not exhaustive; see text):
1. Deficits in social-emotional reciprocity, ranging, for example, from abnormal
social approach and failure of normal back-and-forth conversation; to reduced
sharing of interests, emotions, or affect; to failure to initiate or respond to social
interactions.
2. Deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviors used for social interaction,
ranging, for example, from poorly integrated verbal and nonverbal
communication; to abnormalities in eye contact and body language or deficits in
understanding and use of gestures; to a total lack of facial expressions and
nonverbal communication.

147
3. Deficits in developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships,
ranging, for example, from difficulties adjusting behavior to suit various social
contexts; to difficulties in sharing imaginative play or in making friends; to
absence of interest in peers. (American Psychological Association, 2013)
However, behavior by individuals with ASD that may be interpreted by neurotypical (NT)
individuals as antisocial may not be done with malicious intent (Jones et al., 2010). Rather, such
antisocial behavior could be explained as well-intentioned faux pas by “individuals who find the
social world difficult to interpret” (Jones et al., 2010). Obviously, individuals with ASD, like all
other individuals, may occasionally act with malice.
Individuals with ASD experience empathy in the affective sense similarly NTs but have
difficulty with more cognitive forms of empathy like perspective taking (Jones et al., 2010).
Individuals with ASD have difficulty in understanding the perspective of others
and consequently may react in a seemingly cold and uncaring manner in real-life
situations. However, if information is presented in a way that enables
individuals with ASD to identify others’ point of view, they appear to show as
much concern and compassion as typically developing individuals. (Jones et al.,
2010)
Co-occurrence of ASD and lack of affective empathy (commonly associated with psychopathy) is
possible. Both conditions are believed to be highly heritable, but they are genetically
independent. Thus, although both are sometimes considered empathy disorders, autism and
psychopathy are significantly distinct from one another (Jones et al., 2010).
Although many folks on the Autism Spectrum are highly communicative, either verbally
or non-verbally, ASD is primarily researched and described by neurotypical people. In The
Positive Psychology of Personal Transformation: Leveraging Resilience for Life Change, Garbarino
(2011), who has authored more than twenty books related to childhood violence and trauma,
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boldly discusses his own autistic tendencies (it is not explicitly clear whether or not
Garbarino has been diagnosed):
They say that because of having trouble understanding the emotions of others a
person with Asperger’s31 may be seen as egotistical, selfish, and uncaring. This is
mostly not true of most of “us.” I know it is not true of me. Let me make it clear
that my intentions are good: I believe I am “a good person.” At heart I am a
person of light and spirit. I am kind, generous, compassionate, caring, and giving
to the degree that I can “figure out” what the kind, generous, compassionate,
caring, and giving thing to do would be. (p.34)
Additionally, the book Asperger Syndrome & Social Relationships: Adults Speak Out about
Asperger Syndrome provides a collection of essays about social relationships written by adults
with Asperger Syndrome. The personal narratives reflect a diversity of unique people who
connect with others in a variety of ways. Several of the contributors work in social professions
such as healthcare, teaching, and social work and actively engage in helping others. Many of the
submissions certainly reflect difficulty with perspective taking, but many express the active use
of induction (attempts to make generalizations about the effect of their actions on others).
What I was struck by, was how actively attentive the authors were to their own difficulty
regarding things like perspective taking and theory of mind for the express purpose of helping
other autistic people achieve greater success in social relations. With the attention, deliberation,

31

DSM-5 no longer diagnoses Asperger’s disorder and those previously diagnosed with Asperger’s
disorder are now diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (American Psychological Association, 2013).
Autism spectrum disorder may be specified with or without accompanying intellectual impairment and
with or without accompanying language impairment. Severity is further specified in relation to the level of
support that the individual needs. (2013)
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and detail of any social scientist these folks deconstruct everyday social interactions in order
to understand social convention that many NTs don’t have to pay specific attention to.
The following quote is meant as a joke and lacks empirical support, but it offers a shift in
perspective regarding conceptions of what a disorder is:
Neurotypical syndrome is a neurobiological disorder characterized by
preoccupation with social concerns, delusions of superiority, and obsession with
conformity. Neurotypical individuals often assume that their experience of the
world is either the only one, or the only correct one. NTs find it difficult to be
alone. NTs are often intolerant of seemingly minor differences in others. When
in groups NTs are socially and behaviorally rigid, and frequently insist upon the
performance of dysfunctional, destructive, and even impossible rituals as a way
of maintaining group identity. NTs find it difficult to communicate directly, and
have a much higher incidence of lying as compared to persons on the autistic
spectrum. (Institute of the Study of the Neurologically Typical,
http://inst.autistics.org, accessed 11 February, 2008) (as cited in Beardon &
Edmonds, 2008, p.11)
I intentionally challenge the term disorder. However it is important to recognize that there are
mental and physical disabilities as well as mental and physical different-abilities. By so
frequently pathologizing children as disabled, we form our expectations for them based on
perceived deficits rather than potential (Damon, 2009). Since “children are acutely aware of
how they are being appraised, and they base their own self-conceptions largely on how others
see them,” (Damon, 2009, p.169) we limit our children’s capacities when we view them as
disabled. Damon (2009) argued that “no child who retains a living brain is ever wholly or
permanently disabled … there are always useful and self-fulfilling things that a child can learn to
do” (p.171).
All people deserve an active role in the way that they self-identify and we all need a
little extra help sometimes. Difference is not necessarily disability. However, those who need
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assistance in order to be healthy and successful in daily life should not confuse politics of
(dis)ability with their practical needs. Labeling a human being as high or low functioning based
on their need for help is dehumanizing. But it is not dehumanizing to recognize and understand
someone’s need for help on an individual basis without presuming that their value is based on
their independence.
3.9.2

Psychopaths, sociopaths & antisocial behavior

“The essential feature of antisocial personality disorder is a pervasive pattern of
disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence
and continues into adulthood” (American Psychological Association, 2013). Those diagnosed
with antisocial personality disorder frequently lack empathy, however a lack of empathy is not
required for diagnosis (American Psychological Association, 2013). This definition neatly applies
to the majority of repeat offenders in prisons. In fact, the prevalence of the disorder is above
70% in prisons and substance clinics (American Psychological Association, 2013). Antisocial
personality disorder is also associated with low socioeconomic status and more frequent in
urban areas (American Psychological Association, 2013).
In everyday use psychopath and sociopath are used interchangeably and evoke images
of a merciless criminal or murder. The DSM-5 does not use the terms psychopath and sociopath,
and such conditions would be diagnosed as antisocial personality disorder (American
Psychological Association, 2013). Pemment (2013) overviewed evidence for the biological nature
of psychopathy and relation to early childhood development and advocated for specific use of
the terms psychopath and sociopath. Pemment (2013) suggested that the psychopath does not
feel empathy and thus has no sense of morality or simply no regard for moral convention due to
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their neurological differences. Sociopaths are defined to have a sense of morality that does
not match their cultural context. The sociopaths belief that their actions are just modulate their
feelings of empathy for a potential victim (Pemment, 2013). Although not caring about others is
a possible outcome of the lack of empathy, a lack of empathy doesn’t doom someone to
antisocial behavior.
Furthermore, the terms psychopath and sociopath and associated empathic “deficiency”
are generally only ascribed post-hoc to those who engage in antisocial behavior. However Haidt
(2006) pointed out that folks who “lose most of their emotional lives” due to damage to the
orbitofrontal cortex (the lower third of the frontal cortex) “perform normally on tests of
intelligence and knowledge of social rules and moral principles” (p. 12). Thus, diminished
emotional capacity is not intrinsically associated with antisocial behavior. The deficit that these
folks most significantly suffer is indecision because without the immediate emotional response
to a situation, the individual must logically examine all of the pros and cons of each possible
choice and may find little reason to pick one or the other (Haidt, 2006). However, damage to the
entire frontal cortex has caused people to become sexually aggressive and uninhibited (Haidt,
2006). Certainly differences in the brain affect our behavior, but rarely do they dictate our
behavior. Cultural influence is too complex and profound a factor for any behavior to be
biologically determined. The general consensus is that some people are born with neurological
deficits that are conducive to psychopathy but that environmental factors more significantly
influence the manifestation of psychopathic behavior (Garbarino, Bradshaw, & Vorrasi, 2002).
If someone is already condemned, criminalized and diagnosed with antisocial
personality disorder or as a psychopath or sociopath even their innocence is presumed to be
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evidence of guilt. They are presumed fully and entirely anti-social. Thus, what for a noncriminalized individual would be normal behavior is perceived as a cover for evildoings. Anyone
considered a psychopath is easily rendered socially dead and morally excluded. In fact, the Bush
Administration employed a similar rhetoric to the descriptions of psychopaths in moral research
in order to justify the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Bush administration constructed the Middle East as an area where “the
condition” of “evildoing” was hidden and latent, posing permanent and
unpredictable threats to civilization. Afghanistan and Iraq were constructed as
terrorist “hideouts” or places with “hidden” weapons of mass destruction, and
this presumption of guilt assumed the existence of unseen evidence that may
not, in fact, have existed. In other words, Iraq and Afghanistan would be
presumed guilty even if proven innocent because the requirements for
exoneration were also the terms of indictment. (Cacho, 2012, p.100)
Psychopathy, sociopathy, and antisocial personality disorder are easy answers for antisocial
behavior (cf. Haidt, 2006 on the myth of pure evil) because they simply condemn the evil other
as incapable of goodness. Evil may exist, and I won’t discount the possibility that some
contingent of human population is simply ‘bad’. However, it is too simple to suggest that
someone who engages in antisocial behavior feels no empathy is simply compelled by their evil
nature to commit crimes. We need to consider the possibility that something is very wrong in
environments where antisocial behavior is prevalent.
Childhood bullying may be a warning sign for psychopathy in adulthood (Gini, Pozzoli, &
Hauser, 2011). Gini et al. (2011) found that children who bully their peers often make sound
moral judgments but lack in moral compassion (i.e., psychopathy: they know right from wrong
but don’t care about the moral distinction). The study stressed the necessity of intervention in
bullying behavior. However, a strictly behaviorist approach to antisocial behavior is not
sufficient because “antisocial behavior in children appears to be correlated with physical abuse,
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parental conflict, and antisocial parents (among a number of other factors)” (Pemment,
2013, p.2). Interventions must address the child’s social environment and the process of moral
development in addition to behavioral interventions.
Garbarino (1996) suggested that factors such as violence and economic poverty,
especially urban environments, are significant causes of antisocial behavior. Garbarino (1996)
used the term socially toxic environments to how such circumstances are conducive to antisocial
behavior.
Social toxicity refers to the extent to which the social environment is
psychologically poisonous, in the sense that it contains serious threats to the
development of identity, competence, moral reasoning, trust, hope, and the
other features of personality and ideology that make for success in school,
family, work, and the community… Like physical toxicity, social toxicity can be
fatal in the form of suicide, homicide, drug-related and other life style-related
preventable deaths. But mostly, it results in diminished “humanity” in the lives
of children and youth by virtue of leading them to live in a state of degradation,
whether they know it or not. (Garbarino, 2011, p.30)
This is clearly the position taken by all three Hip Hop artists discussed previously (Boogie Down
Productions & KRS-One, 1990; Dead Prez, 2004; Grandmaster Flash & Furious Five, 1982). In fact
the DSM-5 stated that “Concerns have been raised that the diagnosis may at times be
misapplied to individuals in settings in which seemingly antisocial behavior may be part of a
protective survival strategy” (American Psychological Association, 2013). It should be considered
that if such a survival strategy was persistently necessary throughout a child’s development
“survival strategy” in a toxic environment could be incorporated into one’s moral framework
and become disorder. The motivation for antisocial behavior and associated “lack of remorse”
characterizing psychopaths may be reflective of moral and empathic limitations that all humans
are subject to such as habituation.
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There may be two unique process at work: (1) Antisocial behavior is a product of
toxic environments and diminished or altered empathy and morality allow one to cope with
having acted in such a way; (2) Antisocial behavior is a result of diminished or altered empathy
and morality and the prevalence of such behavior produces toxic environments. To ask which is
more prevalent is the wrong question. Both are at work and together the two processes make
up a positive feedback cycle that creates and reproduces toxic environments (social
degradation) and perpetuates antisocial behavior.
Hunger and malnutrition also contribute to antisocial behavior. Many vitamins,
minerals, and amino acids are vital to cognitive functioning and effect production of chemicals in
the brain, such as serotonin, dopamine, and norepinephrine (Massachusets General Hospital,
2006) . Studies have shown that dietary correction or supplementation can reduce antisocial
behavior and violent tendencies in incarcerated adults (Gesch, Hammond, Hampson, Eves, &
Crowder, 2002) and adolescents (Schoenthaler et al., 1997), and improve cognitive functioning
(Rogers, 2001) and academic performance (Florence, 2007). In the Schoenthaler et al. (1997)
study the researchers in this study collected and analyzed blood samples prior to, and in course
of the intervention study. The subjects who had deficiencies (most common deficiencies were
B1, B3, B6, B9, all associated with mood disorders) prior to the study displayed the most
significant decrease in violent behavior. Rogers (2001) concluded that, “dietary risk factors for
physical (ill)health are also often risk factors for mental (ill)health” (2001). Ultimately, a healthy
diet and healthy brain improve cognitive functioning and may help people resolve conflicts nonviolently.
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When survival is at stake, in cases such as hunger, the pursuit of nourishment is
one’s most primary motivator. Their considerations will likely become egoistic as a matter of
survival and they may find behavior that they might otherwise consider immoral justifiable or
act without moral consideration. Additionally, as discussed in the Hip Hop Interlude, antisocial
behavior, in the face of injustice, may be an act of symbolic defiance. Maybe we shouldn’t
simply consider the ‘rightness’ of the struggling individual’s behavior. Indeed, maybe we should
consider that if someone has to resort to criminal(ized) behavior to acquire food, regardless of
their personal merit, there may be a significant moral shortcoming on the part of all of those
complicit with a system allowing anyone to go hungry.
Just as unmet physiological needs may encourage a tendency towards antisocial
behavior, so do unmet psychological needs. Antisocial behavior that individuals may justify
based on their personal needs is not always morally excusable even in the context of unmet
needs, environmental stressors, and pathology. I draw the line not at the loss of property but at
the infliction of physical harm: it is excusable to steal food if one is starving, but it is not
excusable to shoot a convenience store clerk to acquire food. In these extremely antisocial
cases, individuals often make little distinction between survival needs and desires (Gibbs, 2014).
One such case of atrocity resulting from unmet psychological needs for love and acceptance is
the recent murders committed by 22 year old Elliot Rodger. In videos posted on YouTube titled,
Life is so unfair because girls don’t like me (Rodger, 2014), Elliot blamed women for his
unfulfilled need for love and acceptance. He later murdered six students who attended his
university (Pengelly, 2014). Elliot was obviously mentally ill and took deeply misogynistic
elements of society to an atrocious extreme. However, despite all pathology, and how ‘sick’
Elliot might have been, there is no possibility to suggest that Eliot’s unmet needs excuse his
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actions. Pathologizing behavior does not justify it nor relieve those who have done such
severe harm of responsibility. However, we need to be looking more carefully at social structural
influences on antisocial behavior.
In summary, we can’t immediately dismiss people who do bad things as bad people.
Reductionist theories are always appealing, but human behavior is not that simple. To dismiss
antisocial behavior lets those of us who have self-conceptions as good people off the hook too
easily. The idea that we are only responsible for our own actions is nonsense, we co-construct
our environment together and we (all people) co-construct environments that are conducive to
antisocial behavior. We must work to change the environments conducive to the behavior and
to rehabilitate the individuals who have acted antisocially (cf. Chapter 8 in Gibbs, 2014 Treating
Antisocial Behavior). Hope mandates that even in the most deterministic cases (e.g.,
psychopaths), we critically consider how, when, and where we can make the most effective
interventions in any process that produces undesirable outcomes. This means that regardless of
biological influence (which educators have little ability to intervene in, but psychiatrists may) we
must make social and environmental interventions. We need to create environments and foster
experiences that are more conducive to prosocial behavior than antisocial behavior.
3.9.3

Trauma & chronic stress
Severe trauma can stimulate psychopathy (Garbarino, 2011). Traumatic events are

typically defined as confrontations involving the actuality or threat of death or serious injury
(Alisic et al., 2011). “Traumatic events may disrupt a youth’s brain development, developmental
skills, talents, personality development, and functioning” (Nader, 2011). Nader (2011) suggested
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that less violent events such as prolonged separation for young children or shame and
humiliation for older children can also be traumatic.
Psychological distress following exposure to a traumatic or stressful event is
quite variable. In some cases, symptoms can be well understood within an
anxiety- or fear-based context. It is clear, however, that many individuals who
have been exposed to a traumatic or stressful event exhibit a phenotype in
which, rather than anxiety- or fear-based symptoms, the most prominent
clinical characteristics are anhedonic [inability to experience pleasure in
normally pleasurable acts] and dysphoric symptoms, externalizing angry and
aggressive symptoms, or dissociative symptoms. (American Psychological
Association, 2013)
Garbarino (2011) described trauma as simultaneous affective and cognitive over-arousal. The
overwhelming negative feelings are coupled with thoughts “beyond normal ideas of human
reality” (Garbarino, 2011, p.49).
3.9.3.1

Posttraumatic growth, resilience, and coping
“The experience of a single incident of acute trauma in an otherwise good life is likely to

yield to short-term rest and therapy … that brings a traumatized persons feelings and thoughts
back into normal focus” (Garbarino, 2011, p.50). Human response to trauma is complex and
may, but usually doesn’t, result in posttraumatic stress disorder (Alisic et al., 2011). It may have
transitory or lasting ill-effects but it can also promote emotional growth. Children can recover
and even grow from traumatic one-time-events when their environment is otherwise positive,
but a single event, and especially chronic stress or trauma can negatively affect the
development of a child’s brain (Haidt, 2006). The role of a trusted adult (e.g., parent/guardian or
teacher) is significant in providing assurance and providing a safe and consistent environment
(e.g., home, school). Children need to know that “their world” is ok (physical and emotional
safety and stability) even if the outside world is not (Garbarino, 2011).
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Posttraumatic growth suggests that
making sense of the bad things can lead to some good things – if you are
fortunate in who your friends are, what resources you have, how your
temperament equips you to deal with stress and threat, and how you come out
on the other side with a new appreciation for the meaning of life (Garbarino,
2011, p.47).
Haidt (2006) identified three types of posttraumatic growth. The first suggests that by getting
through a traumatic experience and the resulting feelings, one can discover a sense of inner
strength and emerge with a new understanding of their own abilities that positively changes
their self-concept. This knowledge of their ability to cope with hard situations can be a source of
strength in future traumatic experiences. Haidt (2006) refers to this newfound ability to cope as
something akin to inoculation against future trauma. The second type of posttraumatic growth
that Haidt (2006) discussed was that it can have a filtering effect on personal relationships. In
the aftermath of trauma one’s most important relationships sometimes become more apparent.
Ones’ friends either step up and are there for them or step back and the emotional vulnerability
and dependence on friends and loved ones in recovery from trauma can strengthen those
relationships. Ultimately, people who go through profound challenges together may emerge
closer to one another than ever before or pushed apart. Third, trauma shakes the foundation of
our reality and may thus provide a stimulus for someone to reassess their philosophy and
priorities in life. I think we all anecdotally know examples of all three types of posttraumatic
growth such as a close friendship developing through a shared hardship or someone recovered
from cancer and resolved to quit their office job and pursue their dream to be an artist.
People’s ability to consistently maintain hope in the face of trauma and achieve growth
is referred to as resilience. Resilience can be considered as functional and existential (Garbarino,
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2011). Functional resilience may allow someone to continue their normal business in the
face of trauma, but they could still be suffering inside and trauma symptoms could surface years
later (Garbarino, 2011). The aim of positive psychology is not just surviving, but thriving
(functional and existential resilience). Garbarino (2011) described a human quality called
hardiness that protects against traumatization. Hardiness is composed of a positive outlook on
life, a sense of control, and a disposition to see challenges rather than threats.
Finally, Garbarino (2011) most significantly discussed the importance of forgiveness and
compassion. Violence is cyclical and the victim of one trauma may become the perpetrator of
future trauma. For inner peace and peace in the social environment, forgiveness is vital and “we
must not allow our hurt egos and our dark sides to use the opportunity presented by traumatic
events to liberate and validate our rage” (Garbarino, 2011, p.60). We must also be
compassionate, in that regard, to the possibility that those who have caused our own trauma
have done so as a result of their own trauma. This is about healing breaking the cycle of trauma,
not about excusing or validating the transgression. Through compassion and forgiveness some
violent youth that Garbarino (2011) worked with
have undergone a profound spiritual transformation as part and parcel of fully
owning their crimes and simultaneously seeing the roots of that crime in the
way they themselves were victimized and traumatized by others, earlier in their
lives. (Garbarino, 2011, p.60)
Thus, injustice and trauma offer opportunity for spiritual growth but not without love, hope, and
support.
Just because positive psychology helps us to see positive outcomes of trauma, that
doesn’t make trauma good. As Haidt (2006) stated:

160
I don’t want to celebrate suffering, prescribe trauma to everyone, or minimize
the moral imperative to reduce it where we can … I want only to make the point
that suffering is not always all bad for all people. There is usually some good
mixed in with the bad, and those who find it have found something precious: a
key to moral and spiritual development. (p.141)
The potential for growth doesn’t justify one’s suffering. We need to work to reduce trauma but
focus on positive outcomes when trauma does occur. In our pursuit to stop the degradation of
ourselves and of the world we will never eliminate all opportunities for suffering. Adversity is a
natural part of life, and certain potentially traumatic events such as death can never be
prevented.
3.9.3.2

Chronic trauma
The negative psychological effects of trauma are not always transient. Adequate support

and physical and emotional safety necessary to recuperate may not be attainable or an
individual may be differently equipped to cope. It may also be possible that some traumatic
experiences may simply be too much for anyone to cope with. Acceptance of such reality is
challenging, and positive psychology is important for both reading about trauma32 and treating
it. As Garbarino (2011) said, making sense of bad things can lead to good things. Thus, the
harmful outcomes of trauma must also be addressed with the hope that they can be shifted into
more positive outcomes.
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)

32

I found the investigation of trauma to be the most difficult portion of this project. The research was
heartbreaking and it was difficult to maintain hope. In that sense, I mean that practicing positive
psychology is as important in studying trauma as it is in treating trauma.
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is characterized by overwhelming feelings of reexperiencing the traumatic event
(e.g., nightmares and intrusive thoughts), by the avoidance of stimuli and
emotional numbing (e.g., avoiding places related to the event and feeling
detached from others), and by symptoms of hyperarousal (e.g., concentration
difficulties and hypervigilance) (Alisic et al., 2011).
Nietlisbach et al. (2010) found that affective empathy was diminished by PTSD but cognitive
empathy was not. The participants did not have difficulty understanding the emotional states of
others, but were not emotionally affected and this was explained by dissociation. The
dissociation and diminished feelings of affect were speculated to be a coping strategy to prevent
being overwhelmed by others emotions (Nietlisbach et al., 2010). Certainly this coping strategy
associated with traumatization is consistent with Hoffman’s (2000) discussion of empathic over
arousal. Such dissociation is also consistent with psychopathy and antisocial personality
disorder. The environmental correlates with PTSD are also similar to those of APD, including:
lower socioeconomic status, lower education, childhood adversity, and minority racial/ethnic
status (American Psychological Association, 2013). Indeed, Martens (2005) suggested that
childhood trauma promotes the development of antisocial personality disorder and in turn,
antisocial personality disorder places an individual at greater risk for “violent assaultive
traumatization as a consequence of reckless, impulsive, self-destructive, and violent attitudes
and social-emotional and moral incapacities, and retraumatization” (Martens, 2005).
Violence is prevalent in US American culture and communities and so are symptoms of
trauma. It is not uncommon for students to arrive at school on a Monday morning having lost a
peer, friend, or family member to violence over the weekend. Violence is perpetrated
horizontally (within our social groups e.g., gang violence), and vertically (by those with greater
agency/power e.g., police involved shootings), and on ourselves (e.g., drugs & suicide). Such is
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the reality that many youth face and this violence and trauma may be significantly
influencing their development (Cloitre et al., 2009).
Furthermore, youth living in violent communities may experience ‘pathological
adaptations’ such as hopelessness, fatalistic thoughts, desensitization to
violence, and truncated moral development. These youth often participate in
high risk behaviors such as alcohol or drug abuse, promiscuous sex, or
association with dangerous people. (Garbarino et al., 2002)
Violence spreads through communities like a virus. High-violence, high-economic-poverty urban
environments (but rural environments are not immune) suffer a vicious cycle where the victims
of violence become perpetrators of further violence33. Such environments, as Garbarino (1996)
said, are toxic and they are traumatizing our youth. However, psychopaths and sociopaths thrive
in socially toxic environments (Garbarino, 2011).
When trauma is a pervasive occurrence the lives of children and adolescents the
psychological effects may differ significantly. Chronic trauma occurs

33

Poverty is distributive injustice justified in the minds of the privileged through defensive thinking,
denial, and other moral and empathic bias. However, areas where economic poverty is prevalent are not
necessarily populated by impoverished people. Those who are economically poor may be especially
vulnerable to the atrocities of capitalism and lack economic, social and political agency. In the worst cases
the most destitute are not able or barely able to meet their basic survival needs. However, the targets of
such oppression are resilient and may be extremely wealthy by noneconomic measures. Furthermore,
while I have tried to illuminate problems associated with economic poverty, it is vital to consider these
problems as more significantly structural than individual issues. People who are vulnerable to or targeted
by oppression are not necessarily living a life of perpetual unhappiness and suffering. Certainly some folks
face major hardships that may, in extreme cases be all encompassing, but others live happy and fulfilling
lives in material poverty. In fact, external conditions beyond survival needs play a minimal role in
happiness (Haidt, 2006). But happiness despite material poverty doesn’t provide justification for the
injustice resulting in poverty. What is necessary is a nuanced conception of poverty where we neither
conceptualize people as victims nor justify their oppression, but recognize injustice and make reparations.
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when “normal” is the problem, not the solution. Chronic traumatic danger
imposes a requirement for what we might call “developmental adjustment,” in
the sense that it demands a reorganizing of one’s very understanding of life over
time and not just a relatively short period of recalibration. (Garbarino, 2011,
p.50)
Chronic trauma has also been described as complex or persistent PTSD.
Exposure to sustained, repeated or multiple traumas, particularly in the
childhood years, has been proposed to result in a complex symptom
presentation that includes not only posttraumatic stress symptoms, but also
other symptoms reflecting disturbances predominantly in affective and
interpersonal self-regulatory capacities such as difficulties with anxious arousal,
anger management, dissociative symptoms, and aggressive or socially avoidant
behaviors. (Cloitre et al., 2009)
Gabarino (2011) suggested that individuals (and groups) faced with chronic trauma
developmentally adjust to accommodate a reality that threatens one’s sense of reality. When
someone persistently faces atrocity in their life their brain adjusts in order to accommodate that
reality (Garbarino, 2011). This can potentially result in the compromise of an individual’s basic
instinct for survival because the reality of danger is normalized.
However, it’s not quite that simple. Aside from those who may be somehow
predisposed to a lack of empathy which may be exacerbated by chronic trauma, hypersensitivity
to future trauma is a more common outcome (Garbarino, 2011). Garbarino (2011) suggested
that although it may seem like one’s affect has completely disappeared, seeming lack of
emotion may be symptomatic of chronic trauma that has “not yet reached the point of collapse”
(Garbarino, 2011). This distinction is particularly relevant to criminal (in)justice because many
youths who had committed murder or other violent crimes that Garbarino (2011) interviewed
were believed to be suffering from chronic trauma. Garbarino (2011) suggested that the “most
violent youths construct elaborate defense mechanisms against anxiety, fear, and
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abandonment; these defense mechanisms culminate in the persona of the cold-blooded
‘gangster’” (Garbarino, 2011, p.56). Thus, an apparent lack of remorse for a violent crime may
not be an actual lack of remorse.
Cacho (2012) problematized how “criminalized poor of color are characterized as either
products of violent environments that should be heavily policed or as irrational people incapable
of moral agency who need to be under police surveillance” (p.83). Overemphasis on structure
and overemphasis on one’s own agency both condemn victims of trauma and targets of
oppression. Overemphasis on structure makes situations seem entirely determined and
overemphasis on agency leads to victim blaming. Those affected by trauma are not doomed.
They are not on a one way road to further violence, psychopathic behavior, prison, drugs and
death. Garbarino (2011) refers to this as terminal thinking. It is hope’s kryptonite.
3.9.3.3

Stress
It is not only when the emotional injury that we inflict on our youth results in trauma

that concern is warranted. Institutional racism and other forms of oppression such as economic
poverty are detrimental to psychological and physical health.
Poorer communities are less likely to have adequate health and social services,
creating a problem of access and timely use. Also, the physical environments are
more likely to expose the residents to health hazards (e.g., air pollution, lead,
dust, dirt, smog, and other hazardous conditions). Finally, the concentration of
poverty and its related characteristics (e.g., exposure to drugs, crime, gangs, and
violence; unemployment, stress, and anxiety; substandard housing and schools;
and lack of green space or fresh fruits and vegetables) often creates social
environments that lessen social connectedness and provide fewer social
benefits for residents. (Mays, Cochran, & Barnes, 2007)
“In racially segregated, poor neighborhoods, both chronic and acute daily stressors (e.g.,
violence, unemployment, personal safety concerns) repeatedly invoke a biological challenge
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similar to the flight/fight response” (Mays et al., 2007). The accumulation chronic stress
results in “premature wearing down of the body” referred to as allostatic load and it is
associated with heart disease, chronic inflammation, and cognitive impairment (Mays et al.,
2007). We all know through our own experience that stress also affects our self-care. Rogers
(2001) speculated that since carbohydrate rich junk foods can increase serotonin in the brain,
carb cravings may be our body’s way of self-medicating for depression. However in cases where
the stressors are persistent such self-medication can cause diet related health problems such as
obesity and diabetes may be (exacerbated by education and access for healthy foods, diet and
lifestyle).
The ill-effects of chronic stress are not exclusively correlated with economic poverty, nor
economic poverty as a result racial discrimination. Chronic stress is associated with racial
discrimination independent of socioeconomic status. People experiencing race-based
discrimination have physiological responses including “elevated blood pressure and heart rate,
production of biochemical reactions and hypervigilance” that eventually result in disease and
mortality (Mays et al., 2007). African Americans are disproportionately affected by diabetes,
cardiovascular heart disease, hypertension and obesity and the disparity is not attributable to
genetics or socioeconomic status (Mays et al., 2007). African American women, regardless of
socioeconomic status, suffer the highest rates of preterm birth and their babies weigh the least
(on average).The health disparities affecting African Americans are posited to relate to: “cultural
differences in lifestyle patterns, inherited risks, and social inequalities that are reflected in
discrepancies in access to health care, variations in health providers’ behaviors, differences in
socioeconomic position, and residential segregation” (Mays et al., 2007). Although there is no
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biological validity to the concept of race (Laland & Brown, 2011), the biological results of the
social construct of race are real (Mays et al., 2007).
This paradoxically calls into question notions of race based medicine which essentially
reduces to racial profiling. It is dangerous to make medical assumptions based on perceptions of
racial experience. It’s especially scary when drugs are prescribed exclusively to African
Americans (e.g., BiDil). However, we do see that the social construct of race has real
consequences for health. I propose that the only just race-based medicine is social justice.
However, self-medication in the form of alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drug use is also correlated
with stress associated with racial discrimination and internalized racism- likely as a coping
strategy (Mays et al., 2007). However, such drug use often exacerbates stress and increases
health problems. Additionally, illicit drugs are often associated with violence, increasing the
likelihood that one will experience trauma.
Similarly to trauma, chronic stress causes youth’s response to stress to become erratic
resulting in more frequent involvement in violent situations as victim or perpetrator (DuncanAndrade, 2010). Again, it is important to note that neither trauma nor chronic stress dictate that
any individual will behave antisocially. We (all people) need to take responsibility individually
and collectively for the structural influences on stress and trauma and there are many levels of
collective membership that must be considered. Family groups, blocks, neighborhoods, schools,
workplaces, communities, cities, states, nations, humans, and members of the community of life
all have important roles to play in reducing human violence.
I refuse to be the devil’s advocate by entertaining the possibility that anyone is suffering
and dying because they are bad, unworthy of rights, and ultimately deserving of pain, suffering,
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and death. I maintain that such violence is not inherent it is inflicted. We inflict trauma on
ourselves, we inflict it horizontally to family and peers in similar status groups and we inflict it
vertically to those less protected and less privileged than us. The underlying moral shortcoming
is not just on the part of the repeat offenders, the gangs, or drug dealers (as criminal or
criminalized people). We are all co-responsible. We need to work to reduce violence, trauma,
and chronic stress by addressing the injustices that cause them. We also need to help those
experiencing trauma cope. Education can have a fundamental role in raising consciousness to
help students work for social change and reduced violence. However, there are two practical
actions that schools need to be taking: (1) provide basic mental health training to all teachers in
order to recognize trauma (2) providing mental health services.
3.10 Catalyzing Action
From the most significant actions, such as risking one’s own life to save the life of a
stranger, to the mundane acts of kindness and generosity that humans perform on a daily basis
and go largely unnoticed, humans act altruistically. Oliner & Oliner (1988) suggest that at the
point where a person decides whether or not to act, the decision is already largely made
because that person has already internalized the systems for response. Intuitive or
instantaneous decisions likely result from previous experience and previous contemplation.
Haidt (2006) suggested that
moral judgment is like aesthetic judgment. When you see a painting, you usually
know instantly and automatically whether you like it. If someone asks you to
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explain your judgment you confabulate. You don’t really know why you think
something is beautiful, but your interpreter module (the rider) is skilled at
making up reasons34.” (p.21)
Haidt (2006) didn’t argue that we never know our motivations, but that we do not always
explicitly understand our motivations. Sometimes we contemplate, make inductions and come
to new conclusions and sometimes we act upon the inductions and principles we’ve already
constructed and internalized.
Intuitive moral and esthetic judgments may be associated with natural tendencies, but
are certainly related to previous experiences. The more I study, the more I see a deep
relationship between esthetics and morality. I think that the path to beauty is the path to justice
and vice versa. The gut feelings we so often (at least I so often) act upon are exactly this
combination of esthetic and internalization. As in the famous poem The Road Not Taken by
Robert Frost,
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth;
Then took the other, as just as fair

34

Haidt’s (2006) uses the metaphor of a “ider on an elephant for the human behavior. The rider is our
conscious brain and the elephant is the rest of our self. The rider isn’t in complete control of the
elephant’s actions, only parts and only sometimes and ultimately must defer to the much more powerful
elephant. The elephant is composed of autonomous systems like breathing and our beating heart as well
as emotions. Confabulation is when our conscious mind explains the elephant’s actions without actually
understanding the elephant. Our brain is so good at this that we don’t necessarily know that we’ve fibbed
to ourselves. We ultimately accept the first plausible explanation that our mind offers.
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And having perhaps the better claim,
Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
Though as for that the passing there
Had worn them really about the same
Frost ultimately made a gut decision and tentatively tried to explain why, but admits that the
reason doesn’t really hold up- confabulation. In the process of this research there has been
much that I have laid awake at night contemplating, trying to understand, and trying to
understand how what I’ve learned fits within my existing moral framework. I’ve most
significantly wondered how I act upon my new understandings. However, in my moral
judgments, despite all my contemplation, I’ve ultimately followed my gut. A more substantial
amount of what I’ve learned and written were things I either already knew tacitly without
knowing explicitly or deeply and tacitly realized that I knew as I read. Much of this work consists
of truisms explored empirically, and clichés elaborated and contemplated upon.
The above considerations are central to understanding how and why we take action
when we are confronted with a moral dilemma, especially, when action is not explicitly
demanded of us. Before considering more explicitly how people are morally motivated, I want to
consider an example from my own experience researching morality. Throughout the course of
working on this thesis, I’ve wondered if my own behavior has been affected by the knowledge I
have attained. Has researching morality made me more sensitive to moral conflicts or better
equipped to help others recognize and resolve moral conflicts positively? I’ve often answered
no. Because when I am with young people I am entirely in the moment and I am not thinking
about theory. Although I occasionally do step back from the experience and attempt to consider
how the topics of this thesis apply, I have never found myself considering theory when
attempting to help kids resolve a conflict.
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Oliner & Oliner (1988) are right to suggest that the experiences culminating in a
triggering or catalyzing event are more significantly indicate how someone will respond than the
event. However, they nature of the event is also significant and will be considered further in the
context of a profoundly salient catalyzing event- the Holocaust. At the end of this section I
explore how such triggering may apply in situations where the moral conflict is less monumental
(e.g., climate change). Triggering or catalyzing events challenge the morals that one has already
committed to (Hoffman, 2000). For some Holocaust rescuers, inaction threatened their selfconception to a point where they didn’t consider their behavior to be a choice (Oliner & Oliner,
1988). They felt they had to act because they felt that they could not have lived with themselves
if they hadn’t. Some felt others’ suffering as if it were their own. Others felt that they had simply
reacted to the circumstances that they encountered without significant reflection. A common
sentiment among rescuers was, “I did nothing unusual; anyone would have done the same thing
in my place,” (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.113) a remarkably humble, but inaccurate sentiment.
Oliner & Oliner (1988) identify four circumstances that facilitated action: Information
and comprehension of the need, risk, resources, and a precipitating occasion. The information
available to rescuers and their comprehension of the events were not significantly different
from non-rescuers. Information alone was necessary, but not sufficient for action. Similarly, the
perceived risks for rescuers and non-rescuers were not significantly different. The only
difference was that rescuers acted despite that risk. In terms of material resources, rich and
poor alike rose to the occasion, but the resource that did significantly differ between rescuers
and non-rescuers was community. Rescuers more frequently belonged to organizations or had
personal relations that they believed would support their efforts. Still this was not exclusively a
characteristic of rescuers: some acted alone, keeping their activities secret from friends, family,
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and neighbors even beyond the end of the war. Many of those rescuers stated that their
interview was the first time that they had discussed their activities. Finally, the precipitating
occasion was the most significant indicator for rescue. More rescuers were asked for help than
non-rescuers. This could be due, in part, to the rescuers, through past actions, relationships, and
character traits, seeming more likely to help. This relates to the concept of extensive persons.
Still, others acted without being asked. These circumstances all facilitated rescue in certain
ways, but it is clear that altruistic behavior is not dictated by circumstance alone.
Researchers found that the actions of the individuals they interviewed were
based only partially on their hope that they could create change. Often these
individuals acted in spite of not knowing whether they would actually make a
difference. These activists, at times, “decide that success is not important- that
something must be done even though there is no assurance that it will change
anything.” For them, the essential “rightness” of the action makes the issue of
success irrelevant. (S. Berman, 1997, pp.46-47)

The nature of the precipitating occasion that catalyzes action varies. However, it seems
universal that some event, perceived or experienced, triggers altruistic behavior. Oliner & Oliner
(1988) describe three types of catalysts: those that aroused or heightened the observer’s
empathy, those that challenged a normative demand, and those that violated the observer’s
principles (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). While Oliner & Oliner (1988) recognize that some rescuers
deliberately sought out ways to help, most did so in response to a specific event that they
witnessed. Even those who sought out opportunities to help without having directly witnessed
any of the atrocities of the Holocaust were certainly acting in response to the immediacy and
severity of the situation. Still, it was more than simply the situation that dictated responses from
the rescuers, their actions reflected their individual character. Such a quality of their character is
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illustrated by the fact that majority of the interviewed rescuers continued to be actively
engaged in helping behavior beyond the war (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).
When faced with such a precipitous occasion the moral limitations and empathic bias
that have been described all influence whether or not someone will act. Additionally, the ways
that individuals process information and cope psychologically are influential. Oliner and Oliner
(1988) wrote that “interpretations of events are human inventions, and that what and how we
choose to see shape our responses – and thus the future” (p.260). Humans have an emotional
preference for knowledge that we want to be true and avoid thinking about things we don’t
want to be true (Clayton & Myers, 2009). This bias may be especially pronounced when it comes
to beliefs about our own identities. “Defensive thinking results when our basic wants, such as
the desire for comfort and pleasure, are incompatible with our rational or moral judgment”
(Clayton & Myers, 2009, p.26). Such denial may be a very significant barrier to catalyzing action
in conflicts from the most salient (such as the Holocaust) to the least visible (such as climate
change). In fact, some non-rescuers, interviewed by Oliner & Oliner (1988), reported that they
simply couldn’t believe that something so unthinkable was happening.
Learned hopelessness may result from exposure to events that seem uncontrollable and
as a potential outcome of inaction in the face of precipitous occasions (Christens et al., 2013).
Learned hopelessness may further diminish moral action in future conflicts. Some rescuers,
however, acted despite very low feelings of self-efficacy (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Some rescuers
even continued their efforts despite witnessing the murders of those they had risked their lives
to help (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). However, many would be unlikely to take action, especially at
such great personal risk, if they felt that their efforts would be unsuccessful. Furthermore, a
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sense of self-efficacy, despite not necessarily precluding moral action in conflicts that we
perceive (Oliner & Oliner, 1988) may affect the way we perceive of those conflicts (Clayton &
Myers, 2009).
In the spaces of privilege the effects of the socio-ecological crisis are not always obvious.
Faced with a conflict between a desire for self-gratification through
unsustainable behavior and the knowledge that the environment is threatened
by such behavior, we repress our awareness of the conflict, deny the threats
that face us, displace them onto other communities, and rationalize our
continued unsustainable behavior as having no alternative. (Clayton & Myers,
2009, p.26)
Clayton & Myers (2009) explicitly refer to ecological threats, however the same process certainly
applies to humanitarian and social justice concerns which are inseparable from ecological issues.
Such defensive thinking is more prevalent when one does not feel able resolve conflicts
between their personal needs and moral principles (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). Johns (2013)
wrote that “conservationists … resist taking on structural change because it seems to require
that people make material sacrifices, and this is unrealistic. But is giving up mindlessly complex
social hierarchies that infantilize people a sacrifice” (p.238)? Thus, Johns (2013) resists framing
environmentalism as conflict between consumerism and sustainability and frames the conflict as
one between consumerism (and more generally capitalism) and human welfare (and more
generally planetary welfare). In Johns (2012) framing pro-environmental behavior is also
prosocial and the struggle is against unjust social structure that affects consumerism. However,
Clayton & Myers (2009) frame the conflict in such a way where our own agency in sustainable
behavior is primary. How we perceive conflicts certainly influences the ways we are motivated
to action it may be that in some cases or for some individuals framing a conflict in a certain way
may be more effective than framing it in some other way.
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All humans develop moral principles that guide our determinations of what is fair
and acceptable behavior. We are often unknowingly complicit in injustice and maintain a selfconception that mandates justice. In such cases, triggering events do not necessarily need to be
external. If through conscientization one begins to understand the ways in which their own
actions contribute to injustice, continuation of such behavior would be a violation of their
established moral principles. It would be collusion rather than unintentional complicity. bell
hooks (2003), an artist, teacher, and notable feminist35, suggested that people choose to
collude or oppose racism, but I think that people need experience, opportunity, and agency to
recognize it as a decision to oppose or collude.
Collusion with injustice, would threaten the self-conception of anyone who maintains
justice as a moral mandate.
People affirm their sense of self by endorsing moral mandates consistent with
their personal values. Moral mandates are the selective expression of moral
values that are central to people’s sense of identity. (Clayton & Opotow, 2003,
p.310)
This violation of an individual’s moral mandate threatens one’s sense of identity. The cognitive
dissonance that such a violation incites can be resolved with a change in behavior or through
justification and restructuring of moral principles as a defense. Despite the fact that humans
have a natural tendency or motivation to cooperate and help one another, we do not always

35

bell hooks (2003) wrote:
Coming to academia thinking of myself first and foremost as an artist (a poet, a painter, a writer),
I pursued a teaching career as an avocation. My desire was to create art. (p.185)
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help. When relations of power are involved, moral mandates could conflict with the status
quo and a behavior change could seem difficult or impossible. In such a situation one could
succumb to learned hopelessness (Christens et al., 2013). However, hopefulness- beneficial
effects of perceived or actual control of one’s circumstance- can also be learned (Christens et al.,
2013) and must be addressed through pedagogy.
The value of risk as a catalyst honors “the fact that we may learn and grow in
circumstances where we do not feel safe” (hooks, p.64). Thus, hooks (2003) concluded that “the
presence of conflict is not necessarily negative but rather its meaning is determined by how we
cope with that conflict” (p.64). Conflict should be considered as a process and an outcome.
Conflict processes can be positive (such as cooperation) or negative (such as disrespect) and
lead to constructive and destructive conflict outcomes (Opotow & Weiss, 2000). In cases related
to social and ecological degradation, where the issues may not always be salient, a conflict may
be necessary in order to catalyze moral action.
In more recent years, the targets of degradation and economic exploitation and
globalization by policies and trade agreements like NAFTA and CAFTA have been catalyzed to
action around the world by a perceived threat not only to their traditions and sovereignty but
their very existence. Some refer to this as the fourth world war (where WWIII is defined as the
Cold War). The Zapatistas, for example, felt that NAFTA and the dissolution of communally held
property eliminated their means for subsistence. Proclaiming that NAFTA was a death sentence,
the Zapatistas essentially seceded from Mexico (Hayden, 2002). External threats can increase
solidarity and catalyze collective action. When folks have little left to lose and everything to gain
and perceive inaction as a death-sentence, fighting injustice isn’t an altruistic motivation but
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survival instinct. In some parts of the world, and almost certainly increasingly in more
“developed” nations, the ecological crisis is becoming such a catalyst. However, a significant
motivation for this work is my hope that some of us will be catalyzed to action before we are
confronted with death36.
In summary, a precipitous occasion so pronounced as the Holocaust is not necessary for
action. The three types of catalysts (those that aroused or heightened the observer’s empathy,
those that challenged a normative demand, and those that violated the observer’s principles)
also provide insight for motivation to action for social and ecological justice. In the case of
environmental action, the same considerations of information and comprehension of need, risk,
resources, and a precipitating occasion apply. The need for environmental action is not always
so apparent. For example, the effects of climate change are not necessarily apparent in all parts
of the world to the untrained eye. Education is vital, then, to make the issues salient and
catalyze action.
3.11 Section Conclusion: It Takes All Types
Oliner and Oliner (1988) identified four characteristic types of rescuers based on their
personalities and motivations. Although the rescuers could not all be neatly categorized into a
single type, these idealized types illuminate certain characteristics that may promote altruistic
behavior. The types illustrate that all sorts of people rise to challenging occasions and that there

36

The necessity for social change as a survival need is further discussed in section 4.3.5 Meeting basic
needs mandates social change on page 232.
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is no universal set of circumstances, experiences, or characteristics, that cause a person to
be a hero or to simply act in accordance with principles that are considered to be prosocial. As
educators, I believe it is our role to recognize and support the development of moral principles
of all people, and never to devalue the different ways in which others are prosocially motivated.
The four types represent rescuers who were primarily empathically motivated,
normatively motivated, motivated by a principle of justice, and motivated by a principle of care.
In each case, rescuers were rarely exclusively driven by one of the four archetypes, but some
combination. It was also recognized that the rescuer’s motives changed over time. Still, by
understanding the four motives as archetypes, the differences among rescuers are illuminated.
Thirty seven percent of rescuers were initially empathically motivated and acted
primarily in response to the empathy they felt for the individuals that they helped. Their efforts
and attention were primarily focused on the individuals that they aided and they more
commonly felt close personal attachment to those whom they helped. Oliner & Oliner (1988)
discuss one rescuer, called Stanislaus, in detail. As a prototypically empathically motivated
rescuer, “understanding others, taking their perspective, and anticipating their futures may have
left Stanislaus little psychological room to consider his own needs” (p.197). Interestingly,
Stanislaus was reported to strongly feel an external locus of control and lower than average selfesteem. Oliner & Oliner (1988) describe Stanislaus having a “fatalistic orientation towards life.”
Interestingly, Stanislaus doesn’t fit neatly into the category of extensive or constricted
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persons37. Stanislaus’ accounts seldom focus on himself and describe the victims and their
situations in detail. A sense of connection to others and empathy guided Stanislaus’s actions.
Fifty two percent of rescuers were initially primarily normatively motivated. They were
not typically motivated by their connection to the victim. They were motivated by a sense that
implicit or explicit societal rules that dictate normal activity and behavior were being broken.
These norms sometimes related to a church, national identity, or other social institution where a
rescuer was directly influenced by the inspiration of a leader, or action based on internalized
norms. Normatively motivated rescuers often felt a sense of obligation or duty to help and
anticipated feelings of guilt over inaction. They often viewed themselves as part of a larger
cause. For example, rescue was a matter of national pride for many Danish people. The sense of
normlessness and loss of order that the war provoked, threatened the reality that these people
lived in, and promoted behavior that accorded with the rules of decency that they ascribed to
before the war and fostered a return to normalcy.
Principle based motivation accounted for 11% of rescuers initial action. This includes
those motivated by principles of justice and care. These people were inspired to act because
what was happening violated their moral principles and threatened their sense of self. These
rescuers were often motivated to act despite any perceived futility of their actions because their
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Oliner and Oliner (1988) posited that extensivity was more conducive to prosocial behavior than
constriction (see 3.5.1 Influence of parenting p.94). Einolf (2010) tested the hypothesis for prosocial
behavior such as donating to charity and volunteering and supported the Oliners’ (1988) claim. Both
researchers explicitly state that constricted persons can or do behave prosocially and altruistically.

179
actions were in line with their principles. Those motivated by justice tended to have more
impersonal relationships with those that they rescued but expressed feelings of anger or hatred
towards the perpetrators of injustice. These people more frequently acted independently. A
rescuer called Suzanne, who was highly motivated by principle expresses her actions as simply
cognitively logical. However, as Hoffman (2000) suggests, this sort of principled response is
often “hot cognition.” Suzanne states that
It was evident that a dictatorship had begun. I knew that one of the first
measures would be an indictment against the Jews. I did not react to the first
indictment, but then the second statute was published, I decided to get
involved. I wrote a letter to the three rabbis in my region, and as I remember
what I wrote, it said:
Sirs:
I am very upset that in my country, in the twentieth century, some citizens are
persecuted for their religious or racial conditions. My ancestors, Protestants of
Cevennes, have fought for their freedom of belief. I cannot but follow their
example and at this time, I will be at your side. Can you put me in touch with
some needy French families belonging to your faith so that I may be of some
help. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, pp.210-211)
From this point forward, Suzanne actively sought out ways to help and acted primarily
independently. Her descriptions provide accounts of the sequence of events with few to no
descriptions of individuals or discussion of feelings. Suzanne is reported to have helped several
hundred people all of whom were strangers to her and who had not asked her for help.
Suzanne’s behavior may relate to the empathic limitations discussed earlier. Suzanne was
considered to be much less empathic than average (two standards of deviation below) and was
so she less disposed to empathic over arousal.
Rescuers motivated primarily by the principle of care felt “a dominating sense of
obligation to help all people out of a spirit of generosity and concern for their welfare” (Oliner &
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Oliner, 1988, p.217). A rescuer called Louisa, expresses concern for all people to a point
where she put herself, her husband, and her son in positions of significantly increased risk for
the benefit of the larger group. In her accounts, she sometimes does not distinguish between
her own family and those that she worked to rescue. Louisa stated in her interview,
My mother said, “I don’t think you have the right to do this. Your responsibility
is for the safety of your own children.” I said to her that it was more important
for our children to have parents who have done what they felt they had to do,
even if it costs us our lives38. It will be better for them- even if we don’t make it.
They will know we did what we felt we had to do. This is better than if we think
first of our safety. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p.217)
Although these are all accounts of Holocaust rescuers, Hoffman (2000) and Berman (1997) use
these and other accounts to generalize to situations of similar gravity and to the everyday
activities in our personal lives.
In summary, human behavior is the result of complex interactions between internal and
external processes throughout one’s development. This chapter barely scrapes the surface of
human motivation and morality. However, the lesson is that we would all do well to actively
practice empathy and sympathy in our behavior and in our judgment of others’ behavior.
Pedagogy must always leave space for all people and all voices to develop in their own unique
ways. This is not to say that it is not the job of educators to create space and foster experience
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Note that this sentiment aligns with the concept of elevation as discussed (3.2.1 Prosocial motivation p.
62). Elevation was not a theme explored in Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) work. This speaks to the
relationship between theory and research (Greenwald et al., 1986) because Oliner and Oliner (1988)
aligned their findings with the prevalent theory of their time. I hypothesize that reanalysis of the Oliners’
(1988) data may reveal elevation among rescuers as a significant factor in rescue.
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that is conducive to moral development or specific principles. A lesson from Friere (1994)
concludes this chapter on moral development and transitions to the final chapter on pedagogy.
What kind of educator would I be if I did not feel moved by a powerful impulse
to seek, without lying, convincing arguments in defense of the dreams for which
I struggle, in defense of the ‘why’ of the hope with which I act as an educator?
(p.83)
Friere (1994) expresses this question rhetorically, but continued to state that:
What is not permissible to be doing is to conceal truths, deny information,
impose principles, eviscerate the educands for their freedom, or punish them,
no matter by what method, if, for various reasons, they fail to accept my
discourse- reject my utopia. (p.83)
Freire (1994) is beautifully arguing that education is not value neutral and this chapter reflects
that sentiment. I maintain, as a matter of faith, that every living human from the deviant to the
exemplar has a greater potential for ‘goodness’ than they have realized. My entire exploration
of morality is guided by my faith in humanity, in all of life, and in Earth. An important illustration
of this point is my investigation into outlying behavior. To my knowledge no portion of that
exploration is inaccurate, but it is certainly not complete. I refuse to take myself or the reader
down a path of hopelessness .

182
Chapter 4:

Pedagogy for Restoration

Dear Teacher:
I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no man [sic]
should witness: Gas chambers built by learned engineers. Infants killed by
trained nurses. Women and babies shot and burned by high school and college
graduates.
So, I am suspicious of education. My request is: Help your students
become human. Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled
psychopaths, educated Eichmanns. Reading, writing, and arithmetic are
important only if they serve to make our children more human.
--Author unknown (as cited in Ginott, 1972, p.87)
What follows is my attempt to conceptualize pedagogy for restoration. This final chapter
significantly departs from the preceding attempts to understand the nature of oppression and
human morality. Pedagogy for restoration is not pedagogy in reaction to oppression. No set of
instructions for liberation or restoration could ever be prescribed. Thus, pedagogy for
restoration maintains focus on youth-potential rather than ideology. The goal is to conceptualize
an approach that would help young people reach a physical, emotional and intellectual place
where they feel able to follow their own passions, their own sense of right and wrong, and their
own vision for a better world. Pedagogy for restoration is a process of healing on the individual
level, collectively, and for the planet. I believe such healing or self-restoration could spread
through social systems just as I have suggested that oppression does. Such efforts by educators
in all walks of life promote the global project of restoration.
Restoration must be a process of healing personal, ecological, and social degradation.
The degradation of the natural world caused by humans and the degradation of humans caused
by humans is not inevitably a unidirectional process. As I have argued the planet can and will
heal, I see restoration as a process allowing humans to heal with the planet. Our presence on
this earth has not been a single consistent expression of degradation.
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4.1

Introduction to Pedagogy
Being a responsible member of the global community demands… action to
promote a more just, peaceful, and ecologically sound world through the
appreciation of diversity, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution
of conflict. (S. Berman, 1997, p.190)

I see pedagogy as something beyond the science, art, and theory of teaching. My own
pedagogy is deeply concerned with the philosophy of education, how we relate with our
students, why we teach, and the goals of education beyond curricular objectives - to create a
better society. I have studied, combined, and attempted to reimagine the work of many
teachers and intellectuals rather than extensively reviewing their works. Notably among the
works that I have studied are those of Paulo Freire. Freire’s vision for critical consciousness, of
reading the word and reading the world, of the necessity of hope and the pursuit of utopia are
also my vision. Although it is not my intention to essentialize Freire or to suggest that his works
are beyond critique, much of what he wrote applies just as much today, if not more, than when
his works were published. However, Freire (1992/1994) held that the meaning of his books (or
any book) was not found through passively reading the words, but through critically engaging
with the ideas and making one’s own meanings. Freire’s intention was for his work to be
critiqued and reimagined for application in different contexts rather than wholly adopted. I hold
the same intentions for my work. I do hope that my pedagogy (or any portion of this project)
could be of utility to others, but just as I will be adapting and reimagining this work for the rest
of my life, anyone who finds value in these pages must do the same.
4.1.1

Critical pedagogy
Critical pedagogy brings a socially conscious lens to education that aims to reflexively

critique all of educational and social practice. Critical pedagogy must fundamentally be an action
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oriented anti-oppression approach to education. There is enough in the world that needs
critique that we don’t need to critique what we may omit without damage. Critique solely as an
exercise in deconstructionism is of no utility to critical pedagogy or an anti-oppression effort. My
primary critique of the body of work of critical pedagogy in the decades following Pedagogy of
the Oppressed (Freire, 1970/2000), is the overemphasis on critique over creativity.
Weiner (2007) suggested that critical pedagogy suffers a lack of clear definition as well
as an overemphasis on disciplining itself within particular ideologies (e.g., Marxism). Weiner
(2007) further suggested that critical pedagogy is amidst a crisis of imagination and suggested
that we “put the goal of free and imaginative thinking above the goal of ideological persuasion”
(p.68) to “create context for rejuvenated imagination and its development” (p.67). Debates over
the necessity of Marxist language, an explicitly socialist agenda, and of the centrality of class
struggle become detrimental to the struggle against oppression and the project of restoration
when they overshadow the real work of making change. As the Zapatistas say, we need to be
working for a world where many worlds fit. I’m not interested in a debate over specific ideology.
Rather than a coercive approach that aims to liberate students from capitalism only to
indoctrinate them in Marxism39 (or any ideology), we need to aim only to facilitate experiences
that broaden perspectives, encourage critical thinking and create a space that promote selfliberation. I firmly believe that it is not our business, as educators, to enforce any particular way
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This is not intended to be a condemnation of Marxism, but of essentializing/fetishizing Marxism to the
point that we enforce it on students. Marxism is a fine ideology with broad interpretation in many
contexts, many of which could certainly enrich education.
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of thinking. To deny my own political agenda would be disingenuous, but to assert that
there is only room for my own ideology in a project of restoration would be disparaging to the
project of restoration40.
The stakes are too high to quibble over Marxism. Some critical authors and educators
take such a hardline on particular theories that creative thinking is overwhelmed by a demand
for ideological consistency. Karl Marx famously addressed such ideological stubbornness by
proclaiming: “what is certain is that I myself am not a Marxist” (marxists.org). Marx made this
statement during a disagreement over the Programme of the (French) Workers Party (1880).
Marx believed that Jules Guesde (the leader of the Workers Party) was too dismissive of the
value of reformist workers’ struggles and too strictly insisted on radical-revolutionary
interpretation of Marxism (marxists.org). Thus, Marx made it absolutely clear that he would not
allow his thinking to be marooned in his own ideology by denouncing Marxism. This was
certainly a little hyperbolic, but made the point quite well. Critical pedagogy may be suffering a
crisis of the critical imaginary, as Weiner (2007) suggested, due to strict adherence to ideology
outlined by folks (e.g., Marx and Freire) who never intended such a strict and narrow
interpretation of their own works. Wiener (2007) suggested that “even if it is true that everyday
life is shaped by ideologies, it is less clear that solutions to troubles caused by ideology will be
discovered in ideology” (p.63).

40

One could suggest that I am simply arguing for my own pluralistic ideology of restoration. They would
probably be right. Just as I prescribe to others, I struggle to broaden my perspectives and think beyond my
own ideology.
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However, Wiener (2007) critique of critical pedagogy was not purely deconstructive.
Weiner (2007) proposed four guiding principles for critical pedagogy to resolve the crisis: 1) The
primary concern must be ending oppression in all forms. Weiner (2007) explicitly identified the
difference between “a more complex understanding of how oppression works in all its forms”
and “transforming conditions and relations of oppression” (p. 61). Weiner (2007) did not dismiss
the former but emphasized the latter. 2) This work needs to center those who it hopes to help.
This refers to both the language that we use and the locations (primarily in the academy) where
these conversations take place. Both language and location often exclude those who should be
centered. Weiner (2007) wrote that the primary audience for critical pedagogy are privileged
individuals who are not the targets of systematic oppression and reminded us ” it does not
matter if what you say or write is brilliant if no one who you want to communicate with can
understand a thing you say” (p.60). 3) The work must reach beyond its own ideology. This
refers to the importance of the critical imaginary and of not marooning ourselves or our
educational practice in Marxist territory (or any ideology). 4) There is a need for public
intellectuals. This refers to the necessity of prioritizing bringing theory into the real world rather
than advancing complex theoretical research. People like Noam Chomsky, bell hooks,
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Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Paulo Freire, and Chuck D41 are public intellectuals who
have worked in various ways to bring critical consciousness to the public. Pedagogy for
restoration rests on these theoretical foundations.
4.2

Moral Education
What is required is nothing less than institutionalized structures that promote
supportive relationships with the same seriousness as is currently devoted to
academic achievement. (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p. 259)
Most of education, at least the curricular objectives, and the focus of standardized tests

is explicit knowledge – facts and formulas – but the more important goal of understanding and
meaning making is more difficult to define, discipline, and assess.
If moral instruction imparts only explicit knowledge (facts that the rider can
state), it will have no effect on the elephant, and therefore little effect on
behavior. Moral education must also impart tacit knowledge- skills of social
perception and social emotion so finely tuned that one automatically feels the
right thing in each situation, knows the right thing to do, and then wants to do
it. Morality, for the ancients, was a kind of practical wisdom. (Haidt, 2006,
p.160)
Tacit knowledge can be constructed through induction based on explicit knowledge and
through experience. In education, the experience encompasses everything that happens in the
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Fight the Power: Rap, Race, and Reality (Chuck D & Jah, 1997) was one of the most influential books I
have ever read. In plain language and rooted in the culture of Hip Hop, Chuck D of Public Enemy explained
race in America in a way that is approachable for folks who don’t use terms like microagressions and
structural oppression. In fact, when I read Chuck D’s book almost a decade ago, I would have never sought
out or understood the work of most of the authors I have cited here. In fact, I didn’t read Chuck D’s book
to learn about racism, I read it because it had a catchy title and because of Chuck D’s status and visibility
in pop culture. I was resistant to some of the ideas in the book, but by the time I had finished it, my entire
worldview was beginning to shift. I think this exactly illustrates the role of public intellectuals- to make
knowledge accessible to a broader community than the one already holding that knowledge.
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classroom (or any educational space) from the most subtle to the most overt. The
environment that we construct in education and the relationship between teacher and student
are hugely influential. Students are always learning, but much of what they learn in school is not
what is written into the curriculum. The Moral Life of Schools (Jackson, 1993) explored the ways
in which the subtle or even mundane routines of classroom life may have profound moral
implications. This encompasses everything from the cleanliness and organization of the
classroom, to the decorations on the walls, to the tone of the teacher’s voice.
As educators, we must be sure our students know three things: I hear you, I accept you,
and I am with you no matter what. As the exploration of empathy has shown, we may never
achieve a perfect match between our empathic feelings and our students experience. We may
never completely hear anyone (in the sense that we perceive their inner states). However, it is a
powerful aspiration to seek to fully hear, accept, and support students. I believe this is the true
work of education and if we do this work, the simple vocation of teaching, of sharing
information on a path to understanding, critical consciousness and enlightenment requires very
little theory42.
Humans are moral by nature so moral education only needs to provide opportunity for
children to develop and commit to their own moral principles. This most significantly happens
through action and reflection (e.g., transgression and induction). Moral development research

42

This is not to suggest that curriculum theory, learning theory, and pedagogy are not important. Theory
certainly informs instructional methods that may optimize student learning.
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shows that children need to make their own inductions (often with the guidance of an adult)
rather than be told explicitly what is right and wrong (Hoffman, 2000). Therefore moral
education must be conceptualized as a path of moral growth and development with an
emphasis on the walking (experience and moral action) rather than didactic instruction in
morality43. This means that moral education must be about the real-world and lived experience
rather than academic artifacts of the real-world. Education must be about creating and
protecting space for development, for free thinking, and for imagination. However, it can’t be an
entirely hands off approach. The approach must be flexible and adaptive, but it cannot be
entirely without structure or direction. “Maintaining intentionality and trajectory in the midst of
real-world messiness is demanding, far more demanding than standing at the edge of the
wilderness and giving the expeditionary team a lecture about what they might find there”
(Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p. 40). It’s a journey we take together.
Pedagogy for restoration does not heavily focus on specific moral principles or an
attempt to design moral curriculum but on walking with students and assisting them along the
path. Rather than charting the course, educators help students learn to read the map, chart
their own course and take the lead. We provide experience, knowledge, and logistical support,
but our greatest success is marked by our students’ knowledge that their accomplishments are
their own (Simpson & Hsih, 2003). However in all things, harmony is found in the balance
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However, exploration of near-universal rights that have been established by consensus, such as The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Assembly, 1948) and other international agreements on human
rights, the treatment of animals, and environmental protection would likely be excellent resources to
complement more inductive and experientially focused curriculum.
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between extremes. Students should recognize that their achievements are their own, but
with the humility to recognize that others have helped. This calls for balance between populism
and elitistism (and similarly authoritative and authoritarian approaches) (Freire, 1994). A fully
populist (entirely submissive to public opinion) approach would not provide the direction or
perspective necessary to raise consciousness, but an elitist approach where the educator
presumes to know precisely what the students need to know would be little more than pedantic
and didactic attempt at indoctrination.
There can’t be a scripted how for restorative education. The how has to come out of the
student-teacher-community relationship. I have tried to focus on the what and the why with the
presumption that a framework is tentatively established where each educator’s own how would
emerge. However, the fact that the approach cannot be canned and standardized does not
imply that every educator needs to start entirely from scratch. Leading critical educators need to
produce “concrete, hands-on examples44 to provide educators with both inspiration and ideas
for developing a parallel unit on a similar or different theme or to spin off an activity and add
their own creative questions in a range of content areas” (Bode, 2012, p. 343). In the following
discussions of pedagogy, I have tried to provide examples showing how such ideas are being put
into practice in ways that are both academically rigorous and socially/ecologically important.
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Bode (2012) provided three wonderful examples of critical multicultural curriculum including Cambodia
and the Cambodian American experience, expanding definitions of family, and gay and lesbian literature.
Each unit incorporates multiple content areas such as math, science, English, and history.
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Pedagogy for restoration is composed of three elements: Pedagogy of basic needs,
Pedagogy of Identity, and Pedagogy of purpose. By addressing students’ basic survival needs
(see 4.3 Pedagogy of Basic Needs p.191) we make the journey possible. By helping them to
know themselves and in the process coming to deeply know them (see 4.4 Pedagogy of Identity
p.220) we begin to make the path as we walk it. And by searching for and constructing meaning
and purpose (see 4.5 Pedagogy of Purpose p.242) we help students connect their sense of self
with their community and the planet in such a way that they commit to the path.
4.3

Pedagogy of Basic Needs
[When someone is] chronically and extremely hungry… Utopia can be defined
very simply as a place where there is plenty of food... Life itself tends to be
defined in terms of eating. Anything else will be defined as unimportant.
Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside
as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the stomach. (Maslow, 1943)
Making sure that students have their basic needs met, including emotional needs, must

precede any educational effort. Not only do I know this tacitly, with my gut, to be morally
imperative, it is explicitly and empirically true (as I will show). Therefore, education must
become a healing process before it can become a learning process (cf. Duncan-Andrade, 2010
on education as a healing process). All educators need to think more deeply about our role as
healers: to serve our students and to promote their well-being in any way we can. We must
assist our students in reaching a place where they are physically and emotionally prepared to
learn.
Educator-healers should look to the healers of their own cultures and world-cultures for
guidance. In environmental education it is common for instructors to have wilderness medicine
training because we often take students into the back country and need to be prepared to
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respond to a medical emergency. This training is not periphery to education, but can, should,
and does inform pedagogy. In wilderness medicine (and all emergency medicine), the same
initial assessment is performed on every patient whether they have a minor scrape or a sucking
chest wound in order to avoid overlooking symptoms of potentially life-threatening injuries. We
assess symptoms in the order that are likely to most quickly kill our patient and we stop and fix
any condition that we discover in the order that it is identified during the assessment (Tilton,
2010). There are countless examples of patients dying because the first responder was
distracted by an obvious symptom while the patient died of a less obvious injury. The stop-andfix assessment is designed to prevent such potentially deadly oversights.
Educators as healers need to be performing stop-and-fix educational assessments based
on Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs45. Maslow (1943) suggested that humans are motivated
by the desire to satisfy certain universal human needs. Starting with the most basic needs one
will generally only be motivated to satisfy each “higher” need once the lower needs are met
(usually depicted as a pyramid or tipi). The most basic or ‘lowest’ needs are physiological (e.g.,
food, water, shelter) and safety. Maslow (1943) suggested that these needs may entirely
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Throughout this paper I have tried to emphasize non-academic ways of knowing. Abraham Maslow’s
theory of motivation is an important and valuable academic contribution, but I want to recognize that his
work was inspired and heavily influenced by Indigenous knowledge. Although it is sparsely mentioned in
Maslow’s work Narcisse Blood and Ryan Heavy Head (2007) have spoken about it at length. Maslow spent
six weeks at Siksika in 1938 at with Blackfoot people. His observations of their way of life informed his
hierarchy of needs and concept of self-actualization. In fact, the hierarchy of needs is thought to have
been inspired by Siksika tipi designs (Heavy Head & Blood, 2007). However, one of the fundamental needs
that the Blackfeet recognized that Maslow did not was a sense of place. In fact, Heavy Head and Blood
(2007) joked that Maslow’s tipi was floating in space.
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dominate one’s consciousness if unmet and that the ‘higher’ needs can only be fulfilled once
the basic needs are sufficiently met. There are, however, notable and profound exceptions
where humans forego their basic needs (e.g., Gandhi’s hunger strikes). Psychological needs of
belonging (e.g., love and acceptance) and esteem are next on the tipi. Maslow (1943) recognized
that these needs may not be equally prevalent for all people (e.g., for some self-esteem is may
be of higher importance than love) and when unfulfilled, the ‘higher’ are not as all-consuming as
the basic needs. Finally, when one has satisfied their basic and psychological needs, they can
seek self-fulfillment or self-actualization.
Unfulfilled physiological and safety needs are educationally (as well as morally) stopand-fix situations. Hunger is a stop-and-fix. Trauma is a stop-and-fix. The stakes are not always
as high in education as in first aid, but still we must consider how overlooking the physical and
emotional wellbeing of our students can be catastrophic (academic failure and social or even
physical death). Kids are arriving to school (or any formal or informal educational space) in
conditions not conducive to their education or not arriving at all. Instructional methods and
learning theory don’t make any difference if students are hungry. Thus, pedagogy of basic needs
is focused on meeting children’s physiological and safety needs is the first step in pedagogy for
restoration.
Hunger may represent the most prevalent unmet and inadequately met physiological
need that US students face. “Food is essential to academic performance because it provides the
energy necessary for cognition” (Woodhouse & Mark, 2012). For the purposes of this discussion,
I intend a broad interpretation of hunger. Hunger does not refer strictly to starvation, it includes
students who may have missed breakfast and/or lunch and their attention suffers, but may
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generally be well nourished. We all know what it’s like to skip lunch and have trouble
focusing on school or work later in the afternoon. However, fewer know what it’s like to miss a
meal every day, or several times per week and be unsure if there will be enough to eat for the
next meal and when that will be. This is what so many of our students experience: not
starvation, but food-insecurity. Food insecurity is much more prevalent in United States than
starvation.
Children who are not physically experiencing hunger pangs (contractions of the stomach
due to severe hunger) may be deficient in any number of micronutrients necessary to keep their
body functioning and developing optimally and brain healthy and ready to learn. In United
States children who are suffering health effects of malnutrition may, in fact, be obese.
Childhood obesity is often associated with micronutrient deficiencies resulting from limited
access to healthy foods (Drewnowski & Specter, 2004). Calorie dense, nutrient poor foods are
cheaper, more convenient, and more easily available to folks living in economic poverty
(Drewnowski & Specter, 2004). Overconsumption of macronutrients and under consumption of
micronutrients can lead to obesity and deficiencies (Drewnowski & Specter, 2004).
Malnourishment is not a simple issue of teaching folks to eat better. It is a moral issue.
For example, by suggesting that obesity is always signs of excess and poor education, we ignore
structural and economic injustices and justify oppression by judging individuals as ignorant and
gluttonous based on the appearance of their bodies. Few would be so callous as to suggest that
someone displaying more recognizable signs of malnutrition (e.g., emaciation and bloating) was
simply lazy or ignorant of the necessity of a healthy diet. However, we constantly blame others
for their ill-health which is commonly (at least partially) associated with structural oppression.
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Although food and health education are vitally important and overconsumption can be
harmful to individual health and the health of the planet, we need to be considering how stress,
limited time, resources, and access, as structural injustices, contribute to obesity and myriad
diet related health problems (e.g., heart disease and diabetes) and developmental disabilities
prevalent in United States .
Many parents of malnourished children are not ignorant about how they should feed
their kids, and I maintain that all parents want the best for their children. However due to the
injustice of poverty and corrupt economic systems, many do not have time, access, and ability to
feed their children healthier foods. The documentary A Place at the Table provides a look into
the reality of hunger in United States including several interviews with parents struggling to
provide their children with both enough food and healthy food (Jacobson & Silverbush, 2012).
Such narratives become experiential (even through film) and offer greater potential for
empathic arousal than intellectual accounts of hunger. These narratives make issues real in a
way that empiricism and statistics cannot. Seeing the pain in one mother’s eyes as she discusses
her children’s malnourishment, the stress associated with struggling to get food on the table for
dinner every night, and the agony of sending her children to bed hungry may be more moving
than the knowledge that 17 million families in United States (Weaver-Hightower, 2011) face
food insecurity. Together, in dialectical solidarity, facts and the feeling, the reading of the word
and the reading of the world make this a moral issue and demand action.
Malnourished children have frequently been shown to have decreased attendance,
attention, and academic performance along with various other health issues (Florence, 2007;
Rogers, 2001; Woodhouse & Mark, 2012).
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The human brain needs sufficient energy – specifically glucose – and a variety of
micronutrients to perform cognitive functions. A long-term deficiency of any or
numerous macro- or micro-nutrients causes malnutrition and consequential
cognitive impairment, the extent of which depends on the duration and degree
of the malnourishment and the timing of its occurrence in development. In the
United States, macronutrient malnutrition (i.e., starvation) is rare, but the diets
of America’s schoolchildren lack quality as measured by adequate and varied
consumption of fruits, vegetables, and whole grains, and moderation of
saturated fats and extra-calorie foods. Therefore, it can be inferred that US
students’ brains are often malnourished, as they are undersupplied of the
micronutrients needed for effective cognition.
(Woodhouse & Mark, 2012)
Numerous studies have found significant correlation between decreased overall diet quality and
poor performance on an academic assessments (Florence, 2007). However, as Florence (2007)
discussed, income is a significant indicator for both malnourishment and academic success so it
is often difficult to attribute causality to diet apart from income (and other socio-economic
factors). Children are likely eating an inadequate diet, in part, because of their socio-economic
status. The ill-effects on their overall health and cognition influence their academic and
economic attainment and contribute to generational poverty. However such chicken-and-theegg questions are less important for educator-healers than scientists. We know that the brain
needs both sufficient macronutrients (calories) and micronutrients (vitamins and minerals) to
healthily function and develop. We also know that economic poverty presents myriad barriers to
educational opportunity and attainment. We cannot focus on either/or solutions (poverty or
hunger), we must address both explicitly and simultaneously in whatever ways we can.
Feeding children breakfast has a significant impact on cognition, behavior, and
performance (Florence, 2007). Simply stated, hungry students don’t learn optimally. More
precisely these students don’t optimally learn the lessons on the curriculum. As Maslow (1943)
suggested unmet basic needs, especially physiological and safety needs become all consuming,
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and one can only be motivated to achieve ‘higher’ needs when the ‘lower’ needs are met. As
Maslow (1943) wrote, when the need for food is unsatisfied,
All capacities are put into the service of hunger-satisfaction, and the
organization of these capacities is almost entirely determined by the one
purpose of satisfying hunger. The receptors and effectors, the intelligence,
memory, habits, all may now be defined simply as hunger-gratifying tools.
Capacities that are not useful for this purpose lie dormant, or are pushed into
the background. The urge to write poetry, the desire to acquire an automobile,
the interest in American history, the desire for a new pair of shoes are, in the
extreme case, forgotten or become of secondary importance. For the man [sic]
who is extremely and dangerously hungry, no other interests exist but food. He
dreams food, he remembers food, he [sic] thinks about food, he emotes only
about food, he [sic] perceives only food and he [sic] wants only food.
If even one of our students is hungry the first lesson of the day needs to be breakfast. No other
lesson would matter. If educators serve only to ensure that school (or any space) is a safe place
where kids are served a healthy breakfast and lunch every day and sent home with a healthy
snack it would revolutionize education, even if kids spent the rest of the day on the playground.
I hypothesize that happy healthy kids would learn more on the playground than hungry kids in
the classroom. However, there is tremendous educational opportunity in meeting the basic
needs of students.
Maybe it’s unfair to suggest that the role of education is to ensure and that all students’
basic needs are met inside and outside of school. However, education is part of a public
institution whose concern is exactly that: the welfare of the public. If the larger institution
doesn’t meet its mandate, then education is undermined from the start. This leaves educators
three options. (1) We can keep doing more of the same. We can keep teaching the standards
and attempting to prepare kids for standardized tests knowingly leaving many behind. (2) We
can defer education and focus entirely on meeting basic needs (3) We take up the slack of failing
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and floundering institutions as an educational effort. Such an education in the real world,
addressing hunger or other community needs prepares students to be actively engaged citizens
and provides context and meaning for traditional learning objectives.
It may go without saying that I demand option three. Food is not only prerequisite to
learning; meals are opportunities to learn. Priority number one must be to get food into the
mouths of hungry students. Second must be for the food to be healthy. Third is to sustain
healthy eating. The remainder of this section is focused on attaining and sustaining food security
through education. I explore how helping students and communities meet their basic needs can
meet moral and traditional education goals. However, constant attention to the physical reality
and immediacy of hunger must be maintained. It would be extremely distasteful to ignore the
immediate reality of a student’s physical hunger while working with the class to address access
and food-security in their community.
4.3.1

Shifting the discourse
Learning is often conceptualized as occurring in a social vacuum—the black box
of research—denuded of concerns of the body, its needs, its pleasures, and its
politics. Food, as highly body-centric, thus might seem unrelated to schooling’s
purest mission, the acquisition of skills and knowledge. (Weaver-Hightower,
2011)
Pedagogy of basic needs frames the fulfillment of physiological and safety needs as a

matter of justice which demands action. In such a framing the discourse on need is shifted: the
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shame and stigma associated with need (e.g., homelessness) is replaced with guilt46
associated with privilege. However, it is not the right of an educator to design the discourse, but
to join with the students and community to seek an understanding of the issue beyond cursory
explanations that are so frequently accepted (e.g., justifications based on considerations of
merit which lead to victim blaming). With understanding and contemplation the moral conflicts
of the issue becomes more salient and inaction due to ignorance and lack of contemplation
becomes informed collusion (e.g., realizing that one’s advantage is unfair or comes at the
expense of others). Although we have many psychological defenses, this conflict threatens our
self-conception and demands resolution either by cognitively restructuring (e.g., defensive
thinking) or taking action (see 3.10 Catalyzing Action p.167).
Positive psychology provides some tools to prevent defensive thinking from interfering
with positive resolution of moral conflicts (i.e., action). We need to know and to help our
communities know that we can make things better because that knowledge affects our
perception of the conflict. We are more likely to think defensively when we see a conflict as an
unsolvable problem. However, when an issue is collectively viewed by a community as a moral
injustice that can and should be resolved, action is almost inevitable. The project of restoration
rests on the assumption that people are generally motivated to act morally but face moral road
blocks related to moral development, bias, feelings of hopelessness, defensive thinking, and

46

Guilt, as that Hoffman (2000) defined it, is a prosocial motive encouraging a sense of responsibility or
duty. Guilt is not necessarily a ‘bad,’ painful, or negative feeling unless one feels that they have failed to
reconcile the situation.
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ability to perceive a moral conflict. What educators must facilitate is a shift from emphasis
on the deficits in communities to assets and potentials, from shame and blame to solidarity, and
from determinism to hope.
As the discourse shifts, those whose needs are not met are not depicted as lesser or
undeserving people, they are recognized as the targets of injustice. Stigma is replaced with
moral indignation. Students should be outraged that anyone is being cheated out of their health
and education and guided to positive solutions. The classroom must become a community
development organization. All that stands in our way is our imagination and our perception of
what is possible. Part of what is so wonderful about young people, is that they have strong
imaginations and haven’t learned yet to believe that they can’t make a difference. Youth are
well positioned to be the leaders and free thinkers who will solve problems in their communities
(e.g, hunger) where grown-ups have failed. I genuinely believe that a few committed educators
and inspired elementary school students, with the support of their community, can end hunger
in their neighborhoods.
Depending on the age of the students shifting the discourse may not require a shift at
all, but armoring against the change from a moral emphasis on care to one based on merit. As
Hoffman (2000) discussed, such a change in emphasis happens around fifth grade. Children are
often raised to value sharing, equality, and self-improvement until upper elementary where
considerations of merit, competition, and social comparison take over. This is marked by a
broader shift in world-view, where children would be more likely to view economic poverty as
someone’s fault than naively (and nobly) questioning how the world could let people go hungry.
One might suggest that it is an important process for children to become adjusted to the ‘real
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world’ which parents often shelter young children from. However, our concept of the real
world, in this case, is socially inflicted and perpetuated by accepting the norm of social
comparison and competition and ultimately our own degradation. We need to support the
values that children naturally develop and prepare them to face the ‘reality’ with the courage
not to submit to a voice of morality hijacked by economic interest that serves the market rather
than the people and planet. Since schools play a primary role in the shift in emphasis of moral
principles, educators are well positioned to arm and armor students against the socially inflicted
shift in moral emphasis and equip them with critical perspectives to encourage autonomous
deliberation and choice rather than indoctrination. Additionally, engaging students in real world
problem-solving would provide them experience to reflexively adapt and internalize their own
principles.
For upper elementary and high school students the shift in discourse would require
conversation and experience. Students will be more motivated by affect and positive solutions
than explicit knowledge. However, shifting the discourse can use explicit knowledge to launch
conversation and facilitate experience. Just as the emphasis on social comparison begins to
become prominent in late elementary, students are nearing adolescence, certainly a time of
social comparison, but also a time when youth begin to test and develop their own moral
principles, ethics, and political stances, often very idealistically. Such youthful idealism and
adolescent rebellion is a powerful force and many of the most passionate environmental and
social justice advocates that I have met have been high school students. Thus, as problematic as
I consider the socially inflicted shift from an ethic of care to principles of justice based on merit
and social comparison to be, it’s something that many youth should be well prepared to
interrogate by late middle school or high school.
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4.3.1.1

Discussion
We … seek forms of knowing, teaching, and learning that offer more
nourishment than the thin soup served up when data and logic are the only
ingredients. In our complex and demanding worlds – inner and outer worlds –
the human species cannot survive, let alone thrive, on a diet like that. (Palmer &
Zajonc, 2010, p. 21)
The facilitation of discussion, as an academic exercise aimed at shifting the discourse

must attempt to broaden experience and understanding, The topic of discussion is no more
significant than the way the topic is discussed. For example, lecture is a common method of
discussion in classrooms. In most lectures, the teacher stands at the front and claim most of the
air time, encouraging students to occasionally participate but remain largely passive. Certainly
lecture plays an important role in education, and is not inherently a passive or pacifying
experience- a good lecture can be “a well-staged theatrical drama” (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p.
29). However, a professor’s “rigorous solo act … can feel more like rigor mortis from where the
student sits” (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p. 29). I explore the value of a more open and active
conversation among students. The teacher’s role is to facilitate a conversation that is safe and
academically productive and to provide clarification and direction to the conversation. In such
conversations the balance of power between teacher and student is shifted. Thus both the
content of the discussion and the way in which it is facilitated are beneficial learning
experiences. The content of the discussion involves viewing a topic from multiple perspectives
and expanding their understanding of an issue, and the way the conversation is facilitated
empowers students to make their own meanings and connections.
What is not permissible is for the teacher to not actively engage with the students in the
conversation or to rely entirely on student directed conversation. The teacher should maintain
authority without becoming authoritarian. All active participants should be recognized as co-
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teachers and co-learners. The teacher should be well positioned to help students build on
their existing knowledge and connect their lived experience, their affect, and their tacit
understanding, with explicit knowledge and curricular goals. It is necessary to incorporate a
scaffolding approach where conversation is a central element allowing students to reflect
together. This must be accompanied with curriculum emphasizing individual reflection and
lessons or experiences for the students to reflect upon. If for example, hunger is being
discussed, students should initially be encouraged to voice their own knowledge, feelings, and
experience associated with hunger but the educator must scaffold upon this knowledge of lived
experience with experiences in the community, films, readings, etc., to guide students to deeper
understandings.
It is important to emphasize the difference between conversation and debate. Debate is
intentionally persuasive and competitive and explicitly a controlled form of conflict. Learning to
form and articulate persuasive arguments and face social conflict in a formal setting is an
important skill. However, facilitating debates is not a task that I have expertise or skill in, and in
my own experience, I’ve always feared that conflict and competition overshadow learning
objectives related to the content informing the debate. Especially regarding moral conflicts,
debate is unlikely to change anyone’s original position. When someone argues their moral
position and feels
strongly about an issue, their feelings come first, and their reasons are invented
on the fly, to throw at each other. When you refute a person’s argument, does
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she47 [sic] generally change her [sic] mind and agree with you? Of course not,
because the argument you defeated was not the cause of her [sic] position; it
was made up after the judgment was already made. (Haidt, 2006, p.21)
There are certainly reasons for our moral judgments and Haidt (2006) is not suggesting
otherwise in the above quote. Haidt (2006) is suggesting that we may not be able to identify or
access those reasons and that our brain automatically attempts to make sense of our judgments
anyway. Conflict can become so emotionally charged that our arguments reduce to little more
than confabulation (Haidt, 2006).
I don’t want to suggest that debate, when not reduced to argument, is entirely
ineffective. Debate is a particular skill and presents its own unique educational opportunity.
However I focus on the benefit of shifting the nature of the discussion from debate to open
dialogue. In open dialogue, students should be encouraged to share thoughts, opinions, and
feelings, but not in competition with one another or with the sole aim of advancing their opinion
(or better yet, advancing the depth of their understanding by formulating sound arguments).The
goal in open dialogue is to reflect and to learn from each other and to share an experience.
Loeber et al. (2007) suggested that “an atmosphere of trust and commitment to reciprocity is

47

Throughout the paper I have used [sic] when a quote uses male pronouns to refer to humans generally.
However, some authors alternate between he/him/his pronouns and she/her/hers. In each case, I wonder
how and why they chose. Most likely, in the above quote and most instances it was not something
significantly contemplated. One might even suggest that the choice was random. But unless the author
literally flipped a coin, humans are not capable of thinking randomly. Although, not deeply explored here,
I have frequently noticed that by alternating pronouns in attempt to be inclusive, gendered traits and
values subtly reinforced. Additionally, use of binary pronouns remains uninclusive to non-binary and trans
gender identities. In the quote the use of she/her pronouns subtly derogates women by suggesting that
although all humans confabulate, emotional is feminine and irrational (therefore devalued).
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essential” (p.89) in such dialog. The sentiment was “I’ll let you in on my private
considerations if you’ll let me in on yours” (Loeber et al., 2007, p.89). However, I favor a less
strict demand for reciprocity (i.e., mature reciprocity) where everyone should have the
opportunity to make a contribution as a valuable member of the group and be encouraged to do
so by sharing their thoughts and opinions, but it should to be ok not to speak, too.
In such a dialogue, the why (factual support) of a statement isn’t always as important as
the what. Asking “what makes you feel that way?” is significantly different than “why is your
statement true?” or even “why do you feel that way?” Children and adults alike, may not know,
or may not be able to clearly articulate why, and they may either confabulate or respond that
they do not know. As Loeber et al. (2007) suggested “If there is no clear need to reflect on the
tacit assumptions that underlie common patterns of behavior, they are often factored out of the
discussion” (p.88). However, if we ask what makes us/them say that, we may reduce
confabulation and focus more on the conditions and emotions that lead to the judgment which
we can investigate further towards discovering a more explicit why. It is important to be clear,
however, about the differences between what and why in this context.
Everyone is entitled to their feelings and feelings are never wrong. However our tacit
assumptions and intuitions should not be interrogated. By attempting to bring such assumptions
to the surface by both questioning and encouraging questioning we
can reveal how social structures create stereotypes and lack of information that
may lead to tension, alienation and conflict. Attentive teachers can invite those
questions and affirm a classroom culture that creates trustful, respectful
dialogue. (Bode, 2012, p. 344)
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For example, in a discussion aimed at shifting the discourse on hunger, students may make
certain tacit assumptions about the merit of those facing hunger. Through dialogue, “students
who examine their stereotypes about why people need to make repeated visits to the
emergency food pantry may begin to ask larger questions about why members of the
community are consistently unable to provide for their families” (Eyler, 2002). We need to teach
kids to value different ways of knowing, but to understand the different roles and function of
those different ways of knowing. By exploring what, why, and how we know and feel through
conversation and being clear about the distinctions, we facilitate growth, broaden our
perspectives, and allow the group to delve deeper into issues.
Conflicts and disagreements may arise and can be resolved constructively as long as
respect and equitable power are maintained. Through conversation power is equalized. Berman
(1997) suggested that the shift in power in open and democratic classrooms parallels civic life
and encourages kids to become more involved the democratic process.
Educators should promote the belief that political and social change is necessary
and good, that American society has problems (a ‘reality’ students are well
aware of); that there are means by which citizens can work to resolve those
problems; and that when the channels of political change within the system are
closed to certain groups, conflict (not necessarily violent) may emerge. Conflict
should be treated as creative rather than necessarily destructive, because
eventually it may open up awareness of participation to those who have been
excluded. Conflict is thus a vital and constructive aspect of the American
political system. (S. Berman, 1997, p. 115)
Although discussion is important, students need action to discuss and reflect on. Once a
community need is identified and briefly introduced and explored, action is imperative. From
that point forward action and reflection must be regular and continuous. The discourse will shift
as much with experience as with conversation. For example, a student questioning the merit of
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people continually needing emergency assistance from a food pantry “at the food pantry
giving out emergency food boxes” eventually “arrived at the point where she is ready for critical
reflection on fundamental principles about how society is organized to provide for its members”
only after spending time volunteering at a local food pantry (Eyler, 2002).
4.3.2

Educational action
What students learn about poverty from texts is almost always less compelling
than what they would have learned by doing the reading while volunteering in a
community where the sights, sounds, and smells of poverty are inescapable
elements of the educational experience. (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p. 31)
Shifting conversation about a community need into action is an educational process. I

loosely follow the Action Research and Community Problem-Solving (ARCPS) model48 (Wals et
al., 1990) to imagine what such a process may look like. The ARCPS model is fundamentally
about empowering students as researchers and activists rather than subjects of action research.
Students are often unmotivated and dissatisfied in the classroom because they
feel that what they are taught there is removed from, and not useful or valid in,
the “real world.” ARCPS attempts to address their concerns by challenging
students with “real-world” problems. (Wals et al., 1990)

48

There are many named approaches to participatory research and community action (e.g., Community
Based Participatory Research (Anguiano, Milstein, De Larkin, Chen, & Sandoval, 2012), Action Research,
Youth-led Participatory Action Research (YPAR), etc.) and the methodological differences are sometimes
quite subtle and nuanced. I take a broad approach to the concept of action research most closely
following ARCPS model because ARCPS explicitly focuses on student involvement in community problem
solving as an educational process. However, other models that more broadly focus community
involvement in research and evaluation provide additional insight into the process. Many papers,
including Wals, Beringer, and Stapp (1990) provide specific methods and adaptations particular to the
intended setting (including Environmental Education).
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Additionally, students should benefit both internally (e.g., empowerment and motivation)
and externally by addressing a community problem that affect them. Since ARCPS focuses on
problem solving in the students’ communities (or even schools), students may uniquely be
subject, researcher, and beneficiary of action research. For example, action research conducted
by students may focus on “misinformed decisions and policies intended to help them, but
designed without their input”. Youth can change this dynamic through action research and
influence “the development of programs and policies designed to affect their lives” (Powers &
Tiffany, 2006, p. S80).
The action research process begins with identifying of a community need. The ARCPS
model suggests that the issue should be of the students choosing (Wals et al., 1990). This is
certainly ideal and I think that teacher, students, and community must identify and define the
issues together, but an educator can chum the waters to engage stakeholders. In such cases the
educator must be fully prepared to defer to emergent themes or concerns of students and
community. An initial conversation should focus on the lived experience of the students (see
4.3.1.1 Discussion p. 202). Are they familiar with this issue? Do they think it is prevalent? Do
they think it is fair? What feelings do they associate with it? This could be facilitated in a variety
of ways and should be more informed by the teacher’s relationship with the students than my
hypothetical treatment. Centering student and community needs and emergent themes doesn’t
mean that the teacher doesn’t come prepared for class, instead the teacher must prepare for
multiple possibilities and be ready walk with the students in new directions or take authority
and redirect students as necessary. All the while, the teacher must cunningly seek opportunities
to make grade-level learning requirements relevant and applicable to the goals of the action
research.
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Once an issue has been identified students should engage in research activities with
emphasis on critical thinking and reflection. Fundamental to action research is reliance and
emphasis on the involvement of community experts who “live the research issue” (Powers &
Tiffany, 2006). Thus, students need to conduct their research in the community both acting as
local experts and consulting community experts. Such research can and should be paired with
readings, films, etc. in the classroom.
By promoting critical thinking and the exploration of the social circumstances
related to research questions, participatory research goes beyond mere factgathering and report-writing and uses the knowledge gained to guide and
energize collective change in communities, organizations, programs, and the
research participants themselves. (Powers & Tiffany, 2006, p. S79)
The focus should rapidly shift from an emphasis on understanding the problem to focusing on
possible solutions and opportunities to take action. It is important that initial action takes place
as soon as possible even before full commitment or deep understanding.
This approach differs from the standard way of solving a problem, which is to
first thoroughly understand the problem then to consider what actions, if any,
to take. Evaluation is normally carried out only after a plan is implemented. The
drawback of this method is that it tends to delay action while endless study is
done, and it fails to recognize that one often comes to really understand a
situation only through taking action and evaluating the consequences of that
action. (Wals et al., 1990)
Action cements an issue in the here-and-now, which we have empathic bias towards. However,
before becoming too involved in initiating a community project, it is important to get to know
the community and the issue, especially the current stakeholders and what is already being
done. The process can be summarized as: plan, implement, evaluate, repeat, but rather than
that particular order, beyond an initial cycle action and reflection must be simultaneous and
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constant. Students need to reflect and evaluate individually and collectively, and should
have opportunity to act individually as well as collectively.
Finally, as Anguiano et al. (2012) pointed out, there is no cookbook approach. The
nature of the methodology is that it grows and adapts itself to the participants and to the issue
being addressed. Action research and community problem solving are more about an approach
to the process than specific methods. This is an approach to education that centers community
and empowers students and community members by building relationships and balancing
power among stakeholders in the process of understanding and solving problems. It is also
about building relationships in order to address a specific community need. “It is intended to be
a social process that is participatory, practical, collaborative, emancipatory, critical, and
reflective” (Anguiano et al., 2012). Although there are some subtleties in the specifics, action
research, critical pedagogy, popular education, integrative education, and multicultural
education are among a number of other named approaches aiming at a more holistic,
empowering, and consciousness raising education that demands action.
4.3.3

Application of pedagogy of basic needs
Although intrinsically an important and worthy topic by itself, school food can
also be an entrée (so to speak) into many other topics of interest to education
researchers. It can be the highlight or simply a small piece of context. It can be a
central focus or simply one among many facets to explore as a possible
confounding influence. Whatever the relative weight of food in a study, it is
time to take school food seriously, to consider how much depends on this most
human, embodied part of the school day. (Weaver-Hightower, 2011)
I’ve very generally outlined a theoretical approach to problem solving education, with

specific consideration of hunger and emphasized that by changing the way we discuss problems,
we see solutions differently. Although the actions and solutions should be co-constructed with
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students, I provide a vision of what implementation of the process might look like with
specific examples from real community projects that address community needs, support moral
growth, and meet learning objectives. The premise for this example is that several kids in a class
(or other setting such as an afterschool program) experience food insecurity and students have
come to realize that hunger is prevalent in their community and want to do something.
4.3.3.1

A case against charity
Before continuing to explore the wonderful things that folks are doing to address food

insecurity in their communities, I want to consider a common way that it is addressed in schools:
canned food drives. Food drives do nothing to destigmatize hunger, and often imply that hunger
is an external (in the community) while ignoring or overlooking internal (in the classroom) need.
In my elementary school the class that donated the most cans got to have a party. For several
weeks a tally on the board kept track of how many cans had been donated and everyone knew
who the big can donors were. The number of cans a student had donated became a measure for
social comparison. Although having enough to eat was never a concern in my family and parents
sent me to school with several cans of food, I distinctly remember sneaking additional cans out
of the pantry to bring to school. To be clear, I didn’t sneak more cans because I was engaged in
contributing to a humanitarian effort, I snuck them because I wanted to have a party and
because I wanted to be recognized as a contributor.
I wonder how kids who couldn’t bring any cans felt. I wonder how many kids donated
food knowing that it would mean they wouldn’t get enough to eat in order to avoid being
shamed because their family was unable to donate. This is a process that adds shame to poverty
when the goal should be exactly the opposite. It is demeaning to students facing food insecurity
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to conceptualize food drives as charity rather than justice. We tend to celebrate charity, as if
social change is something the privileged do for the ‘underprivileged’ who are unable to help
themselves or each other. This type of charity little more than self-congratulatory social
posturing for privileged elites and it doesn’t have any place in action research. However, neither
canned food drives, nor the often genuinely humanitarian goals of charity are innately harmful.
It is simply a matter of how we approach helping one another.
We shouldn’t do charity for other communities. There paternalistic way of helping often
associated with charity that encourages downward social comparison and stigmatizes need, but
it is not the only way to conceptualize charity. We need to work with/in our communities49 in
solidarity for justice. The point I am trying to make is that good intentions alone are not enough.
We have to focus on how and why we help just as much as what we intend to do and we must
always work with rather than for those we help. Thus, the approach requires humility, respect,
and attention always focused on the outcomes of the work on both participants50 and
beneficiaries (who should be one in the same).
4.3.3.2

49

A case for educational action

I don’t mean to suggest that we only work in our own neighborhoods. I mean to suggest that rather
than viewing places and peoples as ‘others’ we recognize that we are part of one large community of life
composed of many overlapping communities. In this way our work is always with and never strictly for.
50
Even those acting purely altruistically without any expectation of external reward benefit internally
through such experiences. It is not selfish or counter to the ideals of altruism to recognize that helping
others benefits one’s self.

213
What if children come to see food insecurity as injustice? Need would begin to be
destigmatized and no one would be made to feel ashamed of being hungry. Students could work
together to make sure that they and their community had enough to eat, not as charity, but
solidarity and community. Students could work together to do something as simple as
implement a “share bowl” where students could leave extra food from their lunches. Anyone
would be free to leave or take something whenever they wanted. It’s absolutely atrocious to see
how much is wasted in a single lunch service in most school cafeterias. This is something very
simple that I have seen implemented in school cafeterias to reduce waste and hunger in schools.
Other schools and communities have implemented their own pantry programs and started
sending kids home on weekends with a backpack full of food (cf. Rodgers & Milewska, 2007).
The internal need in schools must be addressed before attention is shifted to external needs.
Once the immediacy of the problem is sufficiently addressed that the class is able to
consider the issue more structurally, they could begin planning, implementing, and evaluating
solutions in and with their community. One solution could be to implement or expand the
school garden either for the purposes of donating to the food bank, supplementing school
nutrition, establishing their own school food bank, or even preparing and serving free meals.
They could potentially partner with churches, community service organizations, or police & fire
departments. One thing that is great about kids is that they are adorable and communities are
often both incredibly inspired by the efforts of their young people and eager to support them.
Action research towards food justice as part of a curriculum with a food education
theme could easily meet learning goals while providing a meaningful experience and solving a
real problem. An educational project with the goal of eradicating hunger in its community could
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also inspire a sense of meaning and purpose, build community, and encourage civic
engagement and moral growth reaching far beyond the classroom. Students cool learn about
healthy diets and lifestyles, food systems and botany by learning to cook and garden. These
skills could be applied to their project addressing community hunger and they could work to
establish community gardens, plant gardens at home, or expand their school gardens and in the
process begin establishing decentralized food systems in their communities. They could donate
excess produce to a community pantry or open their own. They could additionally prepare and
serve meals in their school or community. In the course of such efforts, students could explore
the diets and agricultural systems of other cultures and their own in social studies classes. In
science classes they could study the biology of plant, the water cycle, photosynthesis, and
nutrition – all knowledge relevant to their project. Through spending time in the garden
students could learn natural history and ethnobotany and more generally connect with nature.
Math classes could directly apply to nutrition, cooking, and gardening.
Not only a classroom, but an entire school could engage in a student led action research
project. Every class and every subject could be related to the single goal of eradicating hunger
and students at all grade levels could engage in the process. Not only would it be possible to
meet all of the standards in this process, the students would be eager to learn skills that apply to
solving an important problem.
4.3.3.3

Examples of action research
Students have accomplished amazing things through participatory action research. One

action research project focused on youth homelessness in upstate New York recruited youth
researchers from a community program serving runaway youth (Powers & Tiffany, 2006). The
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youth were involved in the design of the project, data collection, interpretation and the
presentation of findings and recommendations. One difficulty with studying homelessness
among youth is that they tend not to utilize support services as frequently as adults and
researchers often have trouble estimating the population of youth experiencing homelessness,
much less engaging with them (Powers & Tiffany, 2006). By involving youth familiar with this
population through their own lived experience, the research team was able to conduct 165
interviews with youth experiencing homelessness. They presented their reports and
recommendations to community stakeholders including legislators, funders, human services
staff, university researchers, and policy makers. Thus, the youth researchers became powerful
advocates for their peers experiencing homelessness in a way that the detached researcher
likely could not.
Nygreen et al. (2006) described several fully youth led projects that developed
organically out of existing relationships between the authors and youth. Nygreen et al. (2006)
considered themselves adult allies, outlining a strictly supportive role. In one project current
students and recent graduates of a public alternative high school predominantly serving lowincome Students of Color considered as ‘at-risk.’ The groups purpose was to make change in
their school. The group held weekly meetings for a year discussing social issues and personal
experiences and conducted services and interviews with students, teachers, and staff in attempt
to understand how social issues affected their lives and educations. The following year the
students and their ‘adult ally’ developed and instructed weekly 80-minute lessons in the school’s
US Government class designed to encourage “students to think critically about social justice
issues and engage in action for social change” using “dialogue-based pedagogy to address topics
like police brutality, prisons, and environmental racism” (p.111).
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Another group of four Latina transnational second-generation immigrants including
one graduate student and three high school students who all regularly spent time with family in
Mexico spent a year sharing their pictures and experiences (Nygreen et al., 2006). A frequent
discussion topic was how their experience, language, and culture were ignored in school. This
inspired the group to write a children’s book on what life is like having homes on either side of
the border. Beyond their own experience, the group conducted research through dialogue,
interviews and a collection of pictures, home-videos, and other documents from transnational
families. Using this information they wrote and illustrated their book, they initially printed 80
copies through a local small grant and distributed the book to their families, at conferences,
local libraries and day care centers. At the time of publication of the description of the project
(2006) the group was working with a children’s book publisher for national distribution.
I hope to have illustrated through these examples that education focusing on the most
immediate community need can meet learning goals, solve problems, build community, and
facilitate moral growth. This may seem too idealistic, but I argue that restoration must be
idealistic. We can’t replace idealism with practicality, instead we have to remain idealistic in
order to guide or practical efforts. If our ideal and our practice match we have little direction for
progress. Thus, the central theme of this section is rethinking education to start from the
bottom of Maslow’s hierarchy and work our way up. I’ve argued for a radical approach, our duty
as moral humans and as educators is to do what we can in the spaces where we work. Different
institutions and different organizations have different capacities. It’s often slow and difficult
work, but if we’re not in this to serve kids, then we’re not in it at all. I realize this is easy to write
and difficult to do, but I want to conclude by sharing some my own recent experiences
observing lunches school cafeterias before and after salad bars were installed. The principle
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dressed in a banana costume and danced around the cafeteria to encourage kids to eat
healthy. The food service manager quietly paid out of her own pocket for lunches for kids who
were behind on payment51. Food that had been grown in the school garden served in the
cafeteria. I saw everyone from parents, to teachers, to administrators wanting to do better for
kids and working to accomplish it. I saw kids genuinely excited to eat their vegetables! I saw
hope. The point is that we need to be doing big things and making radical changes, but all of the
small things we do on the way matter.
4.3.4

Extending to ecological issues
Action research applies needs beyond the immediate physiological and safety needs. It

is a model for education as social change. This could mean establishing more green space,
reducing litter, recycling programs, etc. The sentiment of a pedagogy of basic needs is that the
most immediate physiological and safety needs need to come first, or at least simultaneous with
addressing less immediate issues. We need to help everyone meet their basic needs in order for
them to rightfully claim their place at the table in discussing the large-scale structural changes
necessary in the face of issues like climate change.
Ecological degradation is readily identifiable as a significant impairment to survival
needs in some parts of the world. As such degradation continues (e.g., climate change), the
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In some schools kids have their lunches taken away at checkout if they are behind on payments surely
inflicting both shame and hunger. For this manager to refuse to do this to kids at her own personal
expense goes to show how important everyone’s role is in the project of restoration. It’s not the work of
academics and educators; it’s all of our work.
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conflict between human and nature will escalate and social reform, as it has in many parts of
the world, will not be a utopian dream, but a matter of survival. Conflicts between meeting our
basic needs and preserving the environment are created through economic exploitation that
reduces all of life (human and planet) to the status of resource. This is killing us. In a struggle
that frames human verses nature and human verses human, we divide and conquer ourselves in
the face of our adversaries (nature and each other). This may be harsh verdict of nature that
Bookchin (1982) described. When we come to see the struggle as human with nature and
human with human there is no adversary at all. We need to meet the immediate needs of
people and planet, but we can simultaneously circumvent the processes that are leading to folks
having their needs unfulfilled.
4.3.5

Meeting basic needs mandates social change
Social change can be a survival need when social structures impede one’s ability to meet

their physiological and safety needs. I imagine such social structure as a completion to see who
can tread water the longest where some people have water wings (privilege) and some have an
anchor chained around their waist (oppression). It could be suggested that everyone has a fair
chance to win based on their skill and endurance (equal opportunity). This might be easily
accepted by those with water wings, and reluctantly accepted by those with anchors
(internalized oppression). But what we don’t realize is that we’ll all get exhausted and drown
eventually if we keep playing zero sum games where our success is inevitably at someone else’s
expense. We need to all help each other out of the anchors and share the water wings (meeting
basic needs) with the goal of getting everyone out of the water (radical social change).
As Maslow (1943) wrote:
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There are certain conditions which are immediate prerequisites for the basic
need satisfactions… Such conditions as freedom to speak, freedom to do what
one wishes so long as no harm is done to others, … justice, fairness, honesty,
orderliness in the group are examples of such preconditions for basic need
satisfactions. Thwarting in these freedoms will be reacted to with a threat or
emergency response…These conditions are defended because without them the
basic satisfactions are quite impossible, or at least, very severely endangered.
The Zapatista uprising exemplifies the necessity of social change in order to satisfy basic needs.
The Zapatistas identified economic policy (NAFTA) and the dissolution of communally held land,
as not only destructive to their way of life, but an attack on their means for survival. For the
Zapatistas, NAFTA was perceived to be a death sentence. The Zapatistas realized that meeting
their basic physiological and safety needs was impeded by larger structural issues.
The Zapatistas have consistently worked for structural change and inspired an
international Zapatismo movement with constant emphasis on the wellbeing of the people over
armed revolutionary conflict. The Zapatistas have worked to autonomously meet the needs of
their own communities by communally operating farms, schools and clinics (Hayden, 2002).
Many other revolutionary struggles have failed to place the highest value on life and have
considered the ends to justify the means. When this happens even a win is a loss and one brutal
dictatorship replaces another. The only revolutionary struggle is one of and for those who love
and honor life more than power.
Pedagogy for restoration is divided into three components strictly for conceptual clarity.
The ultimate goal is planetary restoration and pedagogy of identity and pedagogy of purpose
circle back to the problem solving process and constant attention to meeting everyone’s basic
needs and the necessity of large scale social change. Certainly groups and individuals whose
basic needs are better met can engage further with meeting the basic needs of larger human
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and non-human communities and work towards ecosystem scale restoration. Through the
pedagogy of basic needs identity and purpose already begin to be addressed and pedagogy of
identity seeks to illuminate purpose. In turn, pedagogy of purpose refers back to pedagogy of
basic needs, because when one finds purpose and self-actualization, they have a duty to act.
4.4

Pedagogy of Identity
Native students confined to learn only in Eurocentric systems have poor success
rates. The experience can be described as “looking into a mirror and having the
mirror look away.” (von Thater-Braan & Nelson, 2012)
Once we’ve fed our students we need to know them (to the extent that it is possible to

know someone else and their experience) and help them to know themselves and each other.
Because to know oneself, is to know how one fits into the world, and to become critically
conscious of the world. After this, attainment far beyond academic and economic success is
inevitable and the practice of teaching is inconsequential because students will be mentally and
physically prepared to learn and become open to education from all facets of life.
The epigraph to this section refers to the Native students experience in contemporary
public education. Before continuing with this discussion of the importance of honoring identity
in education, I want to share the narrative of Sun Elk from Taos Pueblo who attended Carlisle
Indian Industrial School for seven years beginning in 1883:
They told us that Indian ways were bad. They said we must get civilized. I
remember that word too. It means “to be like the white man.” I am willing to be
like the white man, but I did not believe Indians’ ways were wrong. But they
kept teaching us for seven years. And the books told how bad the Indians had
been to the white men—burning their towns and killing their women and
children. But I had seen white men do that to Indians. We all wore white man’s
clothes and ate white man’s food and went to white man’s churches and spoke
white man’s talk. And so after a while we also began to say Indians were bad.
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We laughed at our own people and their blankets and cooking pots and sacred
societies and dances. (as cited in Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014, p. 212)
Sun Elk and countless others eventually returned to their native way of life, but reintegrated
with much difficulty (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). This devaluation of non-dominant culture and
coerced assimilation covertly continues in schools today and is a source of internalized
oppression.
This section focuses on Maslow’s psychological needs of love, belonging and esteem. It
encompasses helping students explore their own identity (broadly cultural and ethnic identity,
but also specific identities e.g., environmentalist). It is also about ensuring that students find
themselves in the curriculum and that it speaks to their own experience (e.g., culturally relevant
history). Pedagogy of identity is not only a process of self-discovery, but group exploration.
Students should learn about one another’s identities and experiences and build relationships
recognizing that while they are each uniquely different, they are similar in many important
ways. Most importantly, they should learn that we are all connected and come to respect and
appreciate US American cultures and world cultures. It is critically important that the educator
engages in the process, letting students know them, as they work to know their students.
I broadly consider identity to be the culmination of experiences, statuses, traits, and
beliefs that make up who one is, including both their our own self-conceptions and the way
others perceive them. “Identity is linked with self-concept and self-reflection, and includes
beliefs about who we are as we are as well as who we hope to be. It is, in part, a way of locating
oneself in the world” (Clayton & Opotow, 2003, p. 299). Thus, identity must be “understood as a
complex and multidimensional construct with motivational and behavioral implications”
(Clayton & Opotow, 2003, p.300). Individuals are composed of multiple identities, sometimes
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conflicting and sometimes confusing. Some elements of identity are biologically determined
and some socially determined, some claimed by ourselves and some imposed by others (i.e.,
attained and ascribed identity). However our identity is more than the sum of its parts and while
culturally-constructed markers of identity such as gender, race, and class, may impose meaning
about who one is (i.e., ascribed), they are only one dimension of identity and do not define
anyone entirely52 (Clayton & Opotow, 2003).
Identity is often comparative: by claiming an identity, or having one imposed, an
implication is made that this label significantly differentiates the person claiming the identity (or
having it imposed) from others. The implication is that if someone significantly is something
then someone else significantly isn’t. This establishes affinity among the group of individuals
that the label applies to and distance from those who it does not. It is a natural human tendency
to attempt to understand, categorize, and even stereotype. This behavior is not inherently
harmful. However, the politics of identity are quite complicated and value laden and identity can
be used to establish hierarchy, to divide, and to oppress (see 3.7.3 Social death p. 134). It can
also be dismissed entirely in a way that effectively erases people, their experiences, and voices
(e.g., colorblindness and forced assimilation).
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Certainly in some circumstances the relative significance of particular biologically dictated and socially
constructed identities change. For example, although I have only recently considered my Jewish identity
as it intersects with my other identities and influences how I experience the world, when Neo-Nazis enter
the equation, I am acutely aware of the significance of this particular facet of my identity.
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What is necessary is for all educators to help folks celebrate their similarities and
their differences. Taking the importance of similarity or difference to the extreme is almost
always detrimental. However, the relative importance of similarities and differences depends on
context. In certain contexts it may be important to focus more on the ways in which we are
similar and to stand together in solidarity (but never in a way that attempts to completely
homogenize). In other cases, it may be important to focus more on the ways that we are each
unique individuals with different experiences. For example, in the struggle against oppression,
we must center the identities and statuses most frequently targeted by oppression and how and
why they are targeted.
As we explore identity (especially cultural identity) we must carefully avoid overgeneralization. One’s identity reflects some shared experience among that particular identity
but common experience does not dictate shared values or beliefs. However, cultural identity
may influence dominant themes in beliefs and values (Moya, 2003). Epistemology can be
culturally constructed, thus not only the experience but the theory through which we interpret
experience is influenced by cultural identity (Moya, 2003). The task is to avoid making
assumptions about any individual’s values or beliefs based on their cultural identity, but to also
recognize that cultural identity can influence values and beliefs. Our self conception is relative to
culture but it is not entirely culture defined. This is why, in education, the students own
exploration of identity and the relationship between teachers and students is so important. We
need to know (to the extent that we can know, but never become entirely familiar or entitled
to) our students unique identities and cultural experiences and the intersection between their
own cultural identity and dominant culture. Furthermore, neither identity nor experience is
static and their associated meanings are subject to change at individual and collective levels.
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4.4.1

Role models
Chuck D (1997) discussed the important role of popular culture, especially of Black53

musicians, in fighting racism. Chuck D (1997) argued that all Black public figures have a duty to
strive to be positive role models.
The athletics and entertainment industries have both had a tremendous impact
on the mind-set of today’s youth to the point where many young people grow
up idolizing athletes and entertainers, yet the only time these “idols” are seen is
if they’re playing ball, singing, rapping or dancing... Black youth, especially
young Black men, gravitated to Rap when it first came out, because it’s a vocal
expression, whereas in athletics you’d see somebody do incredible athletic
things on the court or field, but you’d never hear anything from their mind. The
travesty is that both athletes and entertainers could be and should be, more
visual and vocal sources of hope for young children in the ghetto and
throughout the world. (Chuck D & Jah, 1997, pp.95-96)
Chuck D (1997) further argued that Black people, especially Black public figures both model
behavior for Black youth and broader public perceptions and stereotypes54. Thus, he suggested
that when public figures glamorize violence and material wealth they normalize such goals for
youth and furthermore contribute to racist stereotypes. Regardless of whether this is right or
wrong, it is real.
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Although I think that much of what Chuck D (1997) wrote applies more generally, I have tried to be true
to his words in an effort to honor the voices of the authors that I have cited rather than appropriate their
ideas for my own agenda.
54
Kaplan and Berman (2010) suggested that coping with negative stereotypes and devoting attention to
avoid confirming them may deplete one’s resources for self-regulation executive-functioning. This
pressure may be exacerbated for celebrities of color who are constantly in the spotlight. Thus, while Black
public figures certainly serve as role models they cannot be expected to be perfect and we should be
sympathetic to the stressors they face.
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It’s more than just saying, “I’m not a criminal or contributing to a criminal
element that should be good enough.” It’s not enough. It’s not an issue of
donating money to Black causes. What makes me pissed off is that they [Black
athletes] are not saying much of anything. Their words and their time could
steer a lot of young people out of the traps that are set for them. (Chuck D &
Jah, 1997, p.100)
All public figures have an obligation to pay careful attention to their public perception and
persona55.
No one should be so presumptuous as to believe that their behavior reflects on only
themselves. This presumption is a significant function of privilege because whites are rarely
burdened with an awareness that our actions could be taken as a reflection whites that we don’t
consider ourselves associated with. However, we are all co-responsible for bringing social
change. We must all be aware of both how we see ourselves and how others see us. We are all
role models and ambassadors (at least sometimes) for the identities we are socially assigned
and the collective identities we claim membership in.
People of Color alone should not be burdened with the task of breaking down racial
stereotypes and the work of anti-racism. I insist that we challenge the expectation that People
of Color should be accountable for their entire (socially constructed) race and constantly
expected to prove that they are ‘good’ (see 2.1.2 Entitlement and deservingness p.37).
However, as long as such an unjust expectation remains prominent, whites must hold
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It is important to distinguish the public persona of artists and performers from the works that they
produce. Although, it is important to pay attention to the way People of Color are portrayed in film,
television, and music, the consumers of the products need to be accountable for the meaning of it.
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themselves to the same (unjust) level of accountability. An example of this unjust disparity
relates to the election of Barak Obama, our first African American president. Obama had to
prove that he was a US citizen, not a terrorist, and not Muslim- all three criminalized statuses
rather than inherently criminal identities. Such scrutiny has never been so publicly prominent
for any other president of US. Someone with the status of United States Senator and then
President of United States of America faced pressure to establish value not only as a politician,
but as a human being. The underlying injustice is that privileged identities and statuses are
presumed to be good and entitled to rights while dismissed, marginalized and criminalized
peoples are required to prove that they are good and deserving of rights (Cacho, 2012).
As much as I do not like to claim identities such as white, man, and environmentalist or
statuses such as citizen, because of the privilege (and certain behaviors) associated with those
identities and statuses56, I recognize that I have significant power in challenging the associated
meanings. Rather than renounce my own privileged identities, I claim them and challenge their
definitions by the simple fact that I refuse (or aspire to refuse) to resign to privilege and
stereotypes and I interrogate the ways in which I am conditioned by those identities. It would
only be from a position of significant privilege that one could declare themselves not
accountable to a socially imposed identity (e.g., white or Black). As long as such an unjust
disparity exists, I will (aspire to) hold myself similarly accountable. Furthermore, when it comes
to more radical stances relating to race and racism, as a white man, and a unique individual, I
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This is not to suggest that one (myself included) cannot or should not maintain positive associations
with their status and identity. However, there the privilege associated with dominant identities is unjust.
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say things differently and I am heard differently. Equality is a utopian idea, but on the path
to utopia we need to focus on equity. Given that we do not have equal agency and privilege, we
need to think about what is fair and how we can each contribute to a better world uniquely,
individually, and collectively.
Oppression is violent and acts of oppression may be traumatic to both those who enact
oppression and the targets of oppression. The colonization of America was and continues to be
traumatic for colonized and colonizer alike and it’s not too late for us to collectively experience
posttraumatic growth. Those at each level of collective and individual identity and in the
intersections of multiple identities have a duty to work in any way they can to reduce violence in
service of meeting the ultimate goal of ecological and social restoration. I don’t believe that
People of Color and whites exist as a binary framework of race and relation (us or them) where
whites committed to anti-racist can be considered allies at best and saviors57 at worst. This also
applies to other dichotomously situated identities and statuses related to sex, gender, sexual
orientation, citizenship status, and educational attainment. I believe there is a time and place
for allies and saviors, however I want to stand in solidarity as a co-conspirator in an insurgency
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By saviors I mean whites who believe that they know best and are doing anti-racist work for People of
Color, rather than with People of Color. However, this mentality may well apply to folks who rescued my
family from the Nazi death camps and I don’t think such a mentality should be entirely dismissed or
criticized. On the opposite end of the spectrum are allies. Ally is a loaded term, and I don’t intend to delve
deeply into different perceptions of what ally-ship means. Here, I am challenging the perception that
whites can only act with or under the direction of People of Color. I cherish opportunities to act as an ally,
but I think that we all need to be sufficiently informed and empowered to take immediate and
independent action when it is necessary and to lead when appropriate. White co-conspirators must
challenge the role of their own privilege in such behaviors without renouncing their agency entirely. I
conceptualize the co-conspirator as the midpoint in a spectrum with ally and savior on either end.
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against all oppression and a struggle to bring another reality to fruition. I want to be clear
that I am not suggesting that as a white male I feel entitled to be present, influential or even
welcome in every space. Furthermore we all need to hold each other and ourselves accountable
while simultaneously practicing acceptance. What we must not do is reduce all identities and
experiences in life to a single human experience.
4.4.2

Hispanic environmental identities
Anguiano et al. (2012) studied the intersection of environmental values and beliefs

regarding the natural environment with those of dominant culture in New Mexico. The
dominant ideology of environmentalism is so prevalent that Anguiano et al. (2012) found a
“deep disconnect between the word ‘‘environmentalist’’ and Hispanic communities unwilling to
ascribe to such a label despite practicing sustainable ethics” because
Hispanic community member participants may already practice social and
environmental sustainability, but … their strategies are tied to culturally specific
values and meanings and thus differ from those advanced and advocated by the
dominant environmental movement… despite the fact that their articulated
behavior was largely analogous with the environmental justice movement’s
aims. (Anguiano et al., 2012)
Anguiano et al. (2012) significantly raised the point that It is not fair to assume that ecological or
social sustainability are not priorities for those whose practice may not align with the dominant
environmental movement.
Educators and mainstream environmentalists must acknowledge different cultural
conceptions of the environment.
Anglo-American environmental discourses that assume nature is an untouched
space, that ‘‘wilderness is pristine,’’ and that ‘‘protecting nature means
protecting it from predation by humans’’ do not resonate with Latino
communities. (Anguiano et al., 2012)
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Many of the Hispanic community member participants of Anguiano et al.’s (2012) study lived
and worked closely with the land including many ranchers with long-standing generational ties
to the land.
In contrast with the individualistic and culture-nature binary view of dominant
Western environmental discourse, for our Hispanic New Mexican participants,
their environmental concerns stemmed from close ties to their community,
neighborhoods, and place. (Anguiano et al., 2012)
This sense of place is quite complex in consideration of the
deep history of colonization 58 implicates New Mexican Hispanics as both
colonizers and colonized, yielding a complex mixed race identity (e.g., indoHispanic, mestizos, and anglo-Hispanic) that results in interesting paradoxes and
views about land ownership. These paradoxes partly can be attributed to more
recent patterns of exploitation exercised since the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo ended the USMexican War and ceded almost one half of Mexico to the
US, with the Southwest Hispanic colonizers essentially repositioned as the
colonized.
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Northeastern New Mexico was colonized by the French and purchased by US in 1803 while the rest of
New Mexico was occupied following the US Mexican War. The Spanish occupation of New Mexico swept
north of the Rio Grande beginning in 1598 decimating approximately 75% of the Pueblos of New Mexico
over two decades (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014). However, in 1680 the New Mexico Pueblos organized a revolution
with the help of unconquered Navajos, Apaches and Utes, Hopis from the West, and subjugated
Indigenous and Mestizos in the Spanish capital in Santa Fe. The revolution was successful and they drove
the Spanish out of New Mexico for 12 years. The Spanish did eventually occupy the land for another 130
years until Mexico’s independence in 1821. Following independence many Indigenous peoples found
refuge from United States genocide and relocation in the Republic of Mexico. However, Mexico allowed
slave owning Anglo-American immigrants to establish plantations which led to conflict when slavery was
abolished in 1829 ultimately resulting in the secession of the Texas Republic and set forth the US Mexican
War. By 1848 a large portion of Mexico, including New Mexico, was under US American rule and
relocation and genocide of Indigenous people increased up to and following the civil war. By the 1890s
most surviving Indigenous refugees were confined to federal reservations and their children sent to
boarding schools. However the struggle for Indigenous rights and sovereignty continues in New Mexico
and in all of America to this day (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014).
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New Mexico is also home to many Latinas/os who (or whose families) immigrated after 1948
and the influence of both Spanish and US American colonization are prevalent throughout the
state. Additionally, since 1948 the government has seized community held land from Latina/o
communities and dispossessed Latino/as of lands along the US-Mexico border (Chen, Milstein,
Anguiano, Sandoval, & Knudsen, 2012). One begins to see that broad generalizations about the
values and beliefs of Hispanic peoples even in the specific context of New Mexico are
impractical. However, attention to the collection of experiences of these peoples is important in
understanding the formations of individual values and beliefs.
An example of how “environmental justice59” organizing may look for Hispanic peoples
in New Mexico illustrates the intersections between individual and collective identities and hints
at the construction of new collective identities.
At her first meeting she volunteered and became very involved for many years
after:
L: So within like 15 minutes I was the vice president and I was like, what is going
on here? ‘‘And by the way, we are going to have enchiladas you need to go
home and get all this food.’’ and I was like, whoa! . . . One thing we understood
is that every time we had an event, there was some kind of celebration; we had
music; we had food. We understand the way our people think: food and music.
There was a lot of posole60 that we made.
This participant attributed community activist success to understanding that
involving people meant having posole, music and community engagement so
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Not a label the folks in this study identified with.
Posole is a traditional Mexican soup made from hominy that is very popular in New Mexico. It is a dish
that was eaten in pre-colonial Mexico but there is a distinctly New Mexican recipe for posole influenced
by Spanish and American colonization.
60
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that the fight against environmental injustices had a comfortable and familiar
feeling. The notion of understanding ‘‘our people’’ speaks to an activism that
recognizes, caters to, and grounds neighborhood organizing in its cultural
traditions rather than imposing a foreign framework that would not resonate
with the participants. (Anguiano et al., 2012)
Thus, Anguiano et al. (2012) discussed the importance of not only literally speaking the language
(e.g., Spanish) but speaking the language of first-hand knowledge of culture and tradition. “The
larger environmental movement must honor the voices of local communities and acknowledge
the importance of linking cultural orientations within the larger environmental agenda”
(Anguiano et al., 2012). Although an educator can never be completely familiar with any culture
but their own, we must be genuinely interested in and respectful of the people we work with
and in their language, culture, traditions, and experience, and in working together in solidarity,
for a better world.
Additionally, new collective identities can be joined, expanded or formed without
threatening our existing individual identities. An exemplary case of collective identity is the
Zapatistas. The iconic image of the Zapatista with black ski mask, Cuban military cap, and red
bandana is widely recognized around the world. By hiding their personal identities they portray
themselves as one. As a mestizo, Subcomondante Insurgente Marcos’ lived experience is not
that of the Indigenous Mayans. As the story goes, Marcos traveled the Chiapas encouraging and
organizing an uprising informed by Western political theory but was initially unsuccessful
because he lacked a deep understanding of Indigenous culture (Hayden, 2002). There are many
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rumors of his identity, education, and background are rampant, but one thing is for sure,
when he puts on the mask and adornments of the EZLN, he is absorbed into the collective
identity of the Zapatistas and is neither Indigenous, nor mestizo. Furthermore, Marcos has
proclaimed that anyone who stands against injustice is a Zapatista61. In this way, the collective
identity is not exclusive to Mayan people. While the EZLN retains primarily Mayan leadership
and attention to Mayan interests in Mexico, it is done in recognition that their local struggle is
part of a world-wide struggle against oppression.
Thus, the Zapatistas balance the need for a single collective identity and voice individual
identities. One can dedicate themselves to a collective identity associated with a social cause
without sacrificing the individuality. Participants maintain their individual identities and gain a
collective sense of identity. We need that sense of collective purpose, identity, belonging and
acceptance, and we need our sense of individuality. We need to reinforce both, through
education, and emphasize how connected we all are in the collective identities of humanity and
of life on Earth.
4.4.3

Hip Hop
They tell lies in the books
That you’re readin’
It’s knowledge of yourself
That you’re needin’

61

The EZLN remains an organization for and by Indigenous peoples collectively led by the Clandestine
Revolutionary Indigenous Committee and Marcos was a spokesperson since stepped down so that an in
order for an Indigenous person to fill that role. However, Marcos remains an active member of the
collective and has taken the name Galeano in honor of the murdered Zapatista educator.
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-“Prophets of Rage” (Chuck D & Jah, 1997)
Hip Hop is a prominent American (but not exclusive to America) culture and thus Hip Hip
must be part of American education. In addition, this approach to Hip Hop (and Hip Hop itself)
can be applied to the exploration of other cultures and facets of identity. Thus the exploration of
Hip Hop is intended to illustrate an application of pedagogy of identity.
Rather than suggesting that educators bring Hip Hop and non-dominant popular and
traditional cultures into the classroom to engage students and meet learning goals, I suggest
that culture (i.e., Hip Hop) is already in the classroom and doesn’t need to be assimilated into
the critical educator’s pedagogy. To say that hip Hop is critical pedagogy or to say that Hip Hop is
postmodern (cf. Potter, 1995) or for that matter to make such statements about any culture is
to suggest that they be valued in their relation to the value of dominant academic theories.
Black history carries the subversive truth that contemporary rationales for
poverty, ghettoization, and trickle-down economic policy that justify the
increasing wealth of a few on the backs of a growing black underclass are part
and parcel of this ongoing capitalistic hegemony, and black arts are the signal
site for the return of these repressed realities. (Potter, 1995, p.7)
Thus, Hip Hop is already its own critical pedagogy, discourse, and epistemology.
Coming of age outside of the schoolhouse and as an expression of lived
curriculum, hip hop resists the images of American national identity presented
as official school curricula. As lived curriculum, hip hop signifies a site of cultural
struggle where the politics of race, class, sexuality, gender, place, and
generation (among other subjectivities) are played out through the discourse of
power, privilege, and oppression. (Baszile, 2009)
Hip Hop stands on its own as a culture grown within the dominant Western culture and from its
inception is critically conscious and anti-oppressive. I intend to illustrate the unique and
independent value of Hip Hop and suggest a synergistic relationship with critical pedagogy.
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4.4.3.1

Shakespeare v. Tupac
Utilizing Hip Hop education not just about how teachers can use hiphop products to

engage students. It’s about what educators and students can learn together from Hip Hop
culture. Hip Hop is knowledge and movement, facts and feeling, explicit and tacit (KRS-One,
2009). Education has the hip (i.e., knowledge - but not always the important and culturally
relevant knowledge) but it doesn’t have the hop (i.e., feeling, movement, action). It’s not action
oriented, it’s banking oriented (depositing knowledge for economic success).
Obligatory readings of Shakespeare in high school English classes are not generally
framed as a way to get students interested in reading, but as the study of important canons of
English literature. However such are the canons of a dominant and domineering culture that
does not speak to many youth but to derogate them or enforce their invisibility. The discourse
of literary canons seems to render traditional culture historic and static and popular culture as
contemporary and fleeting. What remain as canons are the works that speak to idealized
notions of timelessness. However, as Duncan-Andrade and Morell (2007) pointed out popular
culture has always been a topic of academic inquiry for the academic elite.
Maybe rather than making Shakespeare relevant by aligning it with modern popular
culture, we should be studying the canons of the cultures that students affiliate with including
traditional cultures and contemporary popular cultures. I say we replace (or at least augment)
Shakespeare with Tupac, if Tupac speaks to our students’ own experience. To do anything else is
to weaponize literary canons as tools of colonization by enforcing dominant culture and ignoring
the important and relevant works of non-dominant cultures. As I have already argued the
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knowledge of and from non-dominate cultures found in such works, provides critique and
counter-examples to the degradation attributable to dominant Western culture.
Regardless of idealistic notions of what education should be, educators have a duty to
balance the important work of facilitating meaningful education with the instruction necessary
to get them through the gauntlets of the academy such as standardized testing. DuncanAndrade and Morell (2007) are teacher-researchers who utilize popular culture in their English
classes. They wrote: “Regardless of our philosophical foundation, we understood that our
students existed in a world where they would be expected to take and perform well on
standardized tests that served as gatekeepers to post-secondary education and, by
consequence, professional membership” (p.185). I argue that education relevant to students’
own experience focused on identity and elements of popular and traditional culture meets
learning objectives just as pedagogy of hunger does. More importantly pedagogy of identity, as
explored through the example of Hip Hop, helps students explore their own identity and
become empowered rather than marginalized by an education that does not render them
invisible.
Duncan-Andrade and Morell (2007) pointed out that in order for students to effectively
critique power structures and become critically conscious, students must understand the
language of power and familiarize themselves with the dominant texts. Thus, studying the
literary canons can be a subversive effort and studying culturally relevant materials could
provide tools to critique dominant works. However, such a critical reading of dominant texts
does not prevent students from making connections between these texts and their own lives. In
fact, part of a rich academic conversation could focus precisely on exploring if/how students
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relate to the literary canons62. Duncan-Andrade and Morell (2007) wrote that they were only
able to motivate some students to engage with such literature through centralizing a
commitment to freedom and social change.
4.4.3.2

Wouldn’t some students inevitably feel left out?
Pedagogy of identity is about exploring identity together and certainly seeks a pluralistic

approach to identity. This means questioning Eurocentric dominance in the classroom and
working to more equitably represent non-dominant cultures. Only dominant, racist ideology
leads to the suggestion that an exploration of Hip Hop would speak only to those most severely
marginalized by dominant Western culture and exclude students of privileged identities.
Everyone has culture, and everyone benefits from exploring their own identity, cultural
experience, and ethnicity as well as the diverse identities present in the classroom and in
broader communities. Building such relationships with oneself, one’s culture, and broader
communities connects and empowers everyone.
Pedagogy of identity aims to be no more or less relevant for whites than People of
Color, or heteronormative students than queer students, or any other binary pairing of
dominant and marginalized identities. Furthermore, through exploring our own identities and
experiences together, we see that despite very real structural injustices enacted in society, the
binaries are false. As I have argued throughout this paper, socially constructed realities are real
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This could be an excellent Youth-led participatory action research project. In fact, I’ve heard middle
school students clearly articulate the Eurocentric curriculum in American schools.

237
only in their consequence. Thus, through studying identity in the paradigm of relevant
culture (and multiple cultures) students can learn to appreciate both the similarities and
differences in experience associated with identity in their classrooms and their communities and
challenge binary conceptions of identity and oppressive ideologies63.
Only dominant Western culture has the privilege of marginalizing and ignoring other
cultures. As such, considerations of inclusion are not transitive. “When we recognize the
contingent nature of justice … the impact of identity becomes apparent, and it’s here that
justice becomes slippery, unstable, and controversial” (Clayton & Opotow, 2003, p.300). As
certain culturally-constructed markers of identity are imposed on individuals rather than
claimed, relations of power are significant in the construction of identity.
Identity not only defines, but also facilitates certain interactions and power
relationships. Because of these power differences, justice is not always
transitive: fair ways for person A to treat person B are not necessarily fair ways
for person B to treat person A (e.g., boss-subordinate or doctor-patient
relationships. (Clayton & Opotow, 2003, p.299)
An example of the intransitivity of justice in its relation to power and culture relates to the very
real existence of racism and the imaginary existence of reverse-racism64 and affirmative action.
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I want to note that while discovering, challenging and resolving conflicts related to strict conceptions of
identity that one may hold of themselves or others, it is not innately so ‘intense.’ Sometimes it’s just the
culmination of multiple subtle experiences or a few lyrics from a hiphop track. The big challenges and
breakthroughs are important, but I want to emphasize pedagogy of restoration is meant to be
challenging, but also fun and empowering and beautiful. I firmly believe that if it weren’t there would be
no point.
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If affirmative action sought to create more opportunities exclusively for white men, that
would be extremely racist. However, given the continuing history of overt and structural
discrimination, attempts towards ‘equal opportunity’ that reconcile the imbalances by centering
people of color are not reverse-racism.
Similarly, failure of the curriculum of dominant Western culture to speak to young
People of Color does not reflect prejudice on the part of People of Color in the same way that a
member of dominant culture may assume that the curriculum of non-dominant culture could
not speak to them. The first instance represents a failure of dominant culture to speak to people
whose identities are marginalized65 (rather than a failure to listen), and the second represents a
failure of dominant listen to speak to people whose identities are marginalized (rather than a
failure to speak). Failing to listen to someone does not imply that they failed to speak and failure
to speak to someone does not imply that they haven’t listened. I made the mistake for much of
my life of thinking that Hip Hop didn't speak for or about me and assuming that it didn't speak to
me (as an affluent, suburban, white). By making this mistake, I have not grown to appreciate Hip
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Racism is unilaterally enacted by the dominant group. Spring (2014) provides a very simple definition of
racism : “prejudice plus power. This definition distinguishes between simple feelings of hostility and
prejudice toward another racial group and the ability to turn those feelings into some form of
oppression.” However, both enactors and targets of oppression internalize racist ideology and perpetuate
it. For a humorous explanation of the distinction between racism and “reverse racism” see Aamer
Rahman’s routine on reverse racism. http://poetry.rapgenius.com/Aamer-rahman-reverse-racismannotated
65
Significantly the identities of People of Color are frequently marginalized. However, this failure in
education does not apply exclusively to People of Color, many identities are institutionally marginalized.
Additionally, I want to be clear that no one’s identity is innately marginal (see 2.1.1 Oppressor-oppressed
dichotomy p. 33)
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Hop until recently. Not only did I rob myself through such prejudice of esthetic pleasure, I
have missed what could have been an important opportunity to become more critically
conscious at a younger age.
When certain elements of a unit on non-dominant popular or traditional culture do not
seem to speak to a student of privileged identity, there is a significant lesson to be learned
about equitable redistribution of power. I’ve seen white students so quickly outraged, insulted,
and felt as if they had been excluded when a single lecture (or discussion) did not feel like it was
about them or relevant to their experience. However, the other 23 hours of their day are exactly
about them and center their experiences and identities. Such a shift in power is not oppression,
it is not reverse racism, it is justice. Beyond the initial shock that justice may be for whites, such
inclusion has no cause to threaten whites’ identities, but rather, it should enhance everyone’s
sense of identity.
If at some point Hip Hop spoke primarily to Black youth, it has certainly grown in its
appeal to youth worldwide. Maybe in part because Hip Hip so often speaks to the urban
experience, power, and real life struggle. That said, any pedagogy of identity, including Hip Hop
has to be founded in popular education and led by those who identify with the culture being
explored. I have no right, and neither am I capable to choose the important works of Hip Hop for
study because I am not Hip Hop. I’ve grown to enjoy it, but I am not it. This is a line that would
be crossed with much insult in the exploration of any lived experience. One can be
knowledgeable, respectful, and appreciative of an identity but never entitled to any lived
experience but their own. This doesn’t mean that an educator, such as myself, should shirk their
duty as an educator to develop curriculum and search for works that their students may connect

240
with. The educator must be a co-learner and the students must be co-teachers. As
experienced scholars, educators also have the opportunity model their own learning process. In
this way not only the content of Hip Hop, but the approach to studying Hip Hop facilitates
redistribution of power in the classroom by empowering those who Hip Hop speaks most
profoundly to (often students more frequently disempowered by standard curriculum).
4.4.3.3

The educators role
This approach can develop rich, robust questions and understandings about
specific groups, their histories, and their traditions. However, if the topic of a
certain cultural group is approached merely as “adding color” to the curriculum,
teachers run the risk of stumbling into any one of a number of pitfalls that run
counter to the critical multicultural approach. … “Such pitfalls include
perpetuating stereotypes by painting a group of people with a broad brush;
“exoticizing” the “other” through a shallow “tourist” approach; or, even more
damaging, developing new pigeonholes by reinforcing a limited understanding
of the experiences of a group of people” (Bode, 2012, p.343).
The duty of the educator is to come to the students and begin the process “using a

problem-posing approach and constructing curriculum with students on topics that both
teachers and students want to explore” to create “an authentic learning experience” (Bode,
2012, p. 343). This means that an exploration of Hip Hop must focus on the works that are
relevant and meaningful to students. In such a learning collaboration new meanings and
connections are formed and emergent paths of inquiry may be followed. As the learning
community explores the materials together and makes connections to their own cultures,
opportunities would arise to expand horizons through exploring those connections.
It is also the obligation of a teacher to share their own passions with students and to
reciprocate the students’ contributions of meaningful pieces relevant to their own experiences
within or beyond Hip Hop. In that way, a committed educator has no cause to shy away from an
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exploration of Hip Hop with their students for lack of expertise in Hip Hop. In fact, “when the
teachers announce their own curiosity and model their own struggle with ignorance, students
are empowered to ask previously hushed questions and uncover misconceptions” (Bode, 2012,
p. 344). However, Bode (2012) certainly did not suggest that such an inquiry process relieves an
educator of their obligation to prepare for class. In my own experience guiding student inquiry, I
have found that it takes significantly more preparation than teaching a standard curriculum.
4.4.3.4

Praxis
This is not a theoretical idea, Hip Hop has been successfully brought into the classroom

by educators such as Duncan-Andrade and Morell. Duncan-Andrade and Morell (2007) are not
writing theory, they are writing praxis based on their own classroom experience and research.
One fantastic unit focused on reading lyrics, books and magazines associated with Hip Hop and
popular culture along with classical works (Duncan-Andrade & Morell, 2007). The unit focused
on language comprehension, critical analysis, and prominent cultural issues. Again learning
objectives were met and students were empowered. In the course of studying popular culture
and current events, race and racism, power, and justice, emerged as dominant themes. Students
became involved in working towards change in their schools and communities. At the
culmination of this unit the students initiated a school magazine project which included articles,
poems, and drawings focused on the social conditions of their school. They even interviewed
local politicians (Duncan-Andrade & Morell, 2007).
As with hunger as explored in pedagogy of basic needs, I use Hip Hop as an example of
engaging students with culturally relevant materials, but I do not suggest that Hip Hop is the
best or only way to do that. A practice inspired by pedagogy of identity could just as well center
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punk rock, world music, visual arts (from street art to ‘fine’ art), performance, film, popular
culture or traditional culture. Likely, exploring identity and engaging in activities that connect
with students sense of identity or cultural studies designed to inspire a sense of connection with
other world cultures, would engage students with a variety of topics.
The sense of connection to and appreciation of cultures, identities, and experiences
beyond one’s own allow one to see a larger, more complex, and nuanced world where one can
begin to develop a sense of community and sense of place locally and globally. As culture shapes
the environment (especially urban) and the environment shapes culture, the process of
exploring culture and identity has the potential of enlightening our ways of being in the world.
At the very least, gaining an appreciation for the culture in our communities likely influences
how one values their community. I posit that developing one’s self concept through explorations
of identity, culture, and connectivity fosters engagement and thus contributes to the project of
restoration, in part, by establishing the foundations for one’s sense of purpose.
4.5

Pedagogy of Purpose
A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he [sic]
is to be ultimately happy. (Maslow, 1943)
This section identifies the importance of purpose as an element of restoration and

considers how educators can help students seek purpose. The section begins with an
exploration of what purpose is and why a sense of purpose is important. Next I suggest that
purpose is not the profound and noble pursuit of the highly enlightened, but often a more
grounded and humble commitment anything one finds meaningful. The following section
explores how we develop a sense of purpose and how educators can support students on their
path to purpose. The section concludes with a consideration of the positive youth development
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approach which ultimately circles back to pedagogy of basic needs establishing a synergy
among the elements of pedagogy for restoration.
“Purpose is a stable and generalized intention to accomplish something that is at the
same time meaningful to the self and consequential to the world beyond the self” (Damon,
2009, p. 33). It is a source of resilience and it provides a sense of meaning, a source of
motivation, and contributes to one’s identity. Additionally when students see purpose in their
education or how their education supports their own sense of purpose, they will be more
invested in learning. In this way, students will be better equipped to overcome barriers to their
success. For example, if a student feels that a high school diploma will help them achieve their
goal, they may be more motivated to get through classes that do not appear to directly serve
their purpose or speak to their experience. However, we need to be helping students see
purpose in all of their education, as discussed in pedagogy of identity, we have to help kids get
through the gauntlets as long as the gauntlets exist66. Despite often lacking clear attention to
student identity and purpose, many core subject areas do importantly serve students purpose
later in life. Mathematics may be a common example. Mathematics can certainly be taught it a
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I want to be clear about my position on the gauntlets and the oppression perpetuated in schools: public
education, can, will, and does happen with or without schools (cf. Illich, 1970/2011). As outlined by Illich
(1970/2011) in a society that values children and education above all, schools would be unnecessary.
However, I want to make it clear that I am absolutely and unquestionably a proponent of public
education. I see all of the elements of pedagogy for restoration as both radical and pragmatic. In other
words all of the suggestions that I have made are possible within existing public schools or as an
addendum to the process through community efforts such as after-school programs. Unquestionably, my
dream is to establish a fully democratic public education system free from the problematic structures of
the existing public education system, but until that is possible, I think we have no choice but to work
within the existing systems.
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way that is relevant to students lives and serves important purpose, but many students
dislike math precisely because they struggle with the topic and are not motivated to overcome
their struggle by a clear understanding of the importance of mathematics.
The fundamental need for purpose was something Kurt Hahn (1960) sought to fulfill by
creating a moral equivalent to war (Hahn, 1960). In a speech to the Outward Bound Trust, Hahn
(1960) said ”[William] James hated war but he admits that war satisfies a primitive longing of
men [sic] which will never be extinguished, to lose yourself in a common cause, which claims the
whole man [sic]” (Hahn, 1960). Hahn (1960) was inspired by his perception of despondency
among youth at the time, which he attributed to the lack of a “moral equivalent to war.” This is
little more than a poetic sentiment and Hahn’s work far surpasses any equivalency with war.
Hahn (1960) suggested that
there are three ways of trying to win the young. There is persuasion, there is
compulsion and there is attraction. You can preach at them, that is a hook
without a worm; you can say “You must volunteer,” that is of the devil; and you
can tell them, “You are needed.” That appeal hardly ever fails. (Hahn, 1960)
Thus, through Outward Bound, Hahn (1960) appealed to young people’s duty to serve. Outward
Bound provided young people with a sense of belonging and purpose through emphasis on
fitness, expedition, projects (especially service projects) and rescue services (e.g., search and
rescue).
Hahn (1960) shared an inspiring story of a boy who found purpose:
There was a wild and ruthless boy. I received daily deputations urging me that I
should get rid of him. But I hesitated, wondering whether his undefeatable spirit
could not be directed towards worthwhile aims. I persuaded him to join the
agricultural guild. One day he came to me in great excitement and said, “Mr.
Hahn, something terrible has happened. They want to kill our cow because she
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has swallowed a piece of wire. Now I know from my father, who is a doctor, that
in such cases you can operate on humans, and a cow is a much tougher animal
than a man or woman. May I find a vet who will operate?” In my stupidity, I said
to him, “Well, if you find a Vet, who will operate on this cow, she shall live." He
disappeared for twenty-four hours, then came back with a Vet who lived 30
miles away. His coming cost more than the cow. I shall never forget what
happened then. I was in bed at that time with a broken leg, and the stable was
200 yards away – suddenly I heard a cry. It was the cry of a savage, but it was
not the cry of fear, it was the cry of jubilant mercy. What had happened? The
boy had been allowed to assist at the operation; he had poured much iodine
into the wound made by the surgeon's knife. The arm of the vet, buried in the
recesses of the cow had extracted the piece of wire from near the heart. When
he held it up the boy emitted that triumphant cry which I had heard. He has
since become a distinguished surgeon.
When students find meaning and purpose, regardless of what that meaning and purpose is, they
engage with life in a way that is constructive and creative rather than destructive and they
contribute the project of restoration rather than degradation67.
Regardless of how and where each individual takes their passion, when humans find
purpose and dedicate themselves to it, the environment (social and ecological) will take care of
itself. When people are engaged and passionate about any prosocial or pro-environmental
cause it potentially benefits all causes by uplifting everyone (see 3.2.1 Prosocial motivation
p.62). Furthermore when someone engages at any level of our collective identities (e.g., family,
community, nation, or planet) they will inevitably intersect with other engaged individuals who
are active in other levels of the collective. In this way, all restorative efforts are interconnected
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Antisocial purposes also exist both in the context of ‘evil’ and complicity with social injustice. Certainly
Manifest Destiny provided a sense of purpose to American settlers. This is certainly worthy of further
exploration in light of human morality, but I will not be dipping back into deviance or outlying behavior in
this discussion. Damon (2009) provides some exploration of deviant purpose.
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and synergistic and contribute to the broader project of restoration. If everyone is engaged
in doing something to benefit life, regardless of what it is, we will see positive large scale
change. For that reason, pedagogy of purpose is about helping people to find their own sense of
purpose rather than advocating any specific cause. Pedagogy of basic needs and pedagogy of
identity are both aimed at helping people reach an emotional and physical place (near the top of
Maslow’s hierarchy) where they may discover purpose. Both Pedagogy of basic needs and
pedagogy of identity already facilitate the development of purpose (e.g., helping others meet
their basic needs).
4.5.1

Purposes of grandeur
Purpose does not have to be grandiose. Damon (2009) shared a story about the

manager of a fast food restaurant who took pride and found purpose in that work. Although one
could just as easily succumb to prevalent cultural notions of such a position as a meaningless,
short-term, low wage job, the manager saw purpose and meaning in treating each transaction
as an opportunity to make people smile. The manager felt that anything that they could do,
however small to make a customer’s day better mattered. This sentiment rubbed off on the
young adults working there as well, and the entire staff became engaged in the meaningful
effort to make restaurant patrons happy. Rather than a meaningless short term job, the young
employees found a sense of purpose and a source of pride in their work. Damon (2009)
suggested that the manager’s employees were not only positively influenced at work, but
through the experience at the restaurant, their personal lives benefitted.
The manager’s sense of purpose was likely independent of their job and they would
probably find a way to positively influence people’s lives in any position. The manager seemed
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to have aligned the position with what was almost certainly a previously existing desire to
positively affect others (beyond any mandate of customer service professionalism). One may
suggest, that such purpose within certain structures perpetuates degradation. Certainly the fast
food industry is a significant producer of environmental and social degradation. A neoliberal
ideologue might even suggest that the manager and restaurant patrons are complicit in such
degradation (if such degradation were to be acknowledged). I see this as a conflation distinctly
separate processes. The manager clearly works, as we all do, within a problematic structure.
Who is to say that such a positive and genuine person (as the restaurant manager was
described to be) would have more or less influence in any other career? In fact, as illustrated by
the story of the manager’s story and certainly millions of individuals working in service
industries, one can have a profound impact on the others in many careers68. Education certainly
provides opportunity to encourage commitment to prosocial and pro-ecological causes and
there is a strong tradition of such efforts in liberal arts. However, formal education is not the
only way to find meaningful, prosocial or pro-environmental purpose. We need restaurant
managers, gas station attendants, and construction workers, dedicated to a better world
(including ecological and social causes) just as much as we need teachers, academics, and
politicians. We also need to be more consistently collaborating across such professional divides.
We need everyone to engage everywhere.
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Additionally, such direct social interaction is not the only way positive contributions are made to
society. Our entire society rests on the shoulders of those working in service industries. Our lives and
dedication to ‘higher’ purposes are made possible by millions of people who to ensure that we are able to
do things like buy food in the grocery store.
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4.5.1.1

Career vs. calling and higher education
Damon (2009) described a sense of calling as a realistic awareness of one’s own ability,

an interest in how those abilities can be used in service of meeting the needs of one’s
community (at any level from family to planet) and a feeling of enjoyment associated with using
one’s abilities to meet those needs. One’s career and one’s calling can be fully aligned or
entirely independent (potentially even at odds). Furthermore, one’s career is not their entire
life. Education needs to holistically focus on helping people live a good and meaningful life not
just on career preparation. We place too high an emphasis on economic preparation in schools
and by so heavily emphasizing the necessity of college, we derogate those who choose not (or
are unable) to attend college. This belittles the important and necessary work that the majority
of people do which does not require a college education. We need to be working to make it
possible for everyone (who wants to) to attend college without devaluing those who do not
attend college. Furthermore, if we concentrate all those who are purposeful and motivated to
make the world a better place in careers that are most frequently recognized as helping
professions (e.g., medicine, education, and social work) we diminish the reach of social efforts.
We risk losing great and important teachers such as the fast food manager who reach folks that
classroom teachers may not. Many of the teachers who have been influential in my own life
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have been those I encountered in retail, factory, and warehouses jobs that I worked before
attending college69.
4.5.2

Development of purpose
Purpose isn’t just about what someone finds their purpose to be but also why it matters,

why they care, and how they intend to achieve such a goal. Educators must be careful to focus
on and support young people’s own goals rather than our goals for them. Educators cannot
become passive or complacent, though. Instead we should encourage and guide students in the
search for purpose. We need to help students develop and work towards their goals and offer
our opinions, perspectives and direction (how) and help them to clarify their own values and
interests (why). We need to help students explore their interests through volunteer
opportunities with established organizations and through helping them design and implement
their own projects. We should also connect them with positive role models and mentors in the
community who can offer different perspectives, opportunities, and show students what the
work really looks like.
4.5.2.1

Exploration
Although purpose is stable over some period of time, it is subject to change (Damon,

2009). It may be that someone’s purpose is focused on accomplishing a specific goal and upon
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The point is that great educators (or otherwise positively influential people) are found in all facets of life
and that attempts to concentrate such people into specific fields would diminish opportunities for
education. I hope that it is implicit, but I will make explicit the fact that I also recognize and appreciate the
profound and important role of all of the formal educators in my life from elementary school to
community college to graduate school.
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completion they will set a new goal (e.g., raising $1000 for a local food bank) that may or
may not share a general thematic purpose (e.g., fighting hunger). For others purpose may be a
lifelong ambition. Damon (2009) emphasized the long term benefits of a life of purpose, but
shared many stories of how short term, specific goals have led to life-long purpose. Educators
must support students in their efforts to find purpose whether it is through exploration and
short term efforts or more focused guidance in the direction of an already developed interest.
Explorations and short term efforts should be encouraged and reflected on in order to
determine whether and how the student might explore that cause further or investigate a
different interest.
Even when students become engaged with a particular pursuit, we must remain open
and sympathetic to the fact that interests, passions, and purpose are not static and may shift.
We need to help students stay on track to a certain extent but be prepared and willing to
explore new directions with students. We should encourage and support students not to give up
when they encounter barriers or abandon a cause when an initial surge of passion wanes in
pursuit of some fleeting interest. However, even fleeting interests are worthy of exploration and
through such exploration students may discover deeper interests or common themes among
their interests and develop or clarify their sense of purpose. Additionally, this is not to suggest
that we should expect every student at any grade level to discover profound long term purpose
– that is a lifelong pursuit. Our aim should be to help students on to a path to purpose and help
them develop tools to discover and develop it.
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As Damon (2009) suggested, educators must “listen carefully for the spark and then
fan the flames.” We must allow students to discover their own sense of purpose while
supporting them in the process. What is inadmissible is for educators to take students’ power
from them by too eagerly grabbing the wheel in attempt to support their efforts. The balance is
one between showing support by being involved, attentive, and engaged and becoming
domineering through the same behaviors (Damon, 2009). Continuing Damon’s (2009) metaphor,
we must be very carefully that we don’t smother the spark in our effort to support students.
One way that we extinguish the flame is by focusing too heavily on achievement. Achievement is
not equal to purpose. Damon (2009) suggested that it is not the achievement that is a source of
joy but the long and sustained effort towards a meaningful aim. Achievements are little more
than checkpoints along the way and dedicating oneself to a purpose is about more than
personal achievement. Such economic goals of personal achievement often emphasized in
schools are short sighted and unconducive to deep contemplation of meaningful lifelong
purpose (Damon, 2009). In fact, by suggesting that such purposeful or purpose building efforts
as community service primarily serve the student as a measure of academic (or extracurricular)
achievement and as a means for economic (or other personal) success (e.g., getting into college)
we undermine the true benefits of service. Such extrinsic motivation may sap intrinsic
motivation. By shifting a young person’s budding sense of duty from a truly altruistic effort into
a discrete, one-time effort, focused on their personal gain, we rob them of what may develop
into a lifelong source of meaning and fulfillment.
4.5.2.2

Supporting purpose
As explored by Jackson (1993) everything that we say and do (or don’t say and don’t do)

around young people matters. Students often don’t realize how deeply educators care about
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them and their success and teachers should explicitly discuss their own sense of passion,
pride, and purpose in teaching70 (Damon, 2009). By sharing our purpose, we build the studentteacher relationship, support our students, and inspire their own senses of purpose. However,
supporting kids on a path to purpose is more than uncritically or disingenuously encouraging
them. Students know (even if not explicitly) when adults in their lives do not genuinely believe in
them and support them. We can’t idly promise that they’ll achieve all of their hopes and dreams
(cf. Duncan-Andrade, 2009 on hokey hope and mythical hope). We have to genuinely know that
students can accomplish their dreams while at the same time being honest and critical with
them and avoiding meaningless platitudes.
The nature of the relationship between teacher and student significantly affects
performance. Even measures of IQ, which are largely considered to be static have been long
known to vary according to the effect of the demeanor of the examiner on the emotional state
of the test subject. Subjects who are treated more warmly by the examiner or have a previous
relationship with the examiner score higher on IQ tests71 (Sacks, 1952). Sacks (1952) also
discussed a 1936 study finding that African American children scored lower when tested by
white examiners than when tested by African American examiners and that the opposite was
true for white children.

70

One who cannot genuinely express such a sentiment may need to reassess their own sense of purpose
as an educator.
71
Although this example is intended to highlight the importance of the student teacher relationship, other
considerations of education bias on intelligence tests and cultural bias on standardized tests shouldn’t be
ignored.
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Teachers expectations for a student become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Rosenthal &
Jacobson, 1968). Rosenthal (1968) informed teachers that certain randomly selected students
were ‘growth spurters’ who were expected to be more successful in class based on a fictitious
Harvard Test of Inflected Acquisition. Those students displayed greater intellectual growth than
the control students (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). The implications and validity of this study
are hotly debated, however, it importantly raises the issue that despite our intentions, our
expectations of our students almost certainly influence them. Rosenthal (1987) summarized the
implications of this research by saying,
When our children were in school we didn't want them taught by teachers who
"knew" they couldn't learn. Now that our children are grown, we don't want our
grandchildren taught by teachers who "know" they can't learn. Sometimes
assigning some Bayesian priors seems simply prudent.
(Rosenthal, 1987)
Rosenthal (1987) is suggesting that even if one challenges the statistical validity of the finding,
we accept that teacher expectations have some subjective or uncertain but certainly
undesirable influence on students.
Damon (2009) described how low expectations can become developmentally formative.
For example, when a dream is deferred, one may interpret it as a personal failure which could
lead to feelings of inadequacy that may influence one to defer or decline future dreams and
ultimately result in hopelessness and self-defeat (Damon, 2009). It boils down to the old cliché,
whether you think you can, or think you can’t, you’re right. Educators have a significant
opportunity to positively intervene in this cycle. We have to maintain high expectations for our
students and encourage them to have high expectations of themselves. Instead of deferring
dreams, lowering expectations, and losing hope, we should encourage students to follow the
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wise mantra of The Little Engine That Could which has propelled me to the top of many
mountains: “I think I can. I think I can. I think I can… I thought I could.”
4.5.2.3

Critical hope
“Children can survive – and thrive- in the hardest of circumstances. The children most

likely to thrive are those who move towards positive goals without letting hardships deter
them” (Damon, 2009, p. 171). As educators, we must help students avoid catastrophic thinking,
defeatism, panic and blame. We must focus instead on what control we do have. We need to
help students gain the confidence to change the world (even in the smallest of ways).
The concept of critical hope as introduced in section 1.1 Positive Approach (p.15) is a
composition of two distinct processes: (1) “critical social analysis of inequities and actions taken
to achieve greater social justice” and (2) “a sense of personal efficacy or perceived capacity to
effect change” (Christens et al., 2013). The goal is to achieve both.
The achievement of critical consciousness … requires people to attain an
understanding of structural and historical forces that impinge on and constrain
collective action for social justice, yet to simultaneously maintain their hope
that—despite these forces—their own participation in justice-focused action
can be effective. (Christens et al., 2013)
Christens et al. (2013) identified four clusters of students based on the relation between their
social critique and sense of hope and efficacy: critical and hopeful, critical and alienated,
uncritical and hopeful, and uncritical and alienated. The conceptualization of these four clusters
may offer some insight useful to our teaching practice. As mentioned in the introduction of this
thesis, it is likely (but contested) that humans are more motivated by a greater emphasis on
positive solutions than identifying problems. However, differential emphasis on problems and
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solutions may be effective based on one’s assessment of a student in consideration of the
four clusters.
Positive psychology is important for everyone, and a balance must be maintained. In
order for youth to find purpose they must be encouraged to think positively in order to believe
that they could have any effect towards their purpose. However, it seems likely that those who
are critical and alienated would benefit from a greater focus on positive solutions and less focus
on identifying problems. But a different understanding of the problems may be more conducive
to hope. While those who are extremely hopeful but uncritical may need to focus more heavily
on critique in order to direct their hope toward solving real problems.
4.5.3

Positive youth development
Beyond positive expectations and critical hope we need to broadly consider the way

children are viewed in Western society. Damon (2009) suggested that we have a “tendency to
perceive children as fragile and inept creatures, who need constant protection from the
ordinary challenges of everyday living” (p.170). Damon (2009) suggested that “it is one thing to
warn children about dangers of the playing in traffic, and another thing entirely to prohibit
activities that, in all but freak incidents lead to little more than bumps and bruises" and asked,
“what kinds of messages are such prohibitions sending to children about what they are able to
handle” (p.169).
As already explored (4.3.3.2 A case for educational action p.212) young people, “if given
the opportunity, can become … active participants, and powerful agents of social change”
(Nygreen et al., 2006, p. 108). Therefore we shouldn’t infantilize children by protecting them
from failure or from unpleasant realities, preventing them from taking risks, or declining to
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assign them responsibilities. Because if we fail to treat young people as capable human
beings, we engage in the self-fulfilling prophecies that Rosenthal (1968) identified.
The positive youth development approach embraces risk and opportunity and
emphasizes the manifestation of the youth’s assets and potential over their (externally and
internally) perceived deficits (Damon, 2009). “The positive youth approach aims at
understanding, educating, and engaging children in productive activities rather than correcting,
curing, or treating them for maladaptive tendencies or so called disabilities” (Damon, 2009,
p.168). In accordance with such an approach, opportunities need to be facilitated in such a way
that youth are inspired to become involved and initiate their own projects with an authentic
sense of purpose rather than pushed into predetermined activities. Positive youth development
mandates youth-led participatory action research. Thus, pedagogy of restoration comes full
circle. Moral education and the three elements of pedagogy of restoration (pedagogy of basic
needs, pedagogy of identity and pedagogy of purpose) complement and reinforce one another. I
have proposed that it has to start with meeting basic needs, but beyond that restoration is not a
linear process. We find purpose in meeting our basic needs, we develop our identity in seeking
purpose, etc.
Finally, purpose is not a strictly individualistic concept. It has been primarily explored as
such because pedagogy of restoration has been primarily conceptualized as an approach
focused on the whole child. However, the section began with Kurt Hahn’s (1960) speech as an
illustration that purpose is often about being part of something larger. In fact, just as suggested
in pedagogy of identity that we can form new group identities without sacrificing individual
identities, we can forge group purposes that may be composed of many differing individual
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senses of purpose. Although I reject Hahn’s (1960) thesis of a moral equivalent to war, he
was correct in identifying the value of finding a common cause and devoting oneself to it
entirely. We do occasionally see this when as communities respond to natural disasters. As
climate change becomes a more salient and life threatening issue in a greater portion of the
world, my hope is that rather than chaos we will pull together for the common cause of
sustaining life on Earth.
4.6

Tie back to EE
When we honor the hidden aquifer that feeds human knowing, we are more
likely to develop capacity for awe, wonder, and humility that deepens rather
than diminishes our knowledge. (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010, p. 22)

This section reconnects with the introduction of this work proposing that the project of
restoration is, in fact, a restoration of EE, congruent with its historic dictate (i.e., Belgrade
Charter and Tbilisi Declaration). Throughout this work I have focused on the broad process of
education maintained that all education is environmental education. However, in this section I
examine the specific field of environmental education. I begin by exploring a few significant
themes in EE which can and should inform traditional education and the project of restoration.
In the end of this section I make recommendations to the field of EE informed by pedagogy of
restoration.
4.6.1

Beauty and wonder
Our consciousness must be neither poetry nor science, but a transcendence of
both into a new realm of theory and practice, an artfulness that combines fancy
with reason, imagination with logic, vision with technique. (Bookchin, 1982,
p.20)
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We need bread but we need roses, too. All too often, it seems that bread and roses
are assigned to different disciplines. Environmental education, more than traditional education,
maintains an emphasis on esthetic. Rachel Carson and more recently David Sobel (both
following a long tradition of nature writers) emphasize a connection to nature rooted in
something deeper than understanding. Both Carson and Sobel have sought to foster a sense of
wonder that is not explicit to pristine wilderness, but experienced in one’s own community. In
my interpretation this approach is fundamentally one where love for life encourages wonder
fuels their imagination. Certainly educators in all fields should help students experience nature
and wonder, but wonder and nature are everywhere.
I’ll share a brief story about how I came to love chemistry. I’ve always been intimidated
by chemistry. I never learned it in high school and in college, even at the introductory level; I
was utterly lost within the first week of class. In fact, in high school, community college and
university I have enrolled in chemistry classes and quit within a week or two. That all changed
because of one wonderful/wondrous chemistry professor. In this course, we distilled brandy
from wine, generated electricity through chemical reactions, and made explosives. The
professor seemed, at all times (and especially in the lab) to be grinning and barely able to
control their laughter. In fact, my lab partner and I once boiled over a beaker of who-knowswhat onto a hot-plate and filled the lab with terrible fumes. The entire lab had to evacuate and
our professor laughed and laughed, and never showed any sign of anger or frustration.
It was not this single experience, but the consistent demeanor of my professor that
shifted my perception of chemistry from a discipline of strict rules that I was intimidated by, to a
vast source of wonder, curiosity and excitement. Furthermore, I was no longer terrified of
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making a mistake. One time I overheard this professor say to a colleague, “it’s still magic,
isn’t it?” It has always stuck with me that an experienced chemist with such expansive
knowledge of chemistry still felt a sense of wonder even when overseeing mundane lab
exercises. I think that is clearly the secret of education. If we maintain our own sense of wonder
and love of knowledge, we inspire it in students.
The best lessons that I have shared have always been in situations where I was not
formally the teacher, but a student or friend, and always as an equal. Such lessons have taken
place when a learner has displayed an interest or started making inquiries about a particular
topic (that I happen to be passionate about) on their own. I’ve found my role is more often to
quietly watch and support a student while they share their wonder and explain their discovery.
Sometimes I may ask leading questions or provide some additional information and based on
their interests and suggest related areas of exploration that may be of interest. However, I don’t
want to demystify the world. I don’t want to diminish the magic of learning to satisfy my own
joy of teaching. Sometimes explicit knowledge can be a barrier to tacit knowledge whether that
knowledge is about the natural environment or part of a moral induction.
I’ve often made the mistake of so enthusiastically sharing my explicit knowledge about a
particular plant, rock, or animal a child is observing that their own process of inquiry and sense
of wonder are diminished. I consider this to be selfish teaching. Selfish teaching satisfies the
educator’s love of teaching at the expense of the student’s passion for learning. I’ve frequently
made the mistake of approaching a young person showing interest in a rock launching into a
lecture on that particular rock (e.g., “This rock is called granite, it formed deep below the earth’s
surface as magma cooled and hardened. All of the different colored specs are called minerals
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and the slower the rock cools the larger they can grow… and on I go). In these cases, I
generally talk until the kid loses interest and moves on to something else, probably not daring to
let me catch them pick up another rock. A quartz crystal can be a magical, valuable treasure if
there’s not a geologist around to spoil it (not that we inevitably spoil it). When we are so quick
to name, define, and discipline knowledge, we destroy wonder. The joy of learning is in feeling
wonder, making inquiries, and creating meaning.
The natural sense of wonder experienced in nature may be the most powerful and
meaningful element of environmental education. Both in nature and in the classroom sharing
our sense of wonder and helping students explore their own is important. Whether in nature or
a classroom we should attend to the lessons that are naturally present and waiting to be
learned. We often refer to such lessons as teachable moments, but I think they’d more aptly be
called natural lessons. A mentor once said to me that as environmental educators, we are not
the teachers. The Western Red Cedar, the Sword Fern, the deer, and all the other plants and
animals are natural teachers. Our only job is to help students meet them and learn their lessons.
Certainly this is an underemphasized way of learning that relates to all of education. Certainly
such natural lessons are present in the classroom as well as in nature.
4.6.2

Systems approach and specific ecological knowledge
EE generally emphasizes a holistic and systems thinking approach to the natural

environment compared to the emphasis in fields like biology on a narrow segment of the natural
world. The sort of molecular and atomic thinking which is often prevalent in scientific research
must be integrated with a broader, holistic and observational understanding of ecosystems. This
is illustrated by recent developments in wilderness management efforts tending towards
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adaptive management practices in consideration of trophic cascades (Eisenberg, 2011). The
adaptive management approach relies on both scientific knowledge and careful observation of
ecosystems with a focus on the interdependence of diverse species and abiotic elements72.
In environmental education, we generally emphasize the basic ecological knowledge
necessary to understand the natural world as a system of interdependent processes. The
systems approach facilitates both explicit knowledge and tacit understanding that ecosystems
are interconnected and important and likely motivates to a greater degree than specific
ecological knowledge does. A key application of the moral research is that some specific
ecological knowledge is beneficial to building environmental ethics, but it’s probably not the
most significant motivator for pro-environmental behavior. Environmental education programs
generally do aim to facilitate experiences beyond the basic ecology lessons of their curricula
focused on helping students connect with and grow to love the natural environment. However,
environmental education must extend its systems thinking approach to more significantly
include the ecosystems and social-systems students live in.
4.6.3

Sense of Place
Sense of place is not exclusive to environmental education, however environmental

education places a high emphasis on sense of place which may inform other educational
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Indigenous peoples in America have understood and practiced their own form of adaptive management
for thousands of years. However, management may not be the most appropriate term for the relationship
between the Indigenous peoples and the land. Native peoples didn’t make the same distinction as
Europeans between wild and domestic. Nevertheless, there was likely no wild/unmanaged land in what is
not US by the time European settlers arrived. (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014).
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practice. Here, I explore what sense of place is, how it motivates people, and how sense of
place may develop. Finally, I suggest that EE should avoid a greater emphasis on the value of
natural places (i.e., pristine nature) than the places where participants live.
4.6.3.1

Definitions
Sense of place can be conceptualized as a composition of our attachment to place and

the meaning we associate with place. Place attachment refers to our emotional connection to
place and relates to our dependence on place and the relationship between identity and place
(Kudryavtsev, Stedman, & Krasny, 2011). We may depend on a place as a setting for certain
activities or as a means or as a means of survival. We may identify with place such that a specific
place becomes part of our self-concept. The meaning that we associate with place “is a
multidimensional construct and may reflect an individual’s environment, social interactions,
culture, politics, economics, and esthetic perspectives,… a mix of reinforcing or contradictory
personal experiences, … as well as history of places” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 238).
Individuals construct their own meanings of place and such meanings differ among individuals
and peoples inhabiting the same place.
As an illustration, one person may think of the Bronx in New York City as the
birthplace of hip-hop culture, low-income housing projects, and his [sic] close
friends, while another person may hold different place meanings for the Bronx
such as her73 [sic] community garden, the wildlife in waterways, environmental
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See footnote 47 on page 224 for a discussion on use of alternating pronouns. Here, I will simply raise
the question: What implications is this quote making about gender roles and social expectations of
women, men, and non-binary or trans gender identities?
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injustice, and her community-based organization. (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p.
232)
Attachments to and meaning of place are not always positive and aspects of place may
conflict with one’s self conception or their ability to meet their needs. For example, “collective
memories of slavery and sharecropping may negatively influence African Americans’ place
attachment to wildland recreation areas … and parks” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 238).
Similarly, many Indigenous peoples’ sense of place reflects deep meaning of and affiliation with
place central to their identity and culture. However, the recent history of colonization of
America and attempted genocide of Indigenous peoples (cf. Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014) likely
influences Indigenous peoples’ place affiliation and meaning. Immigrant, refugee, and diasporic
peoples may also experience significant conflict regarding sense of place. The bilingual children’s
book Recuerdo mis raíces y vivo mis tradiciones / Remembering My Roots and Living My
Traditions (a fantastic result of a youth-led participatory action research project (Nygreen et al.,
2006)) discussed the experience of youth who have homes in US and in Mexico. In the end of
the story, a child reflects on leaving their family’s rancho in Mexico to return to US and says to
their sibling: “you were crying and saying, ‘I don’t want to go, but I don’t want to stay’” (TNL,
2003, p. 26). The lesson is that we have meaningful and conflicted connections to place and
sometimes to many places, Similarly, sense of place among other diasporic and Indigenous
peoples
4.6.3.2

Fostering sense of place
Numerous studies have correlated sense of place and pro-environmental behavior

related to preservation and stewardship in valued environments, and cleanup in response to
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human caused environmental problems such as oil spills (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011). Thus
fostering a sense of place is likely to be conducive to pro-environmental behavior.
Fostering place attachment
“Place attachment can be developed through both (1) direct experiences with places,
especially long-term, frequent, and positive experiences and (2) learning about places from
indirect sources rather than direct contact”(Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 236). In the first case,
active engagement with a place tends to increase one’s attachment. All of our experiences take
place in place. Everything from visiting a national park to an urban city park or community
garden contributes to our sense of place. Additionally, our experiences with place include our
diet, daily life in cities, and cultural events. Actively engaging with place refers to not passively
experiencing place by observing it but interacting and manipulating place. In cities, actively
engaging with place could include activities such as participating in (rather than observing)
cultural events, planting gardens, and social interactions. In nature (including urban natural
areas), actively engaging means getting off the trail, building forts, digging holes, swimming,
building fires, feeling, smelling, and tasting the environment, and generally poking around. Such
experiences both include and encourage service in natural and urban places ranging from
stewardship of natural environments to community service in urban environments.
Our attachment to place is related to the way we experience place. For example, those
who frequently visited an urban park feel a greater attachment to the specific park than
volunteers engaged in stewardship of an urban park who are more likely to generally feel
attached to the ecosystem that the park represents (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011). Additionally,
among ‘environmentalists’ attachment to place is often associate with childhood experience
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related to “a sense of security, the ability to influence the environment, and the opportunity
to be a functional community member” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 237). Social interactions,
experiences with animals, and esthetic preference also contribute to one’s attachment to place.
Finally, individuals may develop a sense of place for somewhere they have never been through
study. For example geology students who actively studied the Grand Canyon showed some
attachment to that place despite having never been there. But, their sense of place was
generally weaker than students who had visited the Grand Canyon (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011).
Fostering place meaning
Similarly to the two primary mechanisms by which we attach with place, there are two
processes by which we assign meaning to place:“ (1) creating place meanings through first-hand
experiences in places and (2) learning place meanings from written, oral, and other sources,
including communication with other people” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 237). The meaning we
make of place is related to the structure of our experiences and social activities.
Experiencing unique attributes of places –including geographical features such
as rivers and lakes as well as cultural attractions– may facilitate the creation of
particular place meanings … In this case the physical environment, although not
deterministic of meanings, sets bounds for the possible experiences and place
meanings … For example, through experiencing an urban place it may be
possible to create such place meanings as ‘concrete jungle’ or ‘well-maintained
public parks,’ but less likely ‘wilderness’ or ‘native landscapes.’ (Kudryavtsev et
al., 2011, p. 237)
Additionally, the frequency and variety of our experiences, pivotal moments, and feeling of
safety influence the meaning we make of places. We may also develop meaning of local places
through experiences away from those settings.
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The meanings we associate with place is also socially constructed. Place meaning is
“created, cultivated, and modified not only through direct place-based experiences but also by
such means as stories, myths, literature, promotional materials, folklore, paintings, music, films,
history, casual conversations, and memory” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 238). Thus, narratives
and conversations with others actively shape our perceptions of place. Such narratives may even
be more influential than our direct experiences with place (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011). Finally, the
meanings of place likely evolve over time. “For example, young people may directly experience
places yet take them for granted and realize their unique ecological meanings only when they
grow up” (Kudryavtsev et al., 2011, p. 238).
4.6.3.3

Environmental education and valuing places
Environmental education is quite influential in the process of developing senses of place

and has significant opportunity to shape both participant’s attachment to place and their
meaning of place. These are certainly positive qualities of EE and education more broadly should
put greater emphasis and attention towards developing sense of place with students. However,
certain practices in EE related to developing a sense of place certainly have room to grow.
Maybe, especially relating the narratives (overt or implicit) related to the value of ‘pristine’
natural areas such as National Parks and Wilderness. We have to work to avoid contributing to a
greater value of pristine nature than the places kids are already attached to and engaged with
including: neighborhoods, back yards, city parks, and school grounds.
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This is not to say that we should not facilitate experiences in remote or distant
locations. Experiences in other environments and ecosystems, beyond one’s own community,
such as timber-lands, agricultural areas, and even sewage treatment plants74 also contribute to a
broader understanding of place. Certainly we should also facilitate experiences in the most
pristine natural environments available. As Kahn (1999) pointed out, the environment where we
grow up influences our baseline concept of nature and each generation’s baseline lowers as
natural environments are degraded. It is important, then, for young people to experience our
exemplary natural areas such as Natural Parks. In all cases, we should critically engage with
students in discussions about land management. Additionally, as mentioned above, experiences
away from those places can be important and formative for meaning related to children’s sense
of place in their own community. However, environmental education programs that take place
in such remote or ‘pristine’ locations must actively work to connect with and value children’s
own experience and continue in children’s own communities.
Environmental education can and should take place in urban environments and city
parks. Although urban areas are ecologically degraded, every environment on Earth is degraded,
and we can’t value space only in terms of the myth of pristine nature. Such a fallacy implies that
any perfect environment would be ruined simply by being observed by a human. We have to
recognize that a walk in an urban park can be a really huge adventure for kids if we don’t let our
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Sewage treatment facilities represent fantastically unique ecosystems. Additionally, one of my
community college environmental science professors used to say that every citizen should know where
their community’s resources come from (e.g., water, food, electricity) and where their waste goes (e.g.,
landfills, sewage treatment). These are important elements of human eco-systems.
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stubborn arrogance prevent it from being. By dismissing or overlooking children’s own
narrative related to wildness, we detract from the meaning of their experience. We must truly
be with them and understanding that they are experiencing the situation significantly differently
than we may have planned and attempt to support their experience rather enforce our own
narrative. Whether in a national park or urban city park, we must avoid establishing a hierarchy
of place where local parks and communities are lesser than the places many environmental
educators live and work.
I think a story may best illustrate this point. I was recently bird watching at Deception
Pass State Park in Washington and met a family from New York City. One might suggest that
Deception Pass is ‘better’ than New York City for bird watching or generally observing and
connecting with nature. However after a brief conversation, the child was obviously
unimpressed and bored with the list of species I’d seen and said, “you should see the Peregrine
Falcons dive from the Empire State Building.” Their eyes lit up with their sense of excitement
and wonder and they commenced to rattle off what was presumably every fact that they knew
about falcons. The story serves as a reminder that urban environments are rich with both
natural and cultural experience and that connection with the natural world isn’t about names of
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species and measures of biodiversity, it is about wonder and excitement for the natural
world75. Environmental Educators only have to be open to the value of such environments and
adjust their narrative of nature. We can’t fake it either. We can’t secretly think that our ‘pristine’
nature is better. We have to know that such environments are not lesser and feel the same
wonder for the nature in urban environments as the nature in National Parks.
4.6.3.4

Place, value, and service learning
I recently attended a service learning project where we made improvements to a

campground. None of the kids (of those who I was able to ask) had ever camped there. The only
kids who had been there before (of those I asked) had been there the previous year to make
improvements to the campground. A political representative attended to observe the program
and had the audacity to proclaim how great it was to see ‘at-risk’ youth engaged in community
service efforts. These kids were indeed ‘at-risk.’ At the time they were at risk of two things: (1)
learning that community service is nothing more than free labor for the benefit of others and,
(2) being derogated by the assumptions of some politician who didn’t bother to get to know
them for the sake of political posturing. However, these kids do struggle and cope with things
that I don’t think they deserve to struggle with despite their resilience. Part of that struggle is
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I do not mean to suggest that conservation and preservation efforts are unnecessary since one can
observe nature in urban environments. Instead, the underlying assumption is that helping people value
and connect with local environments would encourage a broader concern for the natural world, especially
when paired with basic ecological knowledge. If one grows to love Peregrine Falcons in New York City and
learns about the species migration pattern and how DDT historically endangered the falcons, they may
become passionate about preservation and conservation efforts.
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how frequently adults both openly and covertly hold low expectations them, see them as
‘at-risk,’ disadvantaged, and hopeless.
We cannot expect those who society has systematically silenced to raise their voice for
the issues that those who have silenced them define to be important. This is where many
service learning efforts fail. Service needs to start in kids own communities and address needs
that kids recognize. Otherwise, the meaning of service is lost and the efforts reduce to little
more than free labor. The joy of service is in the meaning and sense of purpose found in
identifying a need and addressing it. The kids did potentially learn that working outside can be
fun and about possibilities for future careers, however, I suspect few felt like they had solved a
problem or that they would see any of the benefits of their hard work (e.g., camping there).
When we view people and places as lesser, disabled, and irreversibly degraded, we
undermine our intentions to inspire folks to become actively engaged in purposeful pursuits. If
the environments to be protected are ‘other environments’ and not their own, then
conservation-preservation is for the benefit privileged others who get to live in National Parks,
but not for the communities that they live in.
We certainly advocate a symbolic association with public lands (e.g., the National Parks
belong to everyone). In the case of the service project, most of us opted to work for a couple
hours and spend the rest of the day enjoying nature, making art, and playing in the lake. This
was a marvelous success because at least for the afternoon public land was more than
symbolically theirs. However, much of the public lands in US are no more accessible for folks in
economic poverty than private attractions such as Disney Land.

271
Service learning must be focused on the potential that each space offers and the
value that it already represents. Pristine nature does not exist and it never has ever existed.
Certainly our consumption and exploitation of natural resources has gotten extreme, but we’ve
rarely, if ever, intentionally left nature untrammeled. I don’t think we should frame
environmental issues as protecting nature from humans, but as an effort to teach ourselves how
to constructively interact with the rest of life. Neither can we frame social justice as strictly
focused on protecting the vulnerable. We need to focus on the assets that peoples vulnerable to
oppression have and ending the systems of oppression that render them vulnerable and
targeted.
4.6.4

Restorative experiences in nature
Any effort to get people outside and enjoying nature, whether in urban parks or more

remote and ‘pristine’ environments, may have intrinsic value beyond the experience. Certainly
this is an assumption that EE rests on. One such intrinsic benefit of spending time in nature is
that it may uniquely benefit our health and well-being. Attention Restoration Theory (ART)
suggests
interacting with environments rich with inherently fascinating stimuli (e.g.,
sunsets) invoke involuntary attention modestly, allowing directed-attention
mechanisms a chance to replenish (Kaplan, 1995). That is, the requirement for
directed attention in such environments is minimized, and attention is typically
captured in a bottom-up fashion by features of the environment itself. So, the
logic is that, after an interaction with natural environments, one is able to
perform better on tasks that depend on directed-attention abilities. Unlike
natural environments, urban environments contain bottom-up stimulation (e.g.,
car horns) that captures attention dramatically and additionally requires
directed attention to overcome that stimulation (e.g., avoiding traffic, ignoring
advertising, etc.), making urban environments less restorative.”(M. G. Berman,
Jonides, & Kaplan, 2008, p. 1207)
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It is the environment’s capacity to attract involuntary attention softly while at the same time
reducing the hard capturing of voluntary or direct attention that makes it restorative (Kaplan &
Berman, 2010).
Natural environments, such as parks, gardens, and lakefronts are restorative (Kaplan &
Berman, 2010). They provide the necessary balance of stimulation and ability to let one’s mind
wonder with little that requires immediate direct attention. However, it is not strictly the
qualities of an environment that make it restorative, it must be compatible with one’s own
interest and experience.
Thus, if one is in a hurry to get home before it rains, an otherwise lovely creek
that stands in the way of the route home would fail the compatibility test. It also
helps if the environment appears to be large enough to permit one to explore it
or at least imagine exploring it. Thus, a single potted plant would fail the
requirement for extent. And finally, a store filled with flowering plants would
not meet the requirement for ‘‘being away’’ if it looks just like the workplace
one is seeking a break from.”(Kaplan & Berman, 2010, p. 49)
However, if the experience is compatible and one is not distracted by other stressors, time in
nature has restorative capacity. Berman et al. (2008) observed that attention and memory
improved when students took a walk in a peaceful arboretum (compared with a walk on city
streets). They additionally found that looking at pictures of nature had restorative affects.
Patients wellbeing and recovery time in hospitals also improves when their rooms overlook
natural settings or display images of nature (Ulrich, 1993).
It does seem that the ‘quality’ or ‘authenticity’ of nature do influence its restorative
capacity (as far as stress-reduction) despite the fact that images of nature have been found to
be restorative. Peter H Kahn et al. (2008) found that recovery rates from low-stress situations
(measured by heart rate) decreased when participants were able to view a natural setting
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through a window and that the benefit increased the longer they looked. However, using
plasma screen televisions, they displayed nearly identical live footage of nature and observed no
more benefit to recovery rates than a blank wall. Increased time viewing the television did not
improve recovery rates. Thus, time in or observing authentic natural environments is important.
However, Kahn (1999) suggested that “people may take the natural environment they
encounter during childhood as the norm” (Peter H. Kahn, 1999, p.2). Thus, the restorative
capacity of an environment may relate to our own expectations and values of nature.
Environmental educators seem to be intrinsically aware of the restorative quality of
nature and EE programs often facilitate experiences such as sit spots and silent hikes that draw
on the restorative properties of nature. This is a practice that can and should inform education
more generally. Whether in urban city parks, back yards, gardens, or school grounds, time in
nature is an excellent way to recover from stress and fatigue. When one experiences such
restorative effects of nature it gives them reason to value natural areas and feel a sense of
connection to the earth.
4.6.5

Conclusion
Environmentalism, environmental justice and social justice movements all grew in large

part out of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 70s (Anguiano et al., 2012). I have argued
throughout that the needs of humanity and the needs of the planet are and must be singularly
considered. However, I firmly believe in a world where many worlds fit. What I consider vital is
that everyone finds their own passion and purpose and engages in their own way. I do not
believe we will ever eliminate conflict and as I have suggested, when resolved constructively, it
is an important source of growth. For that reason, it is important, for example, that
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environmental justice activists keep environmentalists in check and vice versa. Through the
resolution of conflicting interests, we work towards a greater good as parts of a whole in an
effort for restoration. In the following section I propose an epistemology of restoration as a
reaffirmation of the congruence of such efforts with respect for other ways of knowing.

Conclusion
It is necessary to go beyond rebellious attitudes to a more radically critical and
evolutionary position, which is in fact a position not simply of denouncing
injustice but of announcing a new utopia. Transformation of the world implies a
dialectic between two actions: denouncing the process of dehumanization and
announcing the dream of a new society. (Freire, 1998, p. 74)
I found it imperative that I begin and end this project in a very personal way in order to
communicate that this is not my thesis, this is myself. This work is imperfect because it is
personal and in a sense it is little more than an exhaustively documented glimpse of the current
stage in my own continuing development. I want to conclude by discussing the limitations of this
work in an open way and in my own voice. Given the limitations and the incompleteness of this
document, I reflect on the process I’ve been immersed in and conclude that the process has
been valuable, but that I need to put what I’ve learned to work in a practical setting.
Limitations
This project was never value-neutral. From the beginning, I have sought understanding
entirely for the sake of action. I have been guided by my own sense of morality and my own
vision of utopia. Thus, my investigation was hugely influenced by my own preconceptions and
intuitions; confirmation bias is undeniably present in this work. With that in mind, I started with
the conclusion that social and ecological degradation exist as part of a single process and sought
understanding surrounding that conclusion.
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The lack of neutrality is deeper than confirmation bias, though. Much of the topics
of this work are deeply related to my most fundamental beliefs about life. I’ve always prided
myself as an extremely rational person, but throughout this process I’ve both discovered and
developed a certain faith in life that exists beyond rationality or empiricism. I believe that there
is a greater potential for life on Earth than is currently or has ever been realized. This is not an
unwavering and uncompromisingly belief; it is something that I struggle to know because I need
to know it. I wouldn’t know how to live in the world that is without faith in the world that can
be. Throughout this paper and throughout my life I have been consumed with a struggled to
believe that humans are good. At the outset of this paper, I adopted a positive approach and
simply refused to deviate from a position that humans are good. This bias surfaces most
obviously in my considerations of moral relativism and outlying behavior. I will say that on both
the topics of relativism and antisocial behavior my own beliefs and understanding have
significantly developed. But I maintain, more than ever, that people are good.
Finally, I am well aware that the thread of my thinking may be difficult to follow. I felt
very strongly that the understanding I sought could not possibly be found within a single
discipline, nor could it be strictly empirically or even academically explored. Thus, I’ve
investigated in lots of directions in disciplines ranging history to Hip Hop. I can only suggest that
I think I’ve found several pieces to a puzzle that I haven’t entirely solved; some of the pieces
might be not fit together and some might not even belong to this puzzle, but I feel like I can just
barely make out the picture.
A Demand for action
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As I have written this thesis, others have fought and died for the ideals that I
tentatively defend only with words. A Zapatista educator, known as Galeano, was murdered by
paramilitaries on May 1, 2014, for practicing the closest present day manifestation I am aware
of the ideals that I have discussed. In fact, I was in the library taking a break from reading one of
Freire’s books when I read the news. That day, I said to a friend that if I had any guts at all I
would quit graduate school and head down to Mexico. My thought was that if nothing else the
presence of a US American witness may reduce aggression. In my less dramatic moments, I have
often thought that my time volunteering at after school programs has been the most
meaningful part of graduate school. At the same time, I have a constant feeling that I could
spend my entire life in the library seeking a greater understanding of life.
Because our library is … effectively infinite- no one person can ever read more
than a tiny fraction- we face the paradox of abundance: Quantity undermines
the quality of our engagement. With such a vast and wonderful library spread
out before us, we often skim books or read just the reviews. We might already
have encountered the Greatest Idea, the insight that would have transformed
us had we savored it, taken it to heart, and worked it into our lives. (Haidt, 2006,
p. ix)
I have had to ask myself, at what point does more knowledge and more understanding offer
diminishing returns towards solving our problems? How much of my acquired knowledge simply
put a name to something that I already felt, or empirically proven what I knew from life
experience? How much evidence is necessary to make an effective argument that humans need
to treat each other and the planet better? What did I already know, but fail to deeply
contemplate? What have I failed to savor by devouring so much?
While I doubt I will ever be able to put the books down, I recognize that the time has
come for action. It may be that through further academic investigation, I could extend my
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understanding and communicate it more clearly. However, this has never been about the
writing. I do hope that this work may inform or inspire other educators, but my goal was always
to inform and inspire my own action. At this point, I am satisfied with my experience researching
and writing this thesis. In fact, I expect to continue occasionally writing and revising this
document as I continue my learning process in the real world. But I know, as much as I know
anything that I’ve learned through this process, that it is time to take a pause from studying
change to go out in the world and do it.
The Unfulfilled Promise
The historic foundation of America is filled with atrocity from colonization to the genocide
of Indigenous peoples and slavery and we need to face history and our roles in history as a
continuing process. We have to do so in order to collectively heal and begin to fulfil the promise
of our idealized foundation: liberty and justice for all. The Statue of Liberty is the personification
of America. She stands over our Eastern border as a symbol of welcome, a beacon of freedom,
and a promise of protection from imperialism. The poem inscribed on the statue, and
memorized by many young Americans says:
Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.
"Keep ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she
With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!” (Lazarus, 1903)
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This was a promise that was largely fulfilled for my family and so many European immigrants,
who entered United States through Ellis Island, but it is disgracefully unfulfilled for many
longtime residents and recent immigrants. What welcome do those entering United States on
the Mexican border receive? What New Colossus awaits them?
Aside from some insight on how and why we’ve failed to deliver on our promise and
what an effort to reach it might look like, I haven’t said much that Lazaus (1903) didn’t cover in
those fourteen beautiful lines of positive psychology. Lazarus didn’t focus on the American
reality but the American potential. With equal parts rage and hope, I have tried to do the same
in this work. I want to end by sharing one of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s final speeches before his
assassination in 1968 as he organized the Poor People’s Campaign:
In a few weeks some of us are coming to Washington to see if the will is still
alive … in this nation … Yes, we are going to bring the tired, the poor, the
huddled masses … We are going to bring those who have come to feel that life is
a long and desolate corridor with no exit signs. We are going to bring the
children and adults and old people who have never seen a doctor or dentist…
We are not coming to engage in any historic gesture. We are not coming to tear
up Washington … We are coming to ask America to be true to the huge
promissory note that it signed years ago…
We are coming … to engage in dramatic nonviolent action, to call attention to
the gulf between the promise and fulfillment; to make the invisible visible. (as
cited in Smiley & Ritz, 2014, pp. 226-227)

We are coming
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